Japanese naval assistance and
its effect on Australian-Japanese relations
Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895
greatly changed the Australian view of Japan. The military, especially
the Royal Australian Navy, started to examine the Imperial Japanese Navy,
now emerging as a first rank power in the Far East. A naval exercise was
held ~u i 895 with its object being to defend Sydney from a hypothetical
attack by the Japanese Navy.1 Furthermore in 1896, being uneasy over the
increasing power of Japan, the Australian parliament passed resolutions
excluding all coloured races from Australia and urging Australia to abstain
from participating in the treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed between
Great Britain and Japan in 1894.
In December 1902, the Immigration Restriction Act was
passed which virtually prohibited the immigration of coloured peoples by
forcing them to pass dictation tests given in European language, and in
the same year a ”White Australian' policy” became an explicit part of
the platform of the Australian Labour Party.2 After the annihilation of
the Russian Navy in the Russo-Japanese War. Japan began to be Australia
and New Zealand's 'real and only dangerous enemy';3 Despite this perceived
threat to the Commonwealth countries. Britain gave up naval supremacy in
the Far East by revising the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and withdrawing five
battleships and six first class cruisers from the Pacific to secure the
balance of power in home waters. 4
Because of this Australia was forced to depend on Japan’s
naval forces, even though she bad clashed with Japan over racial matters.
Nevertheless,1908 saw the publication of The Australia Crisis by Frank
Fox in which he exaggerated fears of the 'Yellow Peril'.5 At the imperial
conference in 1909,the foundation of the Royal Australian Navy was recognized.
In the following year. the Australian Parliament passed the Naval Defence
Act. In 1911 the battle cruiser Australia was lunched and in 1913 she sailed
from England to Australia accompanied by the light crutser.5 Sydney and
Mefbourne.6 The motivation for this strengthening lay in the growth of
German naval power, while five months before the outbreak of the war.
Winston S. Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty,.
claimed in the British Parliament that 'the navy would defend these regions
(Australia and New Zealand) from Japanese invasion’.7 However, after the
outbreak of the war,England withdrew most of her warships to defend the
home islands and Australia had to rely for security on her potential enemy,
Japan. This paper will consider Japanese naval operations in defence of
Australia and New Zealand and their long term effects.
Japanese naval operation in the defence of Australia and New Zealand Early period: operation against the German Eastern Squadron
Germany had a fortress and a naval base at Tsingtao on
the Shangdong peninsula. In 1902 Japan concluded an alliance with Great
Britain and due to this alliance, Japan declared war against Germany on
23 August 1914.The Japanese Navy deployed the Second Fleet in September
in order to blockade the port of Tsingtao and bombard the fortress. Tsingtao
was captured in December with a cost of 1,250 dead and wounded. Also the
navy lost one cruiser, the Takachiho, and 280 crew members including the
commanding officer, in blockade operations.8
In the early stages of the war, the most important Japanese
Navy operation was the pursuit of the German Far Eastern Squadron (Spee
Squadron),which comprised the cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and light
cruisers Nurnberg, Leipzig and Emden, commanded by Vice Admiral Maxmilian
von Spee, to the Galapagos archipelago. The pursuit operation was conducted
by a force of British, Australian and Canadian warships under the command
of Vice Admiral Sir George Patey, and was supported by the Japanese American
Expeditionary Squadron with the cruisers Izumo and Asama, and the later-added
Hizen under the command of Rear Admiral Moriyama Keizaburo. For a time
after the start of the war, the Allied forces were unable to find the Spee
Squadron, but in early September 1914, it attacked the British on Fanning
Island and destroyed the wireless station there. On 14 September, the Emden
appeared in the Bay of Bengal, where she sank five merchant ships and
captured a sixth by 19 September. Furthermore, on 22 September she bombarded
Madras and on 27 September she attacked Penag and sank the Russian cruiser
Zhemchug. While in the Pacific, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau attacked
Tahiti on 22 September, and sank the French gunboat the Zelee.9
These intensive German naval activities caused so much
concern in New Zealand that the populace came to oppose the dispatch of
the ANZAC expeditionary forces, which were about to sail without escort
for Europe.10 The British Admiralty thus requested escort ships for the
ANZAC convoy.11 The Japanese Navy ordered the cruiser Chikuma to proceed
to the Indian Ocean, and the Ibuki to Australia. The Ibuki sailed for New
Zealand by way of Fremantle where she received a very enthusiastic welcome
from the people who had feared that the Spee Squadron would attack their
The commanding officer of the Ibuki, Captain Kato Kanji
(later Admiral, Chief of the Naval General Staff), sent a report and commented
that ‘there was a great city wide welcome which reached ecstatic proportions
and the former fear of Japan was swept away to be replaced with an obvious
genuine trust’.12 From Fremantle, the Ibuki, together with the Minotaur,
sailed to Wellington and from there crossed the Tasman Sea with ten transports
carrying the New Zealand ANZAC troops. A further twenty-eight troop ships
were collected from various Australian ports and the entire convoy that
set out for Europe numbered thirty-eight ships. Escort ships were the battle
cruisers Ibuki and Minotaur, and light cruisers Sydney and Melbourne. However
during the voyage to Aden, the Australian escorts were deployed elsewhere
and in the end only the Ibuki remained. The battle between the Sydney and
Emden occurred during the voyage, but the glory of sinking the Emden went
to the Sydney as Ibuki remained to protect the convoy.13 This was in fact
the first military honour for the Royal Australian Navy, and subsequently
whenever the Japanese Navy’s ships visited Australia and New Zealand,
they celebrated ‘the Samurai Spirit of the Ibuki’,14 as Ibuki made way
for the Sydney to attack.Meanwhile, the Spee Squadron moved to the east
and attacked Tahiti on 22 September, and then continued eastward to the
coast of South America.
It was pursued by the Australia and Japanese-American
Expeditionary Squadron with the cruisers Izumo and Asama. On 19 October,
the battle ship Hizen joined the American Expeditionary Squadron. This
Squadron worked in conjunction with Patey’s Squadron and chased the Spee
Squadron as far as the Galapagos Islands. With the British defeat off the
Coronel coast on 1 November, the American Expeditionary Squadron moved
to encircle the Spee Squadron adding the cruisers Chikuma and Yahagi and
the battle cruiser Ikoma to the First Southern Expeditionary Squadron which
had previously consisted of the battle cruiser Kurama, the cruiser Tsukuba,
and two destroyers. The first Southern Expeditionary Squadron moved to
the Fiji Islands by early December. With the destruction of the Spee Squadron
(only the Dresden managed to escape) off the Falklands on 8 December, the
British Navy left the mopping up of the German naval forces to the Japanese
Navy and withdrew almost all of their naval forces to European waters.
