Lessons from History:Journalism and the Japan- US-China Triple
Relationships
Restructing the U.S.-Japan Security Relations:Tokyo Conference
Okazaki Institute/:Pacific Forum CSIS
Sponsored:The U.S.-Japan Foundation/The Japan Foundation/The Yomiuri
Shinbun
January 11-13, 1997
Radm. Dr. Yoichi Hirama(Ret.) Professor of Naval History
Department of Maritime Defense Sciences National Defense
Academy
Introduction
The attitude of China, destined to be the pre-eminent power
in Asia in the 21st century, holds the key to the stability of East Asia
Japan and the United States can influence the China's course of action,
and a strong alliance between the two is regarded as critically important
for the peace prosperity of the Asian-Pacific region and on. In November
1996 president Bill Clinton re-emphasized the importance of the US-Japan
alliance in a speech to the Australian Parliament in which he said: The
alliance between the United States and Japan, a democratic country that
has achieved economic prosperity, is one of the greatest undertakings of
the postwar period. This spring, Prime Minister Hashimoto and I signed
a Joint Declaration of US Japan Security. The military presence of the
United States and Japan's continued support in deepening the defense partnership
between the two countries will further contribute to the peace and stability
of the Asian and Pacific region.
However, in the American media articles criticizing Japan
have increased almost in proportion to America's increasing interest in
China. And following the Hashirnoto-Clinton Joint Declaration China's claims
on Japan for Japanese war criminals escalated. Recent past criticism of
Japan has changed from the simple "Japan is alien" to issues
of racial discrimination by the United States. Today, however, criticism
against Japan in the United States is focusing on issues, posed by China
and pro-China lobby, of Japan’s responsibilities for wars, including the
the Nanking Incident and the use of "comfort women" (the mainly
Korean women to provide sex for Japanese soldiers in military brothels
during World War II.1 This paper aims to analyze anti-Japanese in the United
States from an historic point of view, identify the mechanisms that led
to the formation of such opinions, and seek lessons that are relevant for
the present time.
1. US-Japan Crisis and Reasons
(1) United States and Japan in crisis 1910 - 19202
The first US-Japan crisis in which anti-Japanism played
a role was systematically played up in newspapers owned by newspaper magnate
William Randolph Hearst, and in Cosmopolitan, the magazine. The issues
were a segregation order against Japanese schoolboys issued by the City
of San Francisco in October 1906 after the end of the Russo-Japanese War
an the Alien Land Law of California proposed by the State of California
in 1913. Hearst urged the reinforcement of naval power by sending Congressman
Richmond P. Hobson, a Captain in the reserves and a hero of the Santiago
Blockade all over the United States advocating anti-Japanism and Japanophobia.
Between 1915 and 1920, Banzai by F.H. Gautof, The Battle for tbe Pacific
by Rowan Stevens, and The Valor of Ignorance by Homer Lea were published,
with the latter attracting the most attention. In the Valor of Ignorance
in which Lea wrote about the Japanese race, he claimed that there were
no social, racial and cultural factors that could cut through the confrontation
between the United States and Japan, and that the problems between the
two were divided along the axis of race. He wrote: “Racially, there exists
no relationship between the people of Japan and of the United States. And
the perverse reluctance of man to forget his own tribal gods and fetishes
postpones to such a remote time the assimilation of these two nations that
it cannot now be considered."
He went on: “"Japan is militarily supreme in the
Pacific and industrially the controlling factor in Asia. And in due course
with the mastery of the major portion of the undeveloped wealth of the
earth, Asiatic militancy and industrialism shall reign supreme in this
world and the Mikado shall become the Mikado of kings." He stressed
the necessity of a military buildup, pointing out the military weakness
of the United States and stating that if a war broke out Japan could dispatch
200,000 troops within four weeks, 500,000 within four months, and more
than one million within 10 months. The invasion would start from Hawaii
and the Philippines and occupy all states east of the Rocky Mountains,
including Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and Califomia.3
When the Segregated Education Order was issued, Japanese
newspapers quoted radical speeches made at anti-American protest meetings
United States. Then the Zimmermann Incident occurred, in which Arthur von
Zimmermann, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, sent a telegram to
the German ambassador to Mexico ordering him to negotiate with the Mexican
government, then with the Japanese ambassador to Mexico. This leaked telegram
deepened America's suspicion and distrust of Japan.7
(2) United States and Japan in crisis in the 1920s 8
With the end of World War I and the removal of Germany
as the common enemy of Japan and the United States, the anti-Japanese movement
revived and Hearst-influenced newspapers reported that Japan was a maniac
for domination of the world" and a "threat to crvilization "
Anti-Japanism changed from agitation for the exclusion of Japanese to outright
Japanophobia. This anti-Japanism was based on the “Yellow Peril"
sentiment utilized by Germany to divide Japan and Britain during the war.
