The Growing Chinese Navy and it' influence onTriple-Relations:Japan, Uited.Sates ,and Korea

        1.Back Ground of the Chinese National Strategy
     (1)Chinese Sense of Self as ”Great Power” and the “Middle
     (2)Chinese Sphere Survival?“Lebensraum” Concept

        2.Background of Chinese Military Strategy
     (1)Chinese Navy’s Position in the PLA and her Strategy
     (2)Strategy of the Chinese Navy?Green Water Intercept
       Defense Strtegy

        3.Capabilitie and Limitation of Chinese Navy

         Conference on Post-Unification Security Cooperation
           Among the United States, Korea and Japan
       Hapuna Beach Prince Hotel Kohola District, Island of Hawaii
                      April 20-23,1998

    After the Soviet withdrawal from Cam Rabh Bay and the U.S. withdrawal from Subic Bay, China territorially claimed the Paracels Islands in 1974 and Spratly Islands in 1988. Further, when the U.S. left the Philippines, China built a station where fishing boats could take refuge in the Misschief atolls off the Spratly Islands, which is claimed by the Philippines. This is proof that China is advancing on the seas. In this paper I plan to consider the following issues; In light of both the current state of the People’s Liberation Army-Navy(Chinese Navy) and it's strategy, including capabilities and limits, as well as a review of Chinese history and traditions, does the navy of this continental nation aim to develop into a blue-water navy so as to establish hegemonic naval strength competitive with the power of the United States Navy. Also how will the growth of the Chinese Navy affect relations with both the U.S. and Japan, as well as the stability of Asia. Further, what must the U.S. and Japan do in order to best cope with this rising Chinese Navy.

1 Back Ground of the Chinese National Strategy
(1) Chinese Sense of Self as "Great Power" and the "Middle Kingdom"

       Our concern is Chinese awareness of itself as a great power based on its domination of Asia until the 18th century. It is a country that intended to gain supremacy by following two concepts. First is their age-old conception of order in which the Han people consider themselves to be the middle of the world, surrounding by the culturally inferior peoples on their periphery. At the root of this world view lies the Chinese past experience as a power dominating Asia. This gives the Chinese a proclivity toward hegemony which I call "Great Power" identity. Indeed the Chinese expression "Dongyi Xirong, Nanman,Beidi" reveals this notion that they are surrounded by "barbarians" on all four sides. They came to see the world as consisting of their own nation, China, at the core, and characterized by an international system comprised of "civilized" Chinese and "barbarian" others. I refer to this concept of the international order as the "Sino-centric" world view.

        Further, at the origin of China's international relations lies the concept of the "Suzerin- Vassal" hierarchy. Under this premise, the reach of the Confucian system of "morals," "rites," and "laws" of the Chinese Emperor included, of course, the Chinese mainland, for this territory was under direct political subjugation. But this reach extended in decreasing degrees to those states in outside regions. Areas from the Korean peninsula, Mongolia, and Nepal to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand became viewed as "domestic retainers" or "Chinese dependencies," and as such hosted Imperial envoys who exercised Chinese "morals," "rites," and "law" over them. Beyond these lay the states considered to be "foreign retainers" or "tributary domains," where the Chinese "morals" and "rites" had reached. A further outside layer existed where only the "morals"(mostly Confucian) of the Chinese Emperor had reached. Those who lived in these areas were considered" foreign guests." Of these levels of Imperial reach, those that were considered "domestic retainers" or Dependencies" were seen to be an integral part of china and therefore subject to rule by the envoys of the "Son of Heaven."

        In these ways, the basis of Chinese diplomatic relations centered on both relative "civilization" and "proximity." Possessing this hierarchical view of a "Confucian" world order, China had difficulty maintaining international relations and trade with any sense of parity with these various countries along its periphery. China recognized the surrounding sovereign nations as only semi-independent, and conducted trade via tribute system. Because China designated which nation would have the privilege of entering trade relations with it, they didn't consider them equal partners. The trade system considered of nations submitting tribute goods to the Chinese government and receiving Chinese goods as "gift" in reply." International relations existed under this hierarchical system of trade in its institutionalized "tribute formalities." Korea and Vietnam-even Okinawa --came under this system of tributary international relations.