Until the Dresden was sunk in March 1915, the Japanese Navy deployed part
of her American Expeditionary Squadron off the coast of South America and
the Nishin at Fiji to guard the eastern coast of Australia and New Zealand.15
Thus, from December 1914 to January 1915, the light cruisers
Chikugo and Yahagi patrolled the coast off North Queensland. From May to
July, the light cruisers Aso and Soya visited Rabaul and Fremantle. In
the same year, the Japanese ships were attached to the China Squadron controlling
the Malay Archipelago. In February 1915 the Japanese Navy also helped suppress
the Indian soldier’s mutiny at Singapore, sending 158 marines from the
cruisers Otowa and Tushima.16 At the first stage of the war, as the German
Eastern Squadron was in the Pacific and the cruiser Emden was in the Indian
Ocean, Allied marine traffic was maintained by the Japanese Navy. As the
First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill, wrote in his memoirs, ‘warships
flying the Japanese flag committed themselves to escorts for most of the
transportation in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean’.17
Later period: operation against the commerce raiders
With the elimination of the Spee Squadron, the Third
Squadron, stationed at Singapore after the request of British Admiralty,
was given the task of watching forty or so German merchant ships that could
be converted into commercial raiders, which were lurking in the ports of
the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies and other neutral countries.
In March 1916 reports were received that German merchant ships in neutral
countries were armed to act as surface commerce raiders. At Britain’s
request the Japanese Navy sent cruisers to defend the shipping lanes between
Australia and Aden and destroyers to guard the Straits of Malacca. On receiving
this request the Japanese Navy enlarged the operational area of the Sixth
Squadron, which was commanded by Rear Admiral Nomaguchi Tadashiro and
composed the cruisers Niitaka, Tone, Tushima and Akashi. The Tone and Tsushima
were dispatched to the Indian Ocean while four destroyers were sent to
Singapore to reinforce the patrol of the Straits of Malacca.18
In 1917, the Japanese Navy’s mission and activities
were increased due to German unrestricted submarine warfare and commercial
raider operations.In January 1917, the British Admiralty requested that
a flotilla of Japanese destroyers be deployed to the Mediterranean and
two cruisers sent to the Cape of Good Hope.19 In response to this request
on 7 February the Japanese Navy formed the First Special Squadron which
composed the cruisers Yahagi, Tsushima, Suma and Niitaka, together with
the Second Destroyer Flotilla. This squadron was based at Singapore and
commanded by Rear Admiral Oguri Kozaburo. The British Admiralty requested
that the Tsushima and the Niitaka be sent to the Cape of Good Hope, and
preparations were made for their deployment. However, on 11 March the raider
Wolf entered the Indian Ocean and the British Admiralty changed its request,
and the Tsushima and Niitaka remained in the Indian Ocean.
Furthermore four cruisers or four battleships were
requested for the Indian Ocean to protect Allied transports running between
Australia and Colombo.20 On 26 March, the British Admiralty further requested
the deployment of the Chikuma and Hirado to Australia and New Zealand to
protect against the German raiding operations. The Yahagi and Suma were
ordered to the Indian Ocean to continue cooperation with the British China
Squadron, and the Tsushima and Niitaka proceeded to Mauritius.21
In response to this request, the Japanese Navy added
the Kasuga and Nishin to the First Special Squadron, and re-formed the
Third Special.Squadron on 14 April and deployed it to Australia. It comprised
the cruisers hikuma and Hirado and was commanded by Rear Admiral Yamaji
Kazuyoshi. Its task was to defend the eastern coast of Australia and New
Zealand.22 These cruisers escorted the British merchant ships carrying
Chinese labourers from China to Europe, and Vietnamese workers from Vietnam
to France from March to May. The light cruisers Izumo, Kasuga and Nisshin
escorted sixteen cargo ships from Fremantle to Colombo between April and
May. The light cruisers Hirado and Chikugo deployed to Australia, and the
Yahagi patrolled the eastern coasts of Australia and New Zealand from May
to October.23 The Third Squadron was stationed at Sydney from mid-May to
December 1917. In July they rescued the SS Cumberland and in August and
September, they searched for the missing SS Matunga. From September to
October the Squadron searched for the commerce raider Seeadler.24
With the decrease in the activity of commerce raiders,
after December 1917, the Third Special Squadron was dissolved and the operational
area of the First Special Squadron enlarged to include the east coast of
Australia and New Zealand. Whenever it was thought necessary, one or two
cruisers were sent. Up to October 1918, the First Special Squadron was
responsible for the defence of Australia and New Zealand and of shipping
between Fremantle and Colombo. The Yahagi, the last ship deployed to defend
Australia and New Zealand, sailed from Sydney to Japan on 21 October 1918.
The Chitose, which was to relieve her, reached Singapore on 16 November,
but as the Armistice had been signed on 11 November she returned to Japan.25
Effects of the Japanese Navy with regard to Australian defence
During the war the Japanese Navy deployed a considerable
number of warships in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, but as none took part
in direct action, there were few casualties and little damage. The only
damage incurred was due to the grounding of the Nisshin and the Kasuga,
while causalities included some forty-eight deaths on the Yahagi, from
influenza.26 According to the Australian newspapers, the Japanese Navy
made little contribution to the defence of Australia, its role being limited
to the defence of shipping between Australia and Aden when circumstances
required, to fruitless searches for raiders and the assistance of vessels
in distress. However the German naval history gave a very different account
stating that it was the fear of Japanese naval power combined with a concern
to avoid a provocative clash with Japan which led to the withdrawal of
the Spee Squadron from the Pacific. According to the same work it was the
reconnaissance of the Japanese warships which caused the dispatch of commerce
raiders to the water near Australia to end.27
It also needs to be noted that the participation of Japan
allowed the release of Australian warships for service in Europe. From
early in the war until April 1917, the only Australian warships to remain
in home waters were the cruiser Encounter and three destroyers. But with
the arrival of the Third Squadron in April 1917, three destroyers went
for repairs and were dispatched to the Mediterranean. Furthermore, in the
months of May and June 1917 alone, there were twelve reports of missing
ships and the sightings of strange ships.28 In this period there were usually
one or two cruisers cruising around Australian and New Zealand waters.