It was also played up by those who desired a military buildup to check
the advances Japan had made into China during World War I and to curb the
reduction in their own arms that accompanied the end of the war. In April
1924, the Japanese Emigrants Prohibition Bill was approved. Because this
bill was approved immediately after the conclusion of the Washington Treaty,
the impact on Japan was great and anti-American protests spread nationwide.
This movement started with an anti-American national rally in Tokyo sponsored
by Ryohei Uchida on April 20, 1924.
On June 5, 80,000 people part~'cipated in a protest meeting
sponsored by the Kokuryukai and held at Kokugikan. The radi'cal sentiments
expressed at this meeting included "war with the United States is
Japan's inevitable fate," "Japan should organize a great volunteer
army to lead the colored races," and "Japan should fight even
if defeat Is mewtable " This movement later grew and various incide
nts occurre d s uch as an intrusion by right-wing ze alots into a dance
party at the Imperial HoteL dock workers' refusal to load or unload American
cargoes in Yokohama, boycotts of American films, a movement to stop subsidies
to American-afffliated schools, a protest hara-kixi in front of the American
Embassy, theft of a nati'onal flag from the American Embassy, and an assault
on the American consul at Yokohama. The fever began to calm from July I
when the government showed a calm response to the incidents However, Japan's
nati'onal humiliation was one factor later in encouraging Japan to leave
the Washington System and venture into the Pacific War.
(3) United States and Japan in crisis in the 1930s (9)
The next US~iapan crisis broke out in 1932. This started
with the Manchurian Incident and reached a peak with the Shanghai Incident.
Expressing the United States' Non-Recogniti'on Doctrine, US Secretary of
State Henry L. Stimson declared in January 1932 that "the United States
cannot support anylhing that violates the tradi'tional policies of the
United States and her present treati'es and agreements." America's
threatening atti'tude, underlain by the fact that the Atlanti'c Fleet remained
on the West Coast after the completion of maneuvers, combined with excessive
sympathy toward China and criticism against Japan in the American media
to stimulate Japanese public opinion already oversensiti've in the wake
of the Manchurian Incident, and a crisis broke out.
This crisis was inflamed by the newspaper secti'on of the
Ministfy of War and secti'ons of the right wing movement, by Toslu'o Shirator~
Chi'ef of the Information Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Afiiairs, and by
Kaku Mori, Vice Secretary-General of the Seiyukai These parties sought
to maintain nati'onal tension until they had acquired a large budget for
the army and settled the Manchurian Incident. In the 1930s, however, against
a background of intensified confrontati'on with the United States centering
on the Chinese market, the United States became to be seen as a deadly
enemy in Japan. The image ofAmerica as an inevitable enemy was based on
the idea that America's expansion west since the founding of the country
had finally crossed the Pacific Ocean and reached Asia, resulting in oppression
of the Asian peoples.
However, this was right after the United States had experienced
the Great Depression. In addi'tion, the Japanese people were infiuenced
by several books including SOSAJne~ica by Takeshi Kinwra, and IZle F~l
sto~y of De~:aded Ameriica by Kazuo Yamauchi These helped change public
opinion from a convicti'on of certain defeat in any war against her as
expressed in lhi's Battle by Hironori Mizuno in 1914, to confidence in
Japan's invincibih'ty in a war with the United States. This confidence,
wlu'ch underestimated the real power of the United States, was bolstered
by books like 11le US Un wortby ofFear by Tadahiko lkezaki and A Forecast
of tbe hltulle of tbe Japaa-US Wal:.' A Nove] by Kyosnke Fukunaga CThnode,"
the magazine). These established an image of the TUnited States as a huge
but "spintless countr3/' and a "country in trouble."
This underestimation of the United States and repeated racial discrirnination
produced a feeling among the Japanese that a war between Japan and America
was unavoidable and helped lead Japan into the Pacific War. 2. Analysis
ofAnti-Americanism and Anti-Japanism The reasons why antiJapanism appeared
in the United States were varied, as described above. Internati'onal relati'ons
or the "enviroument of the times" played a strong background
role Moreover this antiJ: ' ･ , apamsm was amplified by third oountu'es
seeking internati'onal advant~ge by promoting the 'Yellow Peril" and
utilizing antiJapanism or Japanophobia. In additi'on, the indus trial world
and th mili e tary authorities, wlu'ch would benefit by boosting arms in
their own countries, and newspapers, which sought to boost circulation,
fanned the flames. This paper will consider the China factor (based on
its philosophy "to control foreign countries by making the most of
foreign countries") in relati'on to USJapan cnses.