        Further, a second concern deals with the fundamental preceptin which shape China's world view. China's traditional world view represents a distinct brand of Chinese "Culturism," whereby they believe their superior culture should be disseminated among the backward peoples living on their periphery, and these outsiders should be remade in the Chinese mold, thereby expanding the Chinese realm. They think the people of these culturally inferior nations should welcome such cultural conquest. Frederich Ratzel elaborated of this concept in his book Geopolitical Studies noting"; A nation's territory expands with the propagation of its culture. In other words, when you spread your own country's culture to another country's territory, that territory is then added to that of your own country."1

       Actually, the Chinese only recently developed this concept of borders which adheres to their "Sino-centric" world view and its pride in Chinese "cultural ism." China first had to recognized a border with the Nerchinsk Treaty of 1968 with Russia. Even after the end of WWII, their concept of national borders remained unclear. When they founded the PRC in 1949, this because a problem as the new government had to decide whether or not to accept the existing borders for their newly-inaugurated Chinese state. At that time, the Chinese announced," We will make an announcement concerning the territory which China lost in the Opium War after further investigation."
       Thus the basis of a re-evaluation of borders would rest with the pre-Opium War Chinese state. But in 1952, they went further and published a map in the junior high school text book "A Short History of Modern China." According to this map, all of the areas which had ever been under the influence of Chinese culture to had engaged in tribute trade with China were part of Chinese "territory," going so far as to include Siberia, the Korea Peninsula, Okinawa, Taiwan, Singapore, the Malaya peninsula, Thailand, Burma, Nepal and Mongolia as "territory that was snatched by the Imperialist nations during the former democratic era (1840-1919)."2

(2) Chinese Sphere of Survival -"Lebensraum" Concept

      The most striking fact is the Chinese Navy's strategy which has a continental touch to it. China maintains and operates its naval forces based on a theory very similar to the living space concept called “Lebensraum" of Karl Haushofer. He asserts that “the nation is a living organization that will perish without continuous feeding. Therefore, it is natural that a nation will try to acquire the necessary resources for survival.3 Adolf Hitler used this tactic to justify the annexation of Poland and Austria. In the April 3, 1987 issue of the People's Liberation Army Daily, 4 an article titled “In search of a reasonable three dimensions strategic frontier" by XU Guang-Yu appeared, an outline of which is as follows:

     “A strategic frontier is the living space of a nation and its people, and it is extremely important for the nation to pursue its strategic frontier to assure its security and development. The extent of the strategic frontier will change depending on a change in the comprehensive capability of the nation. In the past, the Soviet Union and the U.S. had expanded their spheres of influence far exceeding their geographical boundaries by employing military force. The three dimensions space covering land, ocean, space and the undersea area indicates the spread of Chinese strategic boundaries. This assures its security and successful development, as the space for security, survival, science-and-technology and economy, and signifies the national interests should expand up to the front line of the thus expanded sphere of influence and the boundaries should be expanded strategically."

      A piece titled "Strategy Rivalry is Already Targeting the Atmosphere and Open Seas" reported on People Liberation Army Daily in January 1987,5 also indicate some key points;

     "The oceans are a treasure trove, thriving with living mineral, scientific, and power resources. By the end of this era in the year 2000, the amount of total global maritime production may be reach 15-17 percent of general global production......From the end of this century the beginning of the next century, we will enter an era of global maritime economies, and the oceans will become the primary target of military rivalry in the world.........Because China has a large population, it is a country with few natural resources on a per capita basis. We must develop new strategic resources. Whether or not we can meet the challenges of the 21st century will be determined by whether or not we can strengthen our national and military power......