Furthermore, the Japanese Navy ignored bad weather when it aided the SS
Cumberland which had hit a mine.29 The psychological impact of the presence
of the Japanese naval ships should not be underestimated as it gave encouragement
to the Australian population at a time when German activity was creating
dismay.The Japanese Navy in fact sent warships to Australian waters ‘more
than was asked of’ by the British Admirality.30
In August 1918, the British Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, Sir Arthur J. Balfour, remarked to the Japanese Red Cross delegation
that: ‘At present England could not get along without the aid of the Japanese
Navy on the sea routes linking Britain to Egypt and Australia.’31 They
not only protected the sea communications between Britain and Australia,
but in the Mediterranean expeditionary forces depended on the Japanese
Navy. From April 1917 to the end of the war, the Japanese Second Squadron,
which was composed of seventeen ships (one cruiser, fourteen destroyers
and two sloops) carried out direct escort duties for Allied forces, including
ANZAC troops. They escorted troop ships 348 times and the total number
of escorted ships reached 788 while the total number of soldiers transported
reached around 700,000. These activities saved 7,075 passengers from damaged
or sinking ships.32
The Japanese destroyers were under way 72 per cent of
the time. The British record was 60 per cent, the Greek and French 45 per
cent. The number of days at sea reached 25?6 days per month and their cruises
averaged 6,000 miles per month. British officers credited the Japanese
warships with excellent performance. The Second Special Squadron escorted
100,000 soldiers from Alexandria to Marseilles between mid-April and mid-June
1918, and also escorted Allied units from Egypt to Salonika at the end
of September. These efforts may well have had a considerable influence
on easing the tense military situation of the Allied armies at the time.33
The following was reported to the Admiralty by Rear-Admiral George A. Ballard,
Commodore of the Malta naval base:We often have conflicts with French and
Italian navies about the policy of operation. French standards of efficiency
are certainly lower than British however, and Italian standards are lower
still. With the Japanese it is otherwise. Admiral Sato’s destroyers are
kept in a highly serviceable condition and spend at least as large a proportion
of their time at sea as our own, which is far from being the case with
the French or Italian vessels of any class. The Japanese moreover are very
independent in all matters of administration and supply whereas the French
will never do anything for themselves if they can get it done for them.
The C-in-C Mediterranean, G.C. Dickens, reported: ‘Rear
Admiral Sato has always placed the Japanese destroyers at my disposal for
escort work and I find that their officers make no difficulties and have
picked up their duties very satisfactorily.’34 During these operations,
Japan paid a price in terms of both money and lives. On 11 June 1917, the
destroyer Sakaki was torpedoed by an Austro-Hungarian submarine, and on
23 June the destroyer Matsu was torpedoed by a German submarine and twenty-two
crew were wounded and fifty-nine killed, including the commanding officer.35
In the Pacific, in October 1917, the Japanese Navy sent one cruiser to
Hawaii to protect the sea lanes in the northern Pacific, and carried out
this mission for one year and eight months. Besides this assistance the
Japanese Navy built and brought 8 destroyers (called Tribal class) to Portside
for the French navy, and the Kure Naval Arsenal produced howitzers and
cannons, rifles, and ammunition for Russia, Britain and France. These productions
reached \9,076 million (this amount was exactly the same as the Japanese
naval budget for the war) and the amount of weapons and munitions produced
by the army and civil factories reached \69,664 million. On British request
the Japanese Navy sent one or two cruisers from Vladivostok to Canada four
different times to carry gold bricks (worth £70 million). But despite
all this, however, in the course of the relationship between Australia
and Japan a variety of frictions and conflicts arose.36
Wartime friction between Australia and Japan Friction arising from Japan
According to The Royal Australian Navy 1914?1917, joint
operations were conducted in an atmosphere of ‘most cordial relations’
and ‘the Japanese admirals were supplied with all necessary information’.37
However, Australian actions led to complaints from the Japanese Navy on
a number of occasions. The Captain of the Minotaur was protested to by
the captain of the Ibuki, Captain Kato Kanji, for not relaying an emergency
message when the Emden was sighted off the Cocos Islands.38 Similarly a
note of protest lodged by them about the captain of the Yahagi reported
that the Australian Navy did not inform the grounded and immobilized German
raider, Seeadler.39 Japanese high-ranking officers also felt that the British
search for the Emden was conducted without any real plan, and Admiral Moriyama
thought that Admiral Patey did not evaluate information, but immediately
and indiscriminately proceeded to the place where sightings were reported.40
Vice Admiral Yamaji reported that while American activities were reported
in the Australian press frequently, Japanese activities were kept as military
secrets. In fact, after Admiral Yamaji’s speech on the Imperial Birthday,
Japanese naval activities around Australia were finally reported on after
protests by Consul General Shimizu Seizaburo to Prime Minister Hughes.
This press article was the first on such a topic to appear
in Australian newspapers. 41 Admiral Yamaji reported to the Naval General
Staff that ‘Prime Minister Hughes must feel that if it became known that
Australia was being defended by Japanese his previous posture towards Japan,
and his “White Australian Policy” would appear as mistaken.’42 There
was a certain feeling of grievance within Japan that Australia had not
revised her policy of racial discrimination nor her anti-Japanese posture.Australia
not only still followed racially discriminatory policies but positively
limited Japanese activities despite a resolution of protest by Japan against
‘Anti-Japanese feeling and the exclusion of the Japanese in Australia
and the southwestern Pacific.’43 Besides these general complaints regarding
Australian attitudes, there was an incident in which undisciplined anti-Japanese
action by Australians led to a sharp protest by the Japanese Navy.
On 20 November 1917, the Yahagi was fired on by a shore
battery when she entered Fremantle. A single round, the shell passed over
the funnel of the Yahagi and fell only 300 metres away. On the following
day, the commander of the Western Australian Naval District, Captain C.J.