(1) Military buildup and the Chinese market
Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan advocated the following view of sea
power: "An increase in sea power necessitates overseas markets and
marine transportati'on develops to link products with markets. However,
since international laws are not universally observed, a navy is necessary
to protect marine transportati'on, trade, and the markets. The country
that controls the ocean controls the world's wealth and history. Sea power
brings prosperity and wealth to a counby."(lo) In 1910 Mahan wrote
an article entitled 'The Open Door Poli'cy," in whi'ch he pointed
out the necessity of reinforcing naval armaments by connecting se~a power
and the Chinese market･ "As l . ong as the tension in Europe continues,
England and Germany cannot spare large troop strengths to the Pacffic.
Therefore, the countri'es responsible for the balance of power in the Pacific
are the United States and Japan alone. Japan has advantage in trade because
of its locati'on close to China and Manchuria, and Japan is pursuing this
advantage... It is clear that the purpose of the Japan-Russo Cooperati've
Agreement concluded recently is to oppose the suggested neutralizati'on
of the Manchurian Railways sub mitte d by Secretary of State Philander
C Knox."(n)
Mahan's ideas on sea power were supported by politi'cians
like Henry C. Lodge, an enthusiastic supporter of the navy who became a
chairman of the di'plomati'c committee and greatly contributed to the establishment
of the Japanese Emigrants Prohr'bition Bill in 1924, and Senator John
T. Morgan. Mahan ako enjoyed support from other influential figures like
Albert Show, chief editbr of the magazine lieview oflieviews, and Charles
A Dana, chief edi'tor of the New York San.(12) With the support of such
opinion leaders, the 'The Open Door Poh'c~' became a '~)ible of American
di' plomacy."(13)
Moreover, the start of World War I and the Japanese navy's
occupation of the South Sea Islands reinforced the perceived threat of
Japan, whose 2 1 demands on China fhrther soured Alnerican sentiment toward
Japan. These demands triggered sympathy in the United States, always ready
tc support the underdog, for China. Anti-Japanese feeling grew and racist
and pro-Chinese demands for the exclusion of Japanese intensified. Supporters
of a US military buildup took advantage of this sentiment. After China
accepted the Turenty-One Demands, Philander C. Knox, the former secretary
of state, stated that "Japan s acti~ons toward China strengthened
Americans' awareness of the necessity of armament," and newspapers
argued that if the United States neglected its nati'onal defense, it would
become a second China.(14)
When the Japanese cruiser Asama was stranded in the Magdarena
Bay in Mexico while pursuing the German Far Eastern Squadron upon the request
of Britain, Thomas F. Minard, a scholar capitalizing on antiJapanism,linked
the requirements of the Turenty-One Demands to a US naval buildup, pointing
out that the "strandin~' occurred .during negotiati'ons on the Turenty-One
Demands. He beh'eved that Japan intentionally stranded Asama in the Magdarena
Bay, ideally located for controlling the Panama Canal, to prevent the United
States from interfering in the Tarenty-One Demands, and to exert pressure
on the United States by tying up seven or eight warslu'ps for salvage operati'ons.
Since the United States did not have the naval power to stand up to Japan
at the time, it could not take the tough atu'tude that could have saved
China. This was the interpretation placed on the stranding by the North
Amelican Bevdow, a high-quality magazine with a well-established reputation.(15)
(2) The Mirage of the Chinese market
Expanding trade with China, seen as a huge market, was a consistent
goal of the United States. Indeed, one of the purposes of Commodore Perry's
expedi'tion to Japan in the mid 19th century was to expand trade with China.Pressing
west was also an ambiti'on of the US ,navy and was in accordance with Mahan's
ideas on sea power. On the other hand, Japan, wln'ch had the greatest vested
interest in China, had resisted the American ("westward ho!")
push to protect its own interests. That is, Japan and the United States
had been in competi'tion for the Chinese market since the time of Commodore
Perry. The only measures taken by the United States, wlu'ch was late in
discovering the Chinese market, were either imperialisti'c acti'on like
the West European countu'es, alliances with West Europe such as Japan had
concluded (the AngloJapanese Aniance), or non-politi'cal measures such
as advocating the principles of an "open door and equal opportunit~/'
for all nati'ons. Since the policies pursued by the United States were
capitalisti'c, however, the United States became entangled in the comph'cated
intemational politi'cs of China, and confrontation between the United States
and Japan deepened.