   ......The Chinese fleet could have been one of the best-armed in the world, and our people's deep-sea enterprises and our seamen could have gained world renown. But unfortunately, during the time that the people of Europe focused their territorial activities on maritime development, the people of Chinese were already being kept back from any expansion of their own. Under the corruption of the feudal system, scant attention was paid to the oceans or naval defense. The hands and feet of our people were bound they could not proceed with maritime development. Even though China had extensive maritime territory, it was kept from having a strong sense of maritime affairs. This was a significant obstacle to the development of our nation. We must never forget these lessons from history.......
.......The scope of strategic national borders for naval power changes. In the past, the Soviets and America, using military strength, expanded their spheres of influence far beyond their geographic national boundaries. China expand our strategic borders from land to sea, and from space reaching down to the depths of the ocean, thereby encompassing a three-dimensional concept of space. This would give us the room to guarantee our security, our existence, our efforts in science and technology, and our economic activity, allowing smooth development in a secure environment. Our national sphere of influence, thereby giving meaning to this strategic expansion of our national borders."

       In 1989, the number two man in the PLAN(People Liberation Arm-Navy), Deputy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Zhang Xusan said,6 "In today's world, the maritime interests of the seaward-looking nations are a battle for and against control of the maritime order, for and against the plunder of the seas.....〔The duty of the Navy in light of this is〕protection of the nation's sovereignty and maritime interests." With this statement, he proposed that the Navy's duty goes beyond simply protecting territory to include the protection of maritime interests also.

       Further, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral Zhang Lianzhong, in reply to an interview question on the occasion of the 43rd anniversary of the establishment of the PLAN said," 7 Oceans are already the foundation for progress in our policy of opening and reform, and they are the primary routes for trade....The Navy supports policies of reform and opening in the coastal areas, and supports the construction of special economic zones. To protect maritime interests and a friendly environment on the oceans, it is our duty to defend sea-lanes." Thus he added sea-lane defense as a characteristic of China as a maritime nation.

       Then in February of 1992 with the "Law of Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zone" China declared unilaterally the stipulation of their territorial waters, possessions and shipping lanes citing, "the mainland of the PRC and its coastal islands. Taiwan, and all the islands appertaining thereto including the Diayutai (Senkaku) Islands, Dongsha (Pratas) Islands, Xisha (Paracels) Islands, the Penghu (Pescadores) Islands, Zhongsha, and Nansha (Spratly) Islands, as well as other islands belonging to the PRC"(Though in May of 1996, the Chinese government excluded the Senkaku Islands and Spratly Islands. further Prime Minister Li Peng stated in March 1993 on the objectives of defense," We must strengthen our territorial borders and coastlines, we must protect our sovereignty and maritime interests," whereby adding maritime interests to the objectives of defense. In such statements, we can see China's insatiable territorial appetite for maritime resources.

2. Background of Chinese Military Strategy
(1) Chinese Navy's Position in the PLA and her Strategy
       As implied in the moniker of the branch of the People's Liberation Army, the military doctrine of the PLAN substantially means simply the extension of the "people's war" guerrilla strategy for land to operations at sea. This doctrine mirrors the same as that of the Soviet Young School during the first and Second world Wars -- this is, a defensive doctrine meant to fortify and protect the Chinese mainland. Originally, naval doctrine, determined just after the establishment of the PLAN at the Naval Build-up Conference convened in August. From that time until the 1970's, Chinese equipped the Navy with a large number of small patrol craft and submarines in accordance with this policy. Thus the PLA-N limited their fleet to a coastal-defense navy.

       But after, the Chinese leaders, who keenly felt the modernization of the armed forces in the Vietnam War fully realized the necessity for high tech arms in the Gulf War, began emphasizing the modernization of the armed forces and the introduction of technology in their armaments. Thus, the 1985 strategic re-orientation, not only strategy, but also the reconfiguration of the PLA force structure was changed China’s new naval doctrine began to take shape in the early 1980s.8 Furthermore, in the 1980's,when China's coastal provinces underwent remarkable economic development, the resources necessary for that development, especially oceanic resources, emphasizing the importance of the ocean, appeared in party and navy-related papers. One representative article, written by Liu huaquing, was; "Let us build a strong navy and develop the offshore enterprises,"9 published in the Peoples Daily on 24 November 1984.