Clare, explained that as the Yahagi ‘had not flown the pre-arranged signal
flag the shot was simply a means to warn the pilot’. This was clearly
an inadequate explanation as the Yahag had radioed notice of her arrival
the previous day and when approaching the port the signal station at the
entrance to the harbour had flwn a buoy designation flag on its mast. Admiral
Yamaji took a serious view of the matter and demanded an explanation from
higher authorities. While no actual explanation was given, there was a
full apology. On 25 November the Governor-General, Ronald Munro Ferguson,
who was in Fremantle in connection with the conscription issue, made a
personal apology. On 28 November the Naval Board expressed ‘Its deep regrets
over the incident on behalf of the federal government.’ The Minister
of the Navy also sent a telegram of apology expressing deep regret and
stating there would be no further incidents.44
Frictions raised from Australia: occupation of the German South Sea Islands
There was also much dissatisfaction on the Australian
side. In mid-1917, the cruiser Hirdo did not sail in search of the missing
SS Mutunga, because of incomplete information. Also, on the occasion of
the sinking by mine of SS Cumberland, the Hirado sent divers and reported
that she had been sunk by an internal explosion. After this report the
Australian port authorities examined all cargoes and mailbags in every
port, until they discovered she had been sunk by a mine.45 There were other
causes of Australian discontent.While French, Russian and even British
and Australian ships were placed under Japanese command at times, Japanese
warships were never placed under foreign command. In deploying Japanese
warships, even destroyers, the Australian naval board had to consult with
the Japanese Naval General Staff or with the local Japanese commander.46
However the greatest cause of Australian dissatisfaction
with Japan sprang from the Japanese occupation of the German Pacific Islands.
With the start of the war, Australia and New Zealand sought the chance
to occupy the German Pacific Islands together with New Guinea and the
Solomon Islands, which lay within their area of sea power. But they lacked
the naval ships to escort transports, and the chairman of the sub-committee
of Imperial Defence, Admiral Sir H.B. Jackson, wrote a memorandum about
troop movements in the Indian and Pacific Ocean:47
If these waters were known to be clear of enemy cruisers,
the situation would be very different, and I would point out that the duties
that occupy and fore shadow the movements of our Eastern squadron are hardly
those laid down in Standing War Orders, where the destruction of the enemy
warships is the first and principal duty. It is noteworthy that these have
not been encountered or seriously looked for; and we seem to be asking
too much from the limited force we have in those waters, and are looking
ahead and planning our military expeditions without taking sufficient thought
of our enemy’s naval forces. The Gneisenau and Scharnhorst may not be
the only ones in the Pacific; apparently the little Geier is active in
interrupting our communications and it is high time we destroyed the German
communications and armed vessels of all description in these waters. Also,
on 5 September 1914, Admiral Patey telegraphed to the Admiralty:Unless
strong reasons to the contrary existed, Angaur and Nauru should not be
occupied, but their wireless telegraph stations should be destroyed. From
experience gained at Samoa, and from information received the German Pacific
islands were very short of food. Occupying them will entail our feeding
the inhabitants as well as the garrisons, will relieve the German of this
responsibility. While Yap being larger and having submarine cable, might
Already the Japanese navy occupied the German islands
in the Northern Pacific on the pretext that the German navy would use these
islands as bases. The occupation of the north Pacific islands aroused great
problems complicated by an error in interpretation of the meaning of a
telegram by George F.Pearce, the Australian Minister of Defence. On 18
August 1914 the British cruiser Minotaur bombarded Yap and on 12 September
the British Ambassador to Japan, Sir Conygham Greene stated that an Australian
force was to occupy Yap, so the Japanese Navy at first had no plans to
possess this island. But Pearce misinterpreted Sir Edward Grey’s use of
‘Yap and others’ which meant ‘Yap and its dependant island’ to mean
‘Yap and all other German islands in the Pacific’. This changed the situation
greatly. By this misunderstanding, Peace announced officially that the
‘Japanese Government 14 had intimated to British Government, that it was
ready to hand over those islands, recently held by Germany but temporarily
occupied by Japan to Australian forces.’49 Thus the Australian Navy sent
telegrams to the Japanese Navy that the Australian expeditionary forces
had set sail to Yap and Angaur.50 The Japanese Navy sent the Hirado to
hand over Yap to Australia. However, Minister of Foreign Affairs Kato Takaaki
protested Peace’s announcement to Grey, stating that Japan’s intention
related not to all the German islands but only to Yap.51 Concerning this
Grey sent a telegram that the Japanese Navy objected
to the transfer of Angaur and Yap, therefore the dispatch of Australian
troops might cause friction between Britain and Japan. The Japanese occupation
of Yap Island was only for military purposes and Foreign Minister Kato
Takaaki also agreed that the resolution of the territorial possession could
be reconsidered in order to maintain a smooth relationship between Japan
and Britain. Also Churchill sent a message to Colonial Secretary Lewis
V. Harcourt, that:52 We have no cruiser available for Yap at the present
time and much inconvenience would be caused by changing existing arrangements.
There apears to be no military reasons which require us to eject the Japanese at
this juncture. I do not gather that the Australian Governments are pressing
us to act. On the contrary it would seem that you were pressing them. The
admiralty would strongly deprecate any action towards Japan which would
appear suspicious or ungracious. They have intimated that their occupation
is purely military and devoid of political significance and there I trust
we may leave the matter for the present.
Receiving these telegrams and letters, Grey cabled on
the 26 October to the Governor of Australia:Co-operation between Japan
and UK is mutually beneficial for both countries and the Japanese Navy’s
support is sincere. Occupying the South Seas Island of the German territories
is to achieve the military goal and military consideration had to be taken
seriously during the war. Sending your force to Angaur and Yap Island should
be cancelled as their territorial matters will be determined after the
war.53 Thus through Peace’s misreading, Australia lost not only Yap, but
also all of the German Pacific Islands north of the equator.