But did the Chinese market, access to whi'ch had been a long-cherished
US desire since the time of John Hay, li've up to US expectations? Did
Alnerica's investment in the Chinese market and trade with China materially
profit the United States? Japan and the United States, parti'cularly the
latter, used diplomacy backed by abundant dollars, convinced of a bright
future in China. From 1920 through 1940, US investment in China oontinued
to surpass Japanese investment in that counby, with total US investment
rhore than three times Japan's. However, the US volume of trade with China
was only a half to one third of Japan's trade volume with China. History
teaches that US investment in and trade with China was nothing but a mirage
(see the table below), and that competi'tion between Japan and the United
States over the Chinese market brought no profits and only deepened the
confrontati'on between the two countries. 88
(3) Chinese di'plomacy (Controling foreign countn'es by utilizing foreign
countri'es)
In the background to the worsening of US-Japan tensions
and the confli'ct between the United States and Japan were the maneuverings
of a third country determined to gain profit by ah'enating the two. Germany,
whi'ch belatedly began competing for colonies, calculated that if Russia
turned its eyes to the Orient, not only would there be confrontation between
Britain and Russia, but Russian advancement into the Balkans or the Middle
and Near Eas t would be checked. In 1895 when the S~noJ~2p~ne~:~ W~r w:~s
cJos~ lo Asia would eventually Ime up behind Japan, and Europe would be
invaded by a united 'Yellow PeriL" Wilhelm 11 commissioned artist
H. Knackfuss to paint a picture depicting the 'Yellow Penl", and presented
the picture to Nikolai II, the Emperor of Russia with the advice that the
Christian countu'es should rise against "the pagan Oriental races."(18)
This resulted in the Th'ple Interventi'on of Germany, France
and Russia against Japan after the Sino-Japanese War. 'Yellow Peril"
fever was disseminated in the United States after being endorsed by Germany,
France and Russia whi'ch exerclsed the ri'ple Interventi'on When the Segregated
Schoolboys Educati'on Order was declared in 1904, German correspondents
in Washington and London exaggerated events in the United States in their
reports home to German newspapers. For example, they reported that Anibassador
Shuzo Aoki had sent an ultimatum-like document to the US government in
protest at the schoolboys problem in California.(19) The following month,
November 1906, Ie Matiz2 of Paris reported under the headline 'War in the
Pacific" that Japan would soon declare war against the United States
and launch an invasion reaching the West Coast of the US mainland, starting
from the Phili'ppines. Almost simultaneously, the Bout:se Ga216tte of Petersburg
reported that Japan would declare war before the United States completed
its naval expansion plan and the Panama Canal was opened.(20)
Thus provocati'on by Germany seekng to advance its own
ends was closely related to the antiJapanism propagated from 1910 through
the 1920s. On the other hand, the antiJapanism in the 1930s was amplified
by Russian scheming utilizing the Comintern and by China's unique approach
of "controlling foreign countn'es by utilizing foreign countn'es."
This caused mutual hatred in easily persuadable people in both the United
States and Japan, ah'enated both countries, and led them to the Pacific
War. Owen Lattimore, who was in the forefront of the anti~iapanism of the
1930s, became so acti've as to win the epithet "the leader of anti~iapanism."
Lattimore was cln'ef editor of Pad~icA~~~:s, an organ of the Insti'tute
of Pacific Relations founded by the YMCA and was also editor of the pro-Communist
Amerasja founded to support China against Japanese invasion. Lattimore
enjoyed very close relatl'ons with the Chinese Communist Party.(21)
Viadimir I. Lenin beh'eved that if colonies and colonizers
could be separated, a revoluti'on would break out in Europe, severing the
profits from colonies, and advocated urging colonies to launch independence
movements. This combined with China's strong nati'onalism tc develop into
Chinese-style
communism under Mao Ze-dong, and into an anti~lapanese movement. From the
1930s to 1940s many Americans including Lattimore supported the Chinese
Communist Party, beh'eving wrongly that it was an advanced agrarian reform
or agrarian democrati'c movement in contrast to the Soviet-style communist
party. They also saw the anti~lapanese movelnent as a racial 90 independence
movement.
One of the most important historical lessons of USJapan
relati'ons is the 'mirror effecf' -- a tendency to escalate criti'cism
by repeating mutual overreactions of those criticisms because of poor understanding
between the two countries. The United States and Japan share a history
of almost coming to blows because of mutual misunderstanding. In additi'on,
China heightened the hostile sentilnent between the United States and Japan
through skillful diplomatic strategies and the utilization of public opinion
based on the ideas expressed in SLln Tsu, 17leArt of Wal:,(22) such as
"to win 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill; to
subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." Sun Teu also
said, "what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's
strategy; next best is to disrupt his alliances; and the next best is to
attack his army. The worst policy is to attack citi'es. Attack citi'es
only when there is no alternati've."