     "Our nation has about 6.000 islands and several million squares kilometers of territorial water, tremendously rich in resources. The development of oceanic resources holds an important position in our society. These days, the development and the utilization of the ocean is entering a new stage, and the ocean is gradually becoming a territory that holds strategic significance ...Offshore enterprises are an important part of the composition of the economy of the people, and for the development of offshore enterprises, the support of a powerful navy is necessary."

      In 1989, Vice Chief of the navy, Zhang Xusan, insisted that "the protection of sea rights and interests" ought to be included in the governmental report from the Congress of the Representatives of the People. At the 14 meeting of the Representatives of the People, in October 1992. General Secretary Jiang Zemin for the first time referred to "the defense of sovereignty of territorial waters, and sea rights and interests" in his statement:10 "In the future, the army should put effort into improving itself according to the needs of modern warfare. On an overall basis, it should raise its fighting capability, and it should assume the sacred mission of defending the sovereignty of territorial land, water, space, and sea rights and interests; and of protecting the unity and security of the fatherland."

       In May 1993, Liu Huanqing, Vice-chairman on the committee of military affairs, released an article called: "We must advance the characteristic Chinese path of military modernization without any kind of change, whatsoever,"11 in which he appealed for the modernization and the technological improvement of the armed forces.

     "China is a country of sea power. It has several million square kilometers of territorial waters, inlets and bays; continental shelf and maritime economic zones;18,000 kilometers of coastal line and some 6.5000 large and small islands. There is a close connection between the sea and the existence and development of the Chinese people. To maintain and defend the sea rights and interests of our nation, we must build a powerful navy. Currently, no naval or ground operations are made without the support of an air force. Therefore we must give priority to the construction of a naval air force. The mission of military power is the defense of territorial land,water,space and sea rights and interests; the protection of the unity of the nation and the defense of the security of the nation."

       Furthermore, in April 1992 at the 43rd anniversary of the founding of the navy, Chief of the navy, vice-Admiral Zhang Lianghong gave a speech called ;"Be in the forefront of sea lane defense reformation,"12 in which he stated; "The seas is already an advanced base for reformation and liberation policies;and the main route of trade, .............The navy supports reformation and liberation of the coastal regions and the build-up of special economic areas." and that the navy should;" Protect sea rights and interests and the good environment of the sea."

       Furthermore, in March 1996, at the 8th Meeting of the Representatives of the People, president Li Peng presented the 9th five-year plan(1996-2000) and the long term aim for the year 2010, and indicated that the modernization of the armed forces would be a national policy",13 "for the security of our nation we must strengthen the modernization of the defense of the nation. To elaborate fighting ability we should preponderantly methods; and under high-tech conditions we should make the development of necessary efficient weapons a priority." In this way, the aim for oceanic resources gave the Chinese navy the new role of defending sea rights and interests and water borders. This was a conversion of the Chinese navy from a coastal water navy that supported the operations of the army, into an ocean navy.

       Eventually, an article entitled "the Second Navy that can not be neglected"14 appeared in the paper of the liberation Army pointing out that China should also put effort into its mercantile fleet. During the Second World War 74 percent of mercantile ships were enlisted for military purpose, and accoutered for 94 percent of the transport. Also, during the Falkland War mercantile ships were mobilized not only for carrying arms and armaments, but also to be used in landing operations, etc. As a sea power China should therefore build a suitable mercantile fleet as a second navy. China has become a nation with a current mercantile ship gross tonnage of 16.440.900.

(2) Strategy of the Chinese Navy-Green Water Intercept Defense Strategy

       The PLAN's naval strategic reflect the changes in the Chinese leader’s perceptions and maritime interests. According to the Jane's Fighting Ships and other sources, their coastal patrol fleet possesses a large number and variety of light patrol craft. But, the Chinese Navy is spreading its defense perimeter out two-- or three-fold the distance from the mainland to develop a strategy of "multi-layered defense in depth over the seas." According to this strategy, land-based missiles and fast-attack boas equipped with surface-to-surface missiles and torpedoes assume the defense of the first line of defense (from the coastline out 150 NM). Missile-carrying destroyers and escort vessels serve as the primary defense forces within the second layer of defense (from 50NM to 300NM). For the outmost layer of defense, (in other words, the seas out to the "first chain of islands" --Tsushima Strait, Okinawa island chain and down to the Spratly Island group), defense relies on missile-equipped submarines and shore-based aircraft.15