German propaganda for Australia
The Japanese occupation of the north Pacific islands
greatly changed the feeling of the Australian people. This change was used
by Germany to weaken the links between Australia and Japan. A Reuter communication
reported that:The occupation of Yap should not be forgotten. In the future,
this island will be the first military base of a number of bases which
will be used to extend Japanese absolute supremacy in the Pacific as far
as the Antarctic Ocean. We have heard the idea for some decades that Australia
and India under the envious gaze of the Japanese tiger. To defend ourselves
against this danger Australia must remain in the hands of the white man
as the old saying has it.54
This caused racial matters to once again estrange Japan and Australia.The
Germans also worked through agents abroad. An article by Kayahara Kazan,
who was the type of Japanese journalist who specialized as a political
agitator, said in a small newspaper called the Daisan Teikoku (the Third
Empire) that: ‘Our country’s policy must be to advance to the south and
in saying this we do not simply mean the acquisition of small islands …
The expansion of Japan will extend south from the Equator extending to
Australia.’ This article was read out at the Australia Labour Party General
Conference in Perth in June 1918, and also in the South Australian Parliament
in July of the same year, and it inflamed anti-Japanese feelings.55
This antipathy and sense of alarm were also used by
the Australian Labour Party. As Australian foreign trade increased and
a large number of Japanese ships called at Australian ports, the Australian
Labour Party newspaper,Labour Calls, frequently took up the matter of Japan’s
advance to the south. What was unfortunate for Japan was that race issues
arose in the course of Australian domestic politics. This happened on two
occasions. In October 1916 and December 1917, race issues were used to
argue for sending troops overseas. In order to secure Australian participation
and prestige at the postwar peace conference, Prime Minister Hughes, who
had gone to Britain in 1916, had promised that a large number of Australian
troops would be sent to fight in Europe. After an attempt to secure conscription
for overseas service, Hughes left the Labour Party, opposed to conscription,
and went over to his former adversary, the Conservative Party. Labor Calls,
thereupon, used racial issues and the Japanese menace to oppose conscription:Without
doubt the next war will be fought in the Pacific between the white and
yellow races. Today our white comrades are fighting each other in a suicidal
struggle. We should not send our youth to far off battlefields as we must
prepare for the racial war to come. I will vote NO, because I believe in
keeping Australia a white man’s country. YES would commit Australia to
sending 16.500 men away monthly for an indefinite time … Soon … the country
would have to resort to importing labour.56
False intelligence and the Japanese menance
With the start of the war there was a temporary halt
in Australian intelligence activity relating to Japan. But this activity
was resumed in late 1915 by the initiative of the Prime Minister’s Department
and the Australian Navy which suspected that bases were being developed
in the occupied north Pacific islands for use in Japanese expansion to
the south. Information was mainly drawn from employees of the Bruns Philp
company which had traded in the islands in the period prior to the war,
and from men aboard the SS Pukaki and the SS Jubilee, which travelled through
the islands to collect labourers for the phosphate mine on Nauru. Information
supplied by these people was often unreliable and at times exaggerated,
especially the information from those who could not speak the local language.
In the case of the Truk Lagoon, information could be exaggerated, as in
the following report.57
P. Etscheit of the Caroline Trading company reported that
Truk Lagoon was in the process of development as a naval base and that
there were eight 4 inch guns and two 6 inch guns together with a barracks
capable of accommodating seventy-five men. Frank C. Pinching who was in
the field in charge of collecting labour for the Nauru phosphate mine
said that military preparations were being hurried at Truk Lagoon and that
the entrances were being sealed by mines. There was a plan to lay mines
in all the entrances and the mines were to be detonated from a central
point if occasion arose. He also reported that he saw a considerable number
of mines being unloaded from the 7,000-ton SS Ah Ping. Robert Stobo saw
a freighter loaded with mines and reported that these had previously been
laid in the South-Western entrance to Truk Lagoon. Thinking that if the
entrances were mined then there were probably gun batteries he was asked
if such batteries existed. He said that there were no guns in place but
there were emplacements for guns on the islands of Uman, Wela, Tol and
Yoloas. On Toloas, particularly, there were said to be underground emplacements
but no one was allowed ashore there and it was not possible to verify their
existence. R.D. Walton, a lecturer at a university in Brisbane, also argued
that evidence collected in the period after the First World War shows that
Japan was contemplating an invasion of Newcastle, which was a major centre
for iron, steel and coal. In 1919 and 1920 there was the building of a
photographic mosaic for use in an invasion. Between 1922 and 1924 a map
and chart for invasion use was completed.58 The evidence noted by Walton
is briefly outlined below.59
The procurement of photographic information (1919?1924)
During the 1920s some forty-seven Japanese ships docked
at Newcastle and the officers usually went off in groups of three or four
in hired cars and photographed the important Newcastle region. Walton concluded
that through this survey the Japanese Navy acquired complete and precise
topographic information concerning the region.
The investigation of the coal landing facilities (1922)
An employee of the Mitsui Bussan, named Koishikawa, often
discussed arrangements to purchase coal with Newcastle businessmen but
he attached such unreasonable conditions to his proposals that no business
was ever concluded. He showed real interest only in the coal field and
the harbour facilities in the Newcastle area. Walton concluded that the
Japanese Navy was using Koishikawa to investigate the coal landing facilities
which could be used after an invasion.
The acquisition of the secret landing place in Sydney (1922)
The Kanematsu Trading company bought land on the waterfront
in Sydney and it was thought that these were acquired for the secret landing
of espionage personnel.
The production of an invasion chart (1924)
The assistant Harbour Master of Newcastle reported that
the Japanese crew possessed a chart carrying water depths which was unfamiliar
to him.Walton concluded that by 1924, the Japanese Navy had produced a
chart for use in an invasion of Newcastle.
Invasion of the landing beach (1924?1926)
The Japanese merchant ships, SS Madras Maru (May 1924),
SS Chofuku Maru (March 1925), SS Meiko Maru (March 1925), and the SS Egypt
Maru (June 1926) left the usual shipping routes and approached close to
the coast. It could be concluded that these vessels were making surveys
of the coast for troop landings.
The Australian intelligence organizations and the armed
services thus came to collect much inaccurate and conjectural information.
What occupied their time and attention were not so much the actual activities
of the enemy armed services but rather Japanese activities in the Pacific
together with rumours of spying within Australia. From this information
they gained an exaggerated impression of Japanese intentions and the menace
posed by Japan, and came to feel threatened. Influenced by this information
of the Japanese menace, Prime Minister Hughes sent a long letter to Lloyd
George entitled, ‘Thoughts on Australian Defence Against Anticipated Attack’.