Conclusion
Finally, even in the 1930s when anti-Japanism prevailed,
some intellectuals, sensible journalists, and people in financial and religious
circles understood the internal condi'ti'ons of China and regarded Japan
as "the only stable power in the Far East able to keep peace in Asia."
In 1935 one of these,Van A MacMurray, American Ainbassador to China submitted
" IZze Developments A~~ectiag Acaerican Poh'cyh the Far East to the
Department of State." However, his opinions were shelved by Stanley
K Hornbeck, who was in charge of the Far East poh'cy and an anti'Japanese
hawk Currently the United States is highly interested in the Chinese market
and China is being excessively nati:onalisti'c. I would like to conclude
by introducing MadMurray's memorandum, which looks back over Japan's entry
into the War, and contains suggesti'ons that may be extremely useful in
considering future relati'ons between the United States and Japan.(23)
MacMurray states that the Washington System was torpedoed
not by Japan, but by China and the great powers of the West led by the
United States. He says that China weakened the Washington System because
domesti'c elements used nationalism as a domesti'c and foreign poli'cy
plank on wlu'ch to extend their own influence. Although the United States
did not have 91The United States as a huge but "spintless countr3/'
and a "country in trouble." This underestimation of the United
States and repeated racial discrirnination produced a feeling among the
Japanese that a war between Japan and America was unavoidable and helped
lead Japan into the Pacific War.
2. Analysis ofAnti-Americanism and Anti-Japanism
The reasons why antiJapanism appeared in the United States
were varied, as described above. Internati'onal relati'ons or the "enviroument
of the times" played a strong background role Moreover this antiJapamsm
was amplified by third oountu'es seeking internati'onal advant~ge by promoting
the 'Yellow Peril" and utilizing antiJapanism or Japanophobia. In
additi'on, the indus trial world and th mili e tary authorities, wlu'ch
would benefit by boosting arms in their own countries, and newspapers,
which sought to boost circulation, fanned the flames. This paper will consider
the China factor (based on its philosophy "to control foreign countries
by making the most of foreign countries") in relati'on to USJapan
cnses.
(1) Military buildup and the Chinese market
Rear Admiral AVied Thayer Mahan advocated the following view
of sea power: "An increase in sea power necessitates overseas markets
and marine transportati'on develops to link products with markets. However,
since international laws are not universally observed, a navy is necessary
to protect marine transportati'on, trade, and the markets. The country
that controls the ocean controls the world's wealth and history. Sea power
brings prosperity and wealth to a counby."(lo) In 1910 Mahan wrote
an article entitled 'The Open Door Poli'cy," in whi'ch he pointed
out the necessity of reinforcing naval armaments by connecting se~a power
and the Chinese market･ "As l ong as the tension in Europe continues,
England and Germany cannot spare large troop strengths to the Pacffic.
Therefore, the countri'es responsible for the balance of power in the Pacific
are the United States and Japan alone. Japan has advantage in trade because
of its locati'on close to China and Manchuria, and Japan is pursuing this
advantage... It is clear that the purpose of the Japan-Russo Cooperati've
Agreement concluded recently is to oppose the suggested neutralizati'on
of the Manchurian Railways sub mitte d by Secretary of State 8e
Philander C Knox."(n) Mahan's ideas on sea power were
supported by politi'cians like Henry C. Lodge, an enthusiastic supporter
of the navy who became a chairman of the di'plomati'c committee and greatly
contributed to the establishment of the Japanese Emigrants Prohr'bition
Bill in 1924, and Senator John T. Morgan. Mahan ako enjoyed support from
other influential figures like Albert Show, chief editbr of the magazine
lieview oflieviews, and Charles A Dana, chief edi'tor of the New York San.(12)
With the support of such opinion leaders, the 'The Open Door Poh'c~' became
a '~)ible of Americandi' plomacy."(13)
Moreover, the start of World War I and the Japanese navy's
occupation of the South Sea Islands reinforced the perceived threat of
Japan, whose 2 1 demands on China fhrther soured Alnerican sentiment toward
Japan. These demands triggered sympathy in the United States, always ready
tc support the underdog, for China. Anti-Japanese feeling grew and racist
and pro-Chinese demands for the exclusion of Japanese intensified. Supporters
of a US military buildup took advantage of this sentiment. After China
accepted the Turenty-One Demands, Philander C. Knox, the former secretary
of state, stated that "Japan s acti~ons toward China strengthened
Americans' awareness of the necessity of armament," and newspapers
argued that if the United States neglected its nati'onal defense, it would
become a second China.(14)
When the Japanese cruiser Asama was stranded in the Magdarena
Bay in Mexico while pursuing the German Far Eastern Squadron upon the request
of Britain, Thomas F. Minard, a scholar capitalizing on antiJapanism,linked
the requirements of the Turenty-One Demands to a US naval buildup, pointing
out that the "strandin~' occurred .during negotiati'ons on the Turenty-One
Demands. He beh'eved that Japan intentionally stranded Asama in the Magdarena
Bay, ideally located for controlling the Panama Canal, to prevent the United
States from interfering in the Tarenty-One Demands, and to exert pressure
on the United States by tying up seven or eight warslu'ps for salvage operati'ons.