        Further, referring to future acquisition plans, President of the Dalian first surface Vessel Academy Admiral Lin Zhiye indicated that 16 the aims of the Chinese Navy are the protection of national unity, territorial sovereignty and maritime interests, in order to manage a clash at sea which occur in regional waters around the year 2000. To meet these goals, the first stage of development should take palace through the year 2000, and should be separated from the second stage of development (through 2050). Stage one will emphasize land-based medium range fighter/bomber aircraft and helicopters, and must work to develop a well-balanced force through the acquisition of such platforms as fighters, early-warning aircraft, patrol aircraft, and electronic warfare aircraft. As well as mid-air refueling capability. In the second stage, he said, China must acquire an aircraft carrier.
Thus the late 1980s,navy planners have called for changing from a coastal defense strategy to an off shore defense strategy. They would extend the defense perimeter to between 200nm and 400nm from the coast, but by the U.S.Navy ONI(Office of Intelligence) annual report of 1997 reported that the Chinese navy decided to extend its security defense perimeter from the previous inner-island defense line to a much longer-range line more than 10 times the distance from the Chinese mainland -- the "first island chain"-- an arc of Western Pacific archipelagoes stretching from the Kuriles, Japan, and the Ryukus to Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Greater Sundas. "Second island chain"-- the Bonis, the Marianas, Guam, and the Caroline.17.

3. Capabilities and Limitations

      According to the 1995 Defense White Paper, the Chinese naval order of battle numbered 1080 units, 80 of which were submarines, translating into a 1,020,000-ton fleet. This tonnage is triple that of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) fleet, and represents a ten-fold numerical superiority over the JMSDF in sheer number of platforms. However, Chinese navy has many problem militarily, economically and technologically. In the early 1990s the PLA-N commissioned various new models and types of naval vessels. They include the Luhu class guided missile destroyer, the Jiangwei class guided missile frigate, and fast coastal patrol ships. But these vessels are limited by their 1960's technology. On the other hand, the numerical strength of the Chinese amphibious fleet dares attention, especial among those who are concerned about the on-going Spratly Island dispute. This fleet includes 320 amphibious craft, including 3 Yukan-class and 11 Shantang-class LST, as well as 40 personnel transports.

      In May 1980, a report confirmed the long-standing existence of an established of an established PLAN landing Force. In 1987 reports of this force 1st Brigade conduct of a week-long landing exercise in the Paracls Islands heightened concerns about China' apparently emphasize on strengthening its amphibious operational capability. Moreover, in order to strengthen its capability to operate in open ocean, the Chinese Navy is also placing great importance on its ability to sustain long-range naval operations. The Chinese auxiliary fleet has 38 ships, large and small, such as 3 Fuqing/Fujing-class (21,750 ton) AOR, 2 Dayan-class (13,000 ton) AK, and 14 Eizhou-class (900 tons) auxiliary units.

       Moreover, in order to strengthen its capability to operate in open ocean, the Chinese Navy is also placing great importance on its ability to sustain long-range naval operations. With the improvements in high-speed underway replenishment, their at-sea support capability is improving, albeit gradually. Further, the Chinese Navy is also eagerly introducing new technology into their force. Through the purchase of advanced weapons from the United States, Britain, Germany, France, and Russia, they continue to propel their modernization efforts forward. Also, along with fleet expansion, the Chinese focus on increasing their activity at sea.

       From April 28 to June 1, 1980, 18 units -- including six Nuda-class DDG, two (20,000 ton) replenishment ships, two Xian-gyanghong-class 2000-ton AGOR/AGI space-event ships(subordinate to the Academy of Sciences) -- formed a 174,000 ton missile observation fleet and deployed to the southern Pacific. Then, from November 1985 through January of the following year, a Luda DDG and a 20,000-ton replenishment ship left their footprint on the Indian Ocean as they conducted good-will visits to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. Further, in 1986 and 1987, large-scale exercises took place from the East China Sea to the Western Pacific. In 1989, the training vessel Zhenghe visited Hawaii, and in 1996, In 1989, the training vessel Zhenghe visited North America. Step-by-step, China fleet is advancing toward an ocean-going capability.