In this message he said that the Japanese-occupied islands north of the
equator were extremely important to Australia from the point of view both
of defence and possible offence, so all former German possessions in the
Pacific should be placed under Australian control.60
In New Zealand, Minister of Defence, Colonel Sir James
Allen, reminded the Prime Minister W.F. Massey that ‘I can not understand
any argument in favour of the Japanese remaining in the Marshals [sic]
… it seems clear to me that it is meant as an indication that the Japanese
intend to rule the Pacific Seas.’61 There was certain duplicity in the
Australian stance. The Australians were prohibiting coloured immigration
and monopolizing a bountiful land while in Australia’s own region there
were nations suffering from poverty due to over-population. The thought
that this fanatical adherence to the ‘White Australia’ policy might offer
the newly powerful Japan an excuse for an invasion of Australia further
increased the sense of the Japanese menace in Australian minds and gave
it a more concrete form, especially after the Paris Peace Conference when
Japan proposed a racial equality clause.
Australian-Japanese relations after the war
Captain Kato, commander of the Ibuki reported that the
peoples of Australia and New Zealand, at first felt sincere regard for
the Japanese and sympathy to Japan in times of sorrow but they also felt
the need to develop powerful independent fighting services and there can
be no guarantee that there will not be an upsurge of public feeling with
regard to the development of the military.62
The attitude of Australia towards Japan had indeed changed just as Captain Kato had noted in 1914. Admiral Sir John R. Jellicoe, who was charged to investigate affairs in various British territories, wrote a report in 1919 that noted Japan ‘is a country likely to cause war in the future’. He advised the establishment of a joint British, Australian and New Zealand Fleet with a standard strength of eight battleships and eight battle cruisers.63
Influenced by the above thinking, on 12 April 1920, the
Council of Defence reported that Australia could not stop a Japanese invasion
by seapower alone, and proposed the establishment of an army of some 180,000
men and seven divisions,64 and approved £3.6 million for ‘the maintenance
of the existing Naval Unit as an efficient fighting machine’, £3.5 million
for land forces, and £1.1 million for air power.65 Australia’s apprehensions
caused her to approach America, who was also clashing with Japan over similar
racial issues. For the US Navy, which based its war plans on the strategy
of an attack on Japan across the Pacific, Australia was of value as a base
for possible future operations. The US Navy planned a close approach to
Australia and used the sentiments of the Australian people to help establish
its network of bases in the South Pacific, in case Japan fortified its
South Sea Islands.66 In July 1925, the US Navy held exercises off Hawaii,
and after the exercises the US Fleet moved to test its naval deployment
capability across the Pacific, conducting a ‘Non-stop Exercise’ from
Hawaii to Australia. Fifty-five US combatants were welcomed enthusiastically
in Australia and New Zealand.67
Through Japanese participation in the war, German power
was eliminated in the Far East and the Pacific. However for Australia and
New Zealand, this simply meant that Germany, the previous source of unease,was
replaced by Japan. Both Australia and New Zealand had clashed with Japan
in the past over racial issues and considered her a potential enemy. After
the war, the First Naval Member submitted a report of the ‘Misleading
Reference to Japanese Naval Action in the Pacific Ocean during the War’
to Prime Minister William M Hughes.68 Hostile views of Japan prevailed
during the war due to German propaganda of racial animosity, and anti-Japanese
feelings did not diminish.
After the war, the situation in the Pacific was greatly changed and there was no common foe to maintain the alliance. The German threat was eliminated and the nascent Soviet Union was no longer threatening India. Thus Great Britain and Australia did not require Japan’s naval cooperation. Beside this change in the world situation, racial animosities were added and Japanese spy-scares continued, and the idea of the Japanese menace was created. The history of the extensive assistance that Japan had rendered to Allied efforts was inconvenient for the anti-Japanese and navalist groups not only in Great Britain and Australia, but also in the United States. Thus Japanese services were quickly minimized and diminished in Western history.69 But there was another tendency in Australia: negative postwar assessments of Japan began to appear in some circles. On the occasion of the celebration of the Emperor’s birthday in Sydney in November 1920, political leader R.W. Caldwell stated: ‘I avail myself of this opportunity to express my deep regret and shame at the recrudescence of anti-Japanese prejudice, which has taken place in Australia since the conclusion of the late war.’70
Also, in December 1927 the Australian Prime Minister S.M.
Bruce, in response to a message from Prime Minister Kato (Foreign Minster
during the war), on the occasion of the appointment of Tokugawa Iemasa
as Consul-General in Melbourne, said ‘thank Japan for the aid which she
gave us during the war’. The Prime Minister of New Zealand, J.C. Coates,
also replied saying that:he could not forget the deep impression made by
the assistance extended by the IJN in the transporting of New Zealand troops
in the early stages of the war and the fact that throughout the anxieties
of the war period Japan had extended the friendship of alliance to the
British peoples.71 In April 2002, in the Australian Financial Review, there
was an essay entitled ‘Time to Recognize a Forgotten Ally’.72
If past practice is any guide, this year’s Anzac Day
ceremonies will once again take place without representatives from a key
First World War ally. In fact, so critical was this ally’s role that without
its support the events commemorated by Anzac Day might never have occurred
…Needless to say, this does not justify Japan’s later barbaric treatment
of Australian POWs. Once WWI ended, Japan’s contribution was promptly
from Australian collective memories. The realty of international affairs
is that the causes of conflicts are seldom wholly on one side or the other.
As Australians prepare to commemorate another Anzac Day, perhaps the time
has come to recall the significant contribution Japan once made to this
country’s defence. True reconciliation is almost always a two-way street.When
tension in the Pacific relaxed and when Australia and New Zealand wished
to approach and deepen relations with Japan, the Japanese Navy’s assistance
was evaluated and used to improve relations between Japan and Australia.
1 Jack Shepherd, Australia’s Interests and Policies in the Far East, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, pp. 7?8.
2 M.A. Vienna, Shinju no Yuwaku (The Lure of the Pearl Shell), trans. Adachi Yoshiko, Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1987, p. 62.
3 Memo by Vice Admiral A.D. Fanshawe, ‘Australia and New Zealand’s Real
and Only Danger from an Enemy (21 January 1915)’, G48, Governor’s Records
Classified Office File, F-4, Admiral Fanshawe, Note on the Vulnerability
of Australia and New Zealand, New Zealand National Archives (hereafter
cited as NZNA), Wellington.