Since the United States did not have the naval power to stand up to Japan
at the time, it could not take the tough atu'tude that could have saved
China. This was the interpretation placed on the stranding by the North
Amelican Bevdow, a high-quality magazine with a well-established reputation.(15)
87
2) The Mirage of the Chinese market
Expanding trade with China, seen as a huge market, was a
consistent goal of the United States. Indeed, one of the purposes of Commodore
Perry's expedi'tion to Japan in the mid 19th century was to expand trade
with China. Pressing west was also an ambiti'on of the US ,navy and was
in accordance with Mahan's ideas on sea power. On the other hand, Japan,
wln'ch had the greatest vested interest in China, had resisted the American
("westward ho!") push to protect its own interests. That is,
Japan and the United States had been in competi'tion for the Chinese market
since the time of Commodore Perry. The only measures taken by the United
States, wlu'ch was late in discovering the Chinese market, were either
imperialisti'c acti'on like the West European countu'es, alliances with
West Europe such as Japan had concluded (the AngloJapanese Aniance), or
non-politi'cal measures such as advocating the principles of an "open
door and equal opportunit~/' for all nati'ons. Since the policies pursued
by the United States were capitalisti'c, however, the United States became
entangled in the comph'cated intemational politi'cs of China, and confrontation
between the United States and Japan deepened.
But did the Chinese market, access to whi'ch had been a
long-cherished US desire since the time of John Hay, li've up to US expectations?
Did Alnerica's investment in the Chinese market and trade with China materially
profit the United States? Japan and the United States, parti'cularly the
latter, used diplomacy backed by abundant dollars, convinced of a bright
future in China. From 1920 through 1940, US investment in China oontinued
to surpass Japanese investment in that counby, with total US investment
rhore than three times Japan's. However, the US volume of trade with China
was only a half to one third of Japan's trade volume with China. History
teaches that US investment in and trade with China was nothing but a mirage
(see the table below), and that competi'tion between Japan and the United
States over the Chinese market brought no profits and only deepened the
confrontati'on between the two countries. 88
US Investment in Japan and China(16)
(Unit: $1,000)
Country 1930 1936 1 940
China 129.768 90. 593 46. 136
Japan 61.450 46.694 37.671
Year 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1941
Export
Japan 22 41 378 230 165 203 227 60
China 16 16 1 46 94 90 38 78 95
Im port
Ja pan 66 99 415 384 279 153 158 78
C hina ' 30 40 193 169 101 64 93 87
Amount of US trade with Japan and China(1~
(Unit: $1 million)
(3) Chinese di'plomacy ("controlhrLg foreign countn'es by utilizing
foreign countri'es') and the United States
In the background to the worsening of US-Japan tensions and the confli'ct
between the United States and Japan were the maneuverings of a third country
determined to gain profit by ah'enating the two. Germany, whi'ch belatedly
began competing for colonies, calculated that if Russia turned its eyes
to the Orient, not only would there be confrontation between Britain and Russia,
but Russian advancement into the Balkans or the Middle and Near Eas t would
be checked. In 1 895 when the S~noJ~2p~ne~:~ W~r w:~s cJos~ lo Asia would
eventually Ime up behind Japan, and Europe would be invaded by a united
'Yellow PeriL" Wilhelm 11 commissioned artist H. Knackfuss to paint
a picture depicting the 'Yellow Penl", and presented the picture to
Nikolai II , the Emperor of Russia with the advice that the Christian countu'es
should rise against "the pagan Oriental races."(18) This resulted
in the Th'ple Interventi'on of Germany, France and Russia against Japan
after the Sino-Japanese War. 'Yellow Peril" fever was disseminated
in the United States after being endorsed by Germany, France and Russia
whi'ch exerclsed the ri'ple Interventi'on. When the Segregated Schoolboys
Educati'on Order was declared in 1904,
German correspondents in Washington and London exaggerated
events in the United States in their reports home to German newspapers.
