Rising Sun in the Mediterranean -Second Special Squadron,1916-1918
Forward
Scholars such as Julian Corbett and Henry Newbolt are famous
for their great achievements in the field of naval history of the First
World War, but except for Paul H. Halpern's A Naval History of World War
and Ian Nish's Alliance in Decline, only a few studies of the First World
War history in English have paid attention to the Japanese role, especially
of the naval actions in the Mediterranean. Even the work of Halpern, which
presents in full detail the naval history in World War, makes only a few
refrences to the Japanese naval activities in the Mediterranean. This paper
deals with the Second Special Squadron which was despatched to the Mediterranean.
The object is to examine what the Japanese Navy did in the Mediterranean
and how their activities were assessed, why the Japanese Navy hesitated
to send large ships(Battleships and Battle Cruisers) to the European waters
and why destroyers were applied in the Mediterranean, and to consider what
they accomplished in diplomatic terms.
1.Japan's Entrance into the War and limitation of the Operational Area
Great Britain and Japan had been allies since 1902, and
the Japanese Navy was predominant in the Far East at that time. The First
World War began on 28 July 1914, and the British ultimatum to Germany expired
at midnight on August 4. At the beginning, Japan's entrance to the War
was not welcomed, and by the nature of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, there
was no obligation for Japan to automatically join in hostilities even if
Britain declared War. On 3rd August 1914, British Ambassador Sir Conyngham
Greene visited Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kato Takaaki, and showed him
the telegraph which said “Sir Edward Grey did not think that the interests
dealt with by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be involved, nor did he
think it likely that His Majesty's Government would have to apply to the
Imperial Japanese Government under the terms of that Alliance."(1)
Acknowledging this British inten-tion, the Japanese Government declared
neutrality on 4th August. However, Japan added that in the event that “Great
Britain becomes involved in the general conflagra-tion and the object of
the treaty of alliance between Japan and Great Britain is placed in jeopardy,
the realization of which events the Imperial Government sincerely wish
not to take place, Japan will be obliged to take those steps necessary
for the preservation of the object of the treaty."(2)
Nonetheless, on the 3rd, Grey approached Japan by way of
precaution that “if hostilities spread to the Far East and an attack on
Hong Kong or Weihaiwei were to take place, we should rely on their support."(3)
While, as Grey hoped the Far East would remain out side of the War, on
4 August, he told Japanese Ambassador in London, Inoue Katunosuke that
Britain should avoid, if it could, to draw Japan into any trouble.(4) But
on 7th August, Grey reversed his first proposal and Ambassador Greene brought
a most urgent message to Minister Kato which said, “It is most important
that the Japanese fleet should, if possible, hunt out and destroy the armed
German merchant cruisers who are now attacking our commerce."(5) But,
after transmitting this message, Grey again changed his attitude, and attempted
to keep the Far East out of the war, as the dominions of Australia and
New Zealand, the Netherlands East Indies and the United States did not
welcome the participation of Japan into the war. Grey expressed his concern
on the 9th, and relayed to Ambassador Inoue on the 10th via Greene. He
said to Minister Kato that war in the Far East would trigger disturbances
in China and spread to all East Asia, thus dealing a heavy blow to British
trade, and he requested Japan to refrain until further instruction.(6)
But on the 10th in London, Grey also requested Ambassador
Inoue to cancel invoking action under the Treaty to avoid international
trouble and disturbance of trade in China.(7) While in Japan, the Okuma
cabinet had already decided on 8th to give an ultimatum against Germany
following the first British request of 7th August. The cabinet by this
time had reported to Emperor Taisho and had received his approval to declare
the ultimatum to Germany. Minister Kato strongly opposed the British cancellation
because it would overturn the decisions already made, and, the cabinet
would be put in an “extremely embarrassing position". After several
negotiations, Grey finally conceded on 11th August for Japan to send the
ultimatum to Germany, but on condition that the theatre of operations be
confined to the German leasehold on land and the neighbouring China Seas.(8)
Furthermore on the 12th, Grey handed over an Aide-Memoir to Ambassador
Inoue, in London, that “Japanese action will not extend beyond the Asiatic
waters westward of the China Seas, nor to any foreign territory with the
exception of territory on the Continent in Eastern Asia which is under
German occupation.(9)
Ambassador Inoue insisted that the Japanese Navy must protect
her merchant ships on the high sea, and should the German Eastern Squadron
retreated to the German Pacific Islands, the Japanese Navy would pursue
them. Such a limitation would be unrealistic in naval operations.(10) But,
on the 14th August, Grey asked that Japan should give assurances to other
nations such as Australia, the United States, the Netherlands and others
of its geographic areas of operations, since these countries always held
the misapprehension that Japan had territorial ambitions, and to announce
that Japan had no intention of seizing German Islands in the Pacific in
any form.(11)
Due to these British concerns and proposals, Prime Minister
Okuma Shigenobu declared, at the meeting of All Japan Commercial Assembly
that “Japan has no intention of seizing German Islands in the Pacific.(12)
But on the same day, in London, without giving notice to Japan, the British
Government on its own informed the press that the action of Japan would
not extend to the Pacific Ocean beyond the China Seas, except in so far
as it may be necessary to protect Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific,
nor beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, nor to any foreign
territory except territory in German occupation on the Continent of Eastern
Asia.(13)
2. British requests for naval assistance