4 Hector Bywater, Sea Power in the Pacific: A Study of the American-Japanese Problem, London: Constable, 1921, p. 21.
5 Neville Meaney, ‘Okaron to Osutoraria no Kiki’ (The Yellow Peril and Australian Crisis), trans. Akaneya Tatsuo, in Watanabe Teruo (ed.), Nichigo Kankei no Shiteki Tenkai (The Development of Relations between Japan and Australia in Historical Perspective), Tokyo: Kokusai Seiji, 1981, vol. 63, p.8.
6 Royal Australian Navy 1911?1961, Canberra: Department of the Navy, 1961, p. 7?8.
7 Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (ed.), Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Taisho 3nen(Japanese Diplomatic Documents, 1914; hereafter cited as NGB: Taisho 3nen),Tokyo: Gaimusho, 1960, vol. 3, p. 628; Imperial Defence, House of Commons(17 May 1914); Robert R. James (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897?1963, London: Chelsea House, 1974, vol. V, pp. 2262?6.
8 Takayanagi Mitsutoshi (ed.), Dainihon Sensoshi, Tokyo:Sankyo Shoin, 1938, vol.6, p. 377; Kaigun Gunreibu (Naval General Staff) (ed.), Kimitu Taisho 3?4 nen Kaigun Senshi (Top Secret: The Naval War History from 1914 to 1915; hereafter cited as Kaigun Senshi 3?4nen), Tokyo:Kaigun Gunreibu, 1919, vol. I, pp. 384?9.
9 Julian S. Corbett, History of the Great War: Naval Operation, London:Longmans, Green and Co., 1920, vol. I, pp. 348?51.
10 I.G. McGibon, Blue-Water Rationale: The Naval Defence of New Zealand,Wellington: R.D. Hasselberg, Government Printer, 1981, pp. 25?6.
11 British Naval Attache in Japan, Captain E.H. Rymaer to Rear Admiral Takeshita Isamu (26 October 1914), Nichiei Kaigun Kosho Kankei Shiryo (Documents Relating to Negotiations between IJN and RN; hereafter abbreviated as Nichiei Kankei File), National Institute for Defense Studies (hereafter NIDS).
12 Telegram from the Ibuki (29 September 1914), Senji Shorui (Documents on the War), vol. 123, NIDS.
13 Kaigun Senshi 3?4nen, vol. 4, pp. 189?248.
14 Kato Kanji Denki Hensan kai (Editing Association) (ed.), Kato Kanji Taisho Den(Biography of Admiral Kato Kanji), Tokyo: Kato Kanji Denkihensan Iinkai,1941, pp. 605?15.
15 Kaigun Senshi 3?4nen, vol. 1, pp. 387?91.
16 Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 380?8; NGB: Taisho 4nen, vol. 3, pp. 1194?205; also see Jerrame Papers, National Maritime Museum (Greenwich).
17 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911?1914, London: Thormon Buterworth, 1929, vol. 2, p. 299.
18 Kaigun Senshi 4?9nen, vol. 1, pp. 25?30.
19 NGB: Taisho 4nen, vol. 3, p. 99, doc. 123 (27477), Grey to Greene, 9 February 1916; Ann Trotter (ed.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Series E, Asia, 1914?1939: Japan, August 1914-May 1915, Washington: University Publications of America, 1991 (hereafter BDFA), Part II, vol. 1, pp. 116?17.
20 NGB: Taisho 4nen, vol. 3, p. 99, doc. 123 (27477), Grey to Greene, 9 February 1916; BDFA, Part II, vol. 1, pp.116?17.
21 British Embassy (26 March 1917), ibid., pp. 96?8.
22 Kaigun Senshi 4ー9nen, vol. 2, pp. 19-37.
23 Kaigun Senshi 4?9nen, vol. 2, pp. 43?52.; ‘Dai San Tokumu Kantai Senji
Nitsusi’(War Diary of the Third Special Squadron), and also refer to Yamaji
Kazuyoshi,‘Dai 3 Tokumu Kantai no Kodo’ (Operation Report of Third Special
Squadron),in Yushu Kai (ed.), Dai Icihji Sekaitaisen Senpo Yoroku (Recollection
of the World War), Tokyo: Yushukai, 1922, pp. 249-60.
24 Kaigun Senshi 4?9nen, vol. 1, pp. 39?40; vol. 2, pp. 228?50.
25 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 42?3.
26 Kaigun Senshi 4?9nen, vol. 2, pp. 125, 141?51; ‘Gunkan Yahagi Ryukosei Kanbo ni Kansuru Ken (25 January 1919)’, Yahagi Senji Nitsushi, NIDS.
27 Alfred P. Friedrick von Tirpitz, Grand Admiral: My Memories, London: Hurst Black Ltd., 1917, vol. II., p. 351; German Naval Staff (ed.) (trans. General Naval Staff), Doisut Towa Kantai Senshi (Der Kreuzerkrieg in den Auslandischen Gewassern), Gunreibu, 1911, p. 138.
28 Navy Department, N20?6, Senior Naval Officer, 1913?1921: Papers Relating to Trade route Warnings, NZNA.
29 Arthur W. Jose, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914?1918: The Australian Navy, Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1937, pp. 358?9.
30 Julian S. Corbett, History of the Great War: Naval Operation, London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1931, vol. IV, p. 216; also see doc. 173, Secret
Pack of the Commander-in-Chief Grand Fleet, ADM 137, Box 1939, Public Record
Office (hereafter PRO).
31 The Times (ed.), The Times History of the War, vol. XVIII, London: Times,1919, pp. 458?9.
32 Kaigun Senshi 4?9 Nen, vol. 2, pp. 288?313; Kaigun-Senshi Furoku Kmitu Hokan (Top Secret Supplementary File of the Naval Operation), pp. 24?30.
33 For the Second Special Squadron, refer to Dai Ni Tokumu Kantai (Second Special Squadron) (ed.), Enseiki (Expeditional Reports), Tokyo: Dai Ni Tokumu Kantai, 1919, pp. 239?40; Hirama Yoichi, ‘Rising Sun in the Mediterranean: The Second Special Squadron, 1917?1918’, in Ufficio Storico Della Marina Militare (ed.), Il Mediterraneo quale Elemento del Potere Maritimo, Rome: Commissione Italiana di Storia Militare, 1998, pp. 39?54.