       In these ways, advances in Chinese naval modernization contribute to increased open-sea activity. Nonetheless, the Chinese Navy is still remained as a coastal navy; indeed, the PLAN has not yet to even reach the interim stage of possessing a green-water (regional) navy. In other words, the Chinese naval weaponry is dated, and the fleet is still mostly a collection of sundry smaller craft, and PLA-N’s fleet composition is lacks in balance.

      Another problem is one that underlies the basic organization of the Chinese Navy--namely, the practice of conducting side-businesses. Since the beginning, the PLA has participated in businesses in order to save defense expenditures. Today, the income from these troop enterprises lines the pockets of the cadre, a situation deeply rooted in practice, and ingrained in the minds and expectations of the Chinese people. As such, it can be considered to be a problem rooted in the social codes of Chinese behavior. It is, of course, difficult to predict the future of the Chinese Navy, but one indicator may be the time-honored Chinese tradition of subordinating the Navy to the Army, the Navy has never received top-priority. Also, a historical view of the Chinese Navy that bears in mind the conditions Alfred Thayer Mahan outlined as those which influence sea power (eg.,the character and policy of government, the national character, etc.),18 suggests there are many geographic, political, and racial problems that will impede China's Navy from developing into a blue-water navy.

      China's efforts will be especially fraught with difficulty because a navy demands flexible organization. However, China has always operated under the management of bureaucrats by northern continental; currently represented by members of the Chinese Communist Party. Today, the PLAN is burdened with a dual system of command-joint leadership by both military leadership and political commissars under the overall direction and supervision of party committees. Also, doctrine itself poses challenges to modernization.

      The essence of Mao Zedong's "people's war" doctrine conveys the lack of emphasis on weapons development. Even our military, formed as it was in the heat of revolutionary struggle, has numerical and technological inferiority of weaponry, we can use natural shelter (such as reefs, island topography, cloud cover, and fog) to be able to crush an enemy equipped with superior weapons," Not only were the PLA tactical principles developed for land warfare forced onto naval affairs, but they were and are subjected to the forceful and ideological -trained leadership of the Communist Party. These inefficiencies of the bureaucracy and these political factors are incompatible with military necessity and logic, and can only contribute to reduced operational efficiency of the navy.

      Furthermore, nations that have tried to build big navies as well as big armies that is the Japanese Empire, the first World War German Empire and the Soviet Union in the cold war, have failed and was dissolved . In other words, nations that have desired a big navy as well as big army have all gone bankrupt. Furthermore, the navy of a continental nation has always been defeated by allied maritime powers, as for example the German navy in the First World War and Soviet navy in the Cold War. This is the lesson that history teaches. What does China, a continental nation that has an army of 2,200,00 men, think about this lesson, that is, the risk that the transition into a sea power strengthen liberal thoughts and may cause the corruption of the despotic political system, which ia a characteristic of a continental nation.


      The PLA Navy, its doctrine, and its operational capabilities will be a major concern to the world order. Now, one of the most important issues now confronting Asia is how an increasingly strong China will act in the region. As China is often in prickly, narrowly nationalistic fashion, and push hard for the world to accept it on its own terms. Many Western experts contend that the Communist party is attempting to stir up nationalism will most likely manifest itself in the areas. China thinks of America, the world's only superpower, as a separate society outside of their "Sino-centric" order, for America forms the core of those western societies considered "foreign guests." In this sense, China feels it is acceptable to ignore western systems and norms when dealing with basic human rights, contracts for business transactions, and so forth. Put difficulty, China's relates to America as a "foreign guest" when considered in the framework of their "Suzerainty-Vassal" structural view, juxtaposing Chinese continental thought with the concepts of a Christian maritime nation.