For example,they reported that Anibassador Shuzo Aoki had sent an ultimatum-like
document to the US government in protest at the schoolboys problem in California.(19)
The following month, November 1906, Ie Matiz2 of Paris reported under the
headline 'War in the Pacific" that Japan would soon declare war against
the United States and launch an invasion reaching the West Coast of the
US mainland, starting from the Phili'ppines. Almost simultaneously, the
Bout:se Ga216tte of Petersburg reported that Japan would declare war before
the United States completed its naval expansion plan and the Panama Canal
was opened.(20)
Thus provocati'on by Germany seekng to advance its own ends
was closely related to the antiJapanism propagated from 1910 through the
1920s. On the other hand, the antiJapanism in the 1930s was amplified by
Russian scheming utilizing the Comintern and by China's unique approach
of "controlling foreign countn'es by utilizing foreign countn'es."
This caused mutual hatred in easily persuadable people in both the United
States and Japan, ah'enated both countries, and led them to the Pacific
War. Owen Lattimore, who was in the forefront of the anti~iapanism of the
1930s, became so acti've as to win the epithet "the leader of anti~iapanism."
Lattimore was cln'ef editor of Pad~icA~~~:s, an organ of the Insti'tute
of Pacific Relations founded by the YMCA and was also editor of the pro-Communist
Amerasja founded to support China against Japanese invasion. Lattimore
enjoyed very close relatl'ons with the Chinese Communist Party.(21)
Viadimir I. Lenin beh'eved that if colonies and colonizers
could be separated, a revoluti'on would break out in Europe, severing the
profits from colonies, and advocated urging colonies to launch independence
movements. This combined with China's strong nati'onalism tc develop into
Chinese-style
communism under Mao Ze-dong, and into an anti~lapanese movement. From the
1930s to 1940s many Americans including Lattimore supported the Chinese
Communist Party, beh'eving wrongly that it was an advanced agrarian reform
or agrarian democrati'c movement in contrast to the Soviet-style communist
party. They also saw the anti~lapanese movelnent as a racial 90
independence movement.One of the most important historical lessons of USJapan
relati'ons is the 'mirror effecf' -- a tendency to escalate criti'cism
by repeating mutual overreactions of those criticisms because of poor understanding
between the two countries. The United States and Japan share a history
of almost coming to blows because of mutual misunderstanding. In additi'on,
China heightened the hostile sentilnent between the United States and Japan
through skillful diplomatic strategies and the utilization of public opinion
based on the ideas expressed in SLln Tsu, 17leArt of Wal:,(22) such as
"to win 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill; to
subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." Sun Teu
also said, "what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the
enemy's strategy; next best is to disrupt his alliances; and the next best
is to attack his army. The worst policy is to attack citi'es. Attack citi'es
only when there is no alternati've."
Conclusion
Finally, even in the 1930s when antiJapanism prevailed,
some intellectuals, sensible journalists, and people in financial and religi'ous
circles understood the internal condi'ti'ons of China and regarded Japan
as "the only stable power in the Far East able to keep peace in Asia."
In 1935 one of these,Van A MacMurray, American Ainbassador to China submitted
" IZze Developments A~~ectiag Acaerican Poh'cyh the Far East to
the Department of State." However, his opinions were shelved by Stanley
K Hornbeck, who was in charge of the Far East poh'cy and an anti'Japanese
hawk Currently the United States is highly interested in the Chinese market
and China is being excessively nati:onalisti'c. I would like to conclude
by introducing MadMurray's memorandum, which looks back over Japan's entry
into the War, and contains suggesti'ons that may be extremely useful in
considering future relati'ons between the United States and Japan.(23)
MacMurray states that the Washington System was torpedoed
not by Japan, but by China and the great powers of the West led by the
United States. He says that China weakened the Washington System because
domesti'c elements used nationalism as a domesti'c and foreign poli'cy
plank on wlu'ch to extend their own influence. Although the United States
did not have 91 critical interests in China, it let the Washington System
collapse by its consistently ingratiating but ineffective attitude toward
Chinese nati'onalism.Britain, too, considered only the maintenance of its
own interests in China and let the Washington Systeln collapse. But a stable
international society cannot be realized unless all countries observe internati'onal
laws and treaties and implement any modifications by fiked procedures,
MacMurray points out. In seeking to recover own customs rights abolish
th , e extratenitorial rights of another country, or retain territory,
internati'onal laws or treaties cannot be sacrificed on the altar of nati'onalism
no matter what the reason. Since Japan had criti'cal interests in China,
it began taking invasive action in response to the collapse of the Washington
System.
Although this could not be supported, it was understandable.