34 Paul G. Halpern (ed.), The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean 1915?1918, London:Temple Smith/Navy Record Society, 1987, pp. 282, 290.
35 Kaigun Senshi 4?9nen, vol. 2, pp. 324?6.
36 Yoichi Hirama, Dai Ichiji Sekaitaisen to Nihon Kaigun (World War I and Japanese Navy: Relation between Military Operation and Diplomacy),Tokyo:Keio University Press, 1998, pp. 235?2251. For the Japanese contribution refer to Memorandum on Anglo-Japanese Relations (Written for the Imperial Conference, March 1917), BDFA, Part II, vol. 2, pp. 218?22.
37 Jose, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914?1918, p. 341.
38 Kato Kanji Denki Hensan kai, Kato Kanji Taisho Den, pp.600?1.
39 Yahagi Senji Nishi, 9 June 1917.
40 Kaigun Senshi 3?4nen, vol. 1, p. 354.
41 ‘Dai San Tokumu Kantai Ninmu Hokoku No. 2’, Ninmu Hokoku Tuzuri (Third
Special Service Squadron’s Report), no. 2, NIDS; Empire Day, 24 May 1917,
Series A2219/XR1, External Relations, vol. I, pt. 2, p. 16, Australian
National Archives (Hereafter ANA).
42 ‘Dai Ichi Kodo Gaiyo, Shoken 3 (No. 1 Operation Report, Impression No. 3)’;‘Dai San Tokumu Kantai Ninmu Hokoku’, NIDS.
43 Teikoku Gikai Shogiin Iinkai Gijiroku 37?38 Kai (The Records of the 37th and 38th Imperial Diets House of Representative Committee Records), Tokyo:Nozomigawa Shoten, 1982, pp. 312?13.
44 Kaigun Senshi 4?9nen, vol. 2, pp. 60?9; Letter, Captain of Yahagi to
the Naval Committee of Australia, 28 November 1917; Letter to the Minister
of Defence,28 November 1917; Letter from the Naval Minister to Yahagi,
7 December 1917, Yahagi Senji Nitsuki, NIDS.
45 Jose, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914?1918, pp. 356?360.
46 Kaigun Senshi Himitu Hokan, op.cit., p. 9.
47 Jose, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914?1918, p. 50
48 Ibid., p. 72; Corbett, History of the Great War: Naval Operation, vol. II, pp.636?7.
49 NGB Tasho 3nen, vol. 3, p. 670.
50 Telegram from Naval Office Melbourne, 25 November 1914, ibid., Nichiei Kyodo File.
51 NGB: Taisho 3nen, vol. 3, p. 672.
52 Doc. (74103), Greene to Grey, 21 November 1914, G1: Governer’s Records, N18:Japanese Occupation of Former German Owned Islands North of the Equator, NZNA; Churchill to Harcourt, 18 October 1914; Gilbert Martin, Winston S.
Churchill, 2 vols, London, Heinemann, 1975, p. 203.
53 Doc. 330, enclosure doc. 329, Harcort to Governenor of Australia, 24 November 1914, BDFA, Part II, vol. 1, p. 136.
54 ‘Nihon no Nanshin’ (Japanese South Advance), The German Review of Japan No. 1 (Far Eastern Loiyd No. 43), Suikosha Kiji, vol. 13, no. 4, December 1915, p. 15.
55 Henry P. Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia: From the Sixteenth Century to World War II, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991, p. 95.
56 Labour Call, 26 October 1916, p. 9; also 1 June 1916, p. 10; 8 June
1916, p. 3; 15 March 1917, p. 4; Refer to D.C.S. Sissons, ‘Attitudes to
Japan and Defence1890?1923’, Australian National University, MA Thesis,
1956, pp. 35?7.
57 R.D. Walton, ‘Some Substance in the Secrets: The Fortification and De-fortification of the Carolines 1917?1922’, Unpublished, Brisbane, 1986, p. 3?6.
58 R.D. Walton, ‘Feeling for the Jugular: Japanese Espionage at Newcastle 1919?1926’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 32, no. 1, April 1986.
59 AA MP 1582, Series 6. Australian Satiation Intelligence Reports, Part II, 1930, 1932.
60 Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia, pp. 98?9; Ian.H. Nish, Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908?1923, London: Athlone Press, 1972, pp. 207.
61 McGibbon, op. cit., p.33.
62 ‘Dai San Tokumu Kantai Senji Nitsusi’, p. 241.
63 Report on the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa on Naval Mission of New Zealand (August?October 1919), vol. III, The Naval Situation in Far Eastern Waters, p. 6, p. 10.
64 See George E. Matks, Pacific Peril ? Or Menace of Japan’s Mandated Islands,Sydney: Wynyard Book Arcade, 1933.
65 Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia, p. 103.
66 Edwar S. Miller, Orange Paln: The US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897?1945,Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1990, pp. 100?21.
67 John H. Moore, ‘The Eagle and the Roo: American Fleets in Australian Waters’, US Naval Proceedings, November 1917.
68 Memorandum prepared by the First Naval Member for the Acting Prime Minister, June 1919, A2219 vol. 10, ANA.
69 Arthur J. Marder asserted in his Old Friend, New Enemies: The Royal
Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, Oxford: Claredon Press, 1981, p. 4:
‘The Royal Navy had little reason to be grateful to the Japanese in the
first World War. Japan refused to send any ships to fight Germany until
1917, when a destroyers flotilla was set to the Mediterranean, and made
hay in the Far East while the British were committed in Europe, as through
the seizure of German-occupied Tsingtao and German islands in the Pacific
? the Marshals, Mariana, Carolines, and Palau.’ Timothy D. Saxon, ‘Anglo-Japanese
Cooperation, 1914?1918’, US Naval War College Review, Winter 2000, pp.
62?92, gives a very different evaluation.
70 Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia, p. 105.
71 Consul-General Sydney to Minister of Foreign Affairs, ‘Report on an
interview where a Message from Prime Minister Kato was convoyed to the
Prime Minister of Australia in Melbourne and other matters’, 18 December
1925, Concerning the exchange of Message with the Prime Minister of New
Zealand, 12 January 1927; Nichigo Kankei Tuzuri, op. cit.
72 Australian Financial Review, ‘Time to Recognize a Forgotten Ally’, 19 April 2002, p. 1.