(1) Encourage "Maritime Values"

      The breakdown of the Soviet Union and East European nations represented an economic victory for liberal economies. Furthermore, geopolitically, it was also a victory of maritime nations over continental powers. Next, if we return to the geographical factors of the Sino-Japanese relationship, we can see there is a conflict in the conceptual outlooks between a continental state and a maritime nation. In essence, a continental state, (in comparison to a maritime state), requires a large standing army to defend its territory, necessitating a conscription system, As a result, the state system and the nature of the people are, as a rule, closed and inward-looking. Such a political system tends, in general, to become a centralized, despotic dictatorship. Meantime nations, however, surrounded by the natural barrier afforded by the sea, have little fear of being invaded by outside nations. Therefore their defense concentrates in their navy and, as a rule, they tend to employ a volunteer military system. Therefore, maritime nations tend to be open and have liberal political system. This disparity in conceptual outlooks between continental and maritime powers is another factor which impedes more intimate ties between China and Japan.

       Let us now consider Japan. The most important determinant in future Sino-Japanese relations in the choice Japan facts--either to follow the continental nations centered on China or the maritime nations centered on Europe and the United States. Because maritime nations conventionally achieve prosperity through sea-going trade, they tend strongly to place importance on international relations, and to seek smooth relations with all outside nations. Also, the domestic system tends, as in Europe and America, to ensure that activity remains free from excessive government control. Further, no matter how powerful it becomes, a maritime state cannot supply all of the resources needed domestically, so such nations usually move toward trying to construct multiple international ties of sea-borne interdependence.

       Further, looking also at Japan's history, when Japan has formed alliance with continental powers Germany, it has only known hardship. " The U.S.-Japan cooperation under the umbrella of American naval power, thereby facilitating a shared U.S. and Japanese responsibility for "Pax-American" and "western values and world order" under the dominion of the U.S. maritime strength. Such a policy course by Japan, however, is only possible if premised on the U.S.-Japanese alliance, an alliance of maritime nations.

(2) Pay attention to the Sun Tzu' "Art of War"

       The United States and Japan share a history of almost coming blows in the past because of mutual misunderstanding. In addition, China heightened the hostile sentiment between the United States and Japan through skillful diplomatic strategy and the utilization of public opinion based on the ideas expressed in Sun Tzu, Art of War, such as "to win hundred victories in hundred battles is not the acme of skill; to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." Sun Tzu also said, "What is supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy, next is to disrupt his alliances; and the next best is to attack his army. The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternatives."

             If we continue to pursue the course of history leading up to the Pacific War, we also see that America viewed Japan--which had the power to stabilize Asia--as an enemy. They were excessive in this assessment of Japan as an enemy, swayed by the skillful way with words of the Chinese in their diplomacy. This is already embodied in China's intention to divide the United States and Japan today using Nan king incident widely. The scenario China fears the most is that the United States and Japan will continue their strong alliance and prevent China from exerting hegemony in Asia. United States and Japan, as democratic nations where public opinion influences national politics, must be mindful of the like hood that China, consistent with history, will apply Sun Tsu's "Art of War" and skillfully encourage public opinion so that our two nations will suffer misunderstandings, and end up fighting one another as a result of deepening antagonism.

      Concluding my paper, I would like introduce the book introduced and noted by Arthur Waldon, How Peace was Lost - The Developments Affecting American Policy in the Far East. 19 This report was transmitted in the critical era of 1935 from the American Ambassador to China Van A.MacMurray to the Secretary of State, and he wrote Japan as " the only stable power in the Far East able to keep peace in Asia. It is not China but Japan." But this telegram was not adapted for American foreign policy. He stated that;

     "The Washington Treaty System was torpedoed not by Japan, but by China and the great powers of the West led by the United States. China weakened the Washington Treaty System because domestic elements used nationalism as a domestic and foreign policy plank on which to extend their own influence. Although the United States did not have critical interests in China. it let the Washington System collapse by its consistently ingratiating but ineffective attitude toward Chinese nationalism.
Britain, too, considered only the maintenance of its own interests in China and let the Washington System collapse. But a stable international society cannot be realized unless all countries observe international laws and treaties and implement any modifications by fixed procedures. In seeking to recover own customs rights, abolish the territorial rights of another country, or retain territory, imitational laws or treaties cannot be sacrificed on the alter of nationalism no matter what the reason."