Unless China, the United States, and other Western countri'es observed
international laws and treati'es too, Japan would inevitably be pushed
fhrther and fhrth er into a corner and toward a USJapanese War. Although
Japan would be defeated in a US-Japanese war regardless of how well it
fought, the victorious United States would be embarrassed by a new problem
-- the hostile attitude of the Soviet Union in the Far East -- just what
it didn't intend. US hopes that China became a d emocratic country would
be betrayed, and if the United States which assisted China and defeated
Japan, became the dominator of the F~ East in place of Japan, the hostility
of China, which saw itself in a central position in the world, would be
directed toward the United States. Sooner or later Japan would revive as
one of the strongest powers in the world despite its defeat in the USJapanese
war. 32
Footnotes
:
5 . Takeuchi, Shigetoshi, Sekai ~i'~len Shoui~ Beikloku no Jo~~o CThe US
in the Early Stages of World War F), Senpo Yorokn Cljngering Scent on the
Overcoaf'), I~ilyuroku C1Reminiscenses"), Sekaj T~isen no M~zb (World
War r) (Yiushukai; 1929), p.30. For histcrical changes in public opinion
about Japan, see E. Tupper and G.E. McReynolds, Japan h Amelican hlbh'c
Opiaion (Clark University Press, 1937) .
6. 'The Foreign Press on the GermanJapanese War," a telegram sent
to the 93 Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kato, by Ambassador Chinda (August
14, 1996), The Foreign Diplomacy Archr've.
9. Ibid., pp. 198-227.
10. ALfred Thayer Mahan, IZle hfl:uence ofSea Power upon E~~iory; 1660-1783
(Little Brown, 1890), p.71, 138, Walter La Feber, IZle NewEmp~le -An htexpretati'on
ofAmelican ~oansjon. 1860-1893 (Cornell University Press, 1963), pp.91-93.
1 1 . Asada, Sadao, Aa2enban C]assjcs Libraly 8 - AJ~~ed T M~zhan (Kenkyusha,
1980), pp.277-287.
12. George T. Davis, A Na vy Second to None: IZze Development ofModern
Amelican Naval Pohby(Harcourt Brace, 1940), pp.75-76.
1 3. Howard K Beale, Theodore Boosevelt and Bise of Amelica to Wor]d Power(Colli'er
Books, 1956), p.23.
14. Os~kaAsaijNewspaper(May 10, 1915).
15. Thomas F. Millard, Our Eastem Questibn (Yale University Press, 1916),
p p.278-279.
16. Mira Wilkins, The liole of US Bushess, Edited by Dorothy Borg and Okamoto
, Shumpei, PeaH Hal:bor as H~to~y : Japanese-Ameriican Be]ati'ons 1931-1941
(Columbia University Press, 1973), p.374.
17. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Historical Statisti'cs of the United States
-Colonial Thnes to 1970 (Bureau ofthe CENSUS, 1972), p.903, p.906.
18. For German maneuvers, see Teunoda, Jun, Manshu Mondej to Kokubo Hoshia
CIVlanchurian Problems and Nati'onal Defense Policy") (Hara Shobo,
1967), pp.386-399.
19. See R.A Thompson, The Yellow PeriZ, 1890-1924 (1978) and Hashikawa,
Bunzo, sto~yoftbe YellowPeril(1976).
20. Hata, op.cit., p.67.
2 1 . Nagao, Ryuichi, An2erika no Oh'shi~jin to Kyokuto - La~caore to sono
Jld~j ("American Intellectuak and the Far East - Lattimore and His
Thnes") (The University of Tokyo Press, 1985), pp.7-17. According
to pp.227-228. Lattimore was accused of being (at least a former) communist
94 spy for the USSR by Joseph R. McCarthy on March 30, 1950. This accusati'on
was based on Lattimore's contacts with Russia when he was cln'ef editor
of Pad~icA~~~air:s, and also because of his alleged instigati'on of riots
by pro-Soviet Chinese students, a visit to Yan'an in 1937, his influence
on Warres when he participated in the Warres Mission in 1944, suspicions
about his involvement in the AJnerasja pubh'cation, and his contact with
the leaders of the Japan Communist Payty when he visited Japan in 1945
and 1946.
22. Samuel B. Griffith (translator and editor), Sun l~u. 17ze Art of War
(Oxiord University Press, 1963), Chapter enti'tled Att~ck by Stratagem.
23. Edi'ted with an introducti'on and notes by Arthur Waldron, How tbe
Peace was Lost; IZle Developments A~~ectiag Amenbaa Poh~y h the Far East,
Prepared for the State Department by Ainbassador John Van Antwerp MacMurray
(Hoover Insti'tute Press, 1992). Ub