(1)Request concerning the Pacific and Indian Oceans
Having asked Japan for geographical limitation, however,
the British Navy, recognized their lack of naval power in the Pacific and
in the Mediterranean. They reversed their policy and requested Japan to
despatch naval forces to European waters outside of the original geographical
limitation on the 13th August. The British Navy asked the Japanese naval
assistance attach , Captain Abo Kiyotane, to deploy the cruiser “Izumo"
which had been dispatched to Mexico, to head for Esquimalt to protect the
coast of North America.(14) Then on 2nd of September, Grey sounded out
Ambassador Inoue as to whether the Japanese Government would be disposed
to send a division of their Navy in order to cooperate with the Allies
Navy primarily in the Mediterranean and ultimately in the decisive theatres
to cope with the Turkish and the Austrian battleships, the German cruiser“Goben"
and the light cruiser“Breslau" in the Mediterranean.(15)
To this requirement, Minister Kato explained to the British
Ambassador Greene, on 9th September, that Japan could not afford to split
its naval force to the European waters because its operations in Tsingtao
and in the Pacific Ocean were being carried out, and since the Imperial
Naval vessels were designed mainly for home defence, it was almost impossible
to gain the approval of public opinion to send naval forces to Europe.(16)
Two months after the first request, on 4th November 1914, Britain again
extended its request for the Japanese Army to head for Europe and the Navy
to the Dardanelles, because of Turkish participation in the war. Greene
handed a private “most secret" message from the First Lord of the
Admiralty, Winston S. Churichill, to the Minister of the Navy, Vice Admiral
Yashiro Rokuro, asking for naval assistance, “as Tsingtao will be taken
and the German cruisers will probably be destroyed, we hope early in the
year to be strong enough to increase the severity of our naval pressure
on the Germans by entering the Baltic". On this proposal, at the conversation
with Kato, Greene offered the advantages to Japan of a more powerful voice
at the peace conference, if Japan concurred to this proposal.(17)
These incoherent and conflicting approaches by the British
created strong arguments and deep distrust within the Japanese Navy that
the British had limited Japanese naval activities in the China Sea at the
beginning of the war. The Navy Minister Yashiro relayed his negative opinion
to the Foreign Minister that if main forces were despatched to the European
waters, the Navy could not secure national defence against “the second
enemy〔the United State Navy〕." Secondly Japan would lose diplomatic
power if she lost her main battleships. Thirdly, the Navy Minister was
concerned about the enormous costs for overseas campaign.
Chief of the Naval General Staff, Vice Admiral Shimamura
Hayao shared the opinion that Japan should avoid the risk of losing naval
power for home defence against possible United States threat, and moreover
that the British request was not covered by the Treaty.(18) While the Japanese
Navy was debating, Churchill sent the following proposal on 15th November
to the Japanese Navy Minister Shimamura that; firstly -- Japanese Navy
can make whatever dispositions of their squadrons and ships in the Australian
waters, since the British Navy will allow their own squadron to be concentrated
in the search for the “Scharnhorst" and “Gneisenau" and to
pursue them. Secondly -- such dispositions of Japanese naval vessels in
the Australian archipelago will prevent the return to the Pacific of the
German Squadron from the coast of Chile, and also afford protection to
the trade of Japan and Great Britain throughout the Indian and Pacific
Oceans; Thirdly -- as these operations will not fully occupy the naval
forces of Japan, we ask whether the Japanese Government and Admiralty would
find it agreeable to send a squadron to the Dardanelles to blockade the
German-Turkish fleet there. If any vessels employed in the last-named operation,
we should of course be willing to indemnify the Japanese Government, and
all facilities for fuel, supplies and docking will be afforded by us free
of cost to any vessels employed in European waters.(19)
On 18th November, the Japanese Navy replied to the British
Naval Attach, Captain Edward H.Rymer, that the first and second requests
were approved and that details would be decided by both admiralties. But
with regard to the third, it should be considered not by the naval authorities,
but by the Government. The definite answer would be given later by the
Imperial Government after considerations.(20)
Then on the 25th November, Foreign Minister Kato officially
declined Britain's third request through a Memorandum. He repeated in the
Memorandum that,“the Imperial Navy is, as the British Ambassador is well
aware, organized with the main object of defending the Empire against foreign
invasion and of securing Japan's position in East Asia. The despatch of
a force strong enough to render the effective assistance as desired by
the British Admiralty would seriously weaken the national defence."
“Moreover, the presence of the Japanese main fleet in these waters being
a strong factor of guarantee of peace in East Asia, its removal to the
theatre of War in Europe would render it exceedingly difficult to meet
with any emergency that may arise in East Asia, and to carry out completely
the obligations imposed upon us by the articles of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
In view of these considerations, the Imperial Navy extremely regrets that
it is unable to meet the wishes of the Great British Admiralty."(21)
Britain persisted and continued to solicit the assistance
of Japan. On 18th December, unofficially, the British Navy sounded out
the Japanese Naval Attach Rear Admiral Oguri Kosaburo about sending battle
cruisers to the Mediterranean. But, Admiral Oguri replied that he could
not comply since it was not a matter for naval authorities but for the
Governments to talk it over.(22) Again, on the 13th January 1915, Ambassador
Greene sounded out Foreign Minister Kato on this matter. However, Greene
could not obtain any concession from him.(23)
(2)Request concerning the Mediterranean
Subsequently, there was no request from Britain for over
a year. But, as German naval effort had been concentrating on commercial
raiders, on 2nd February 1916, the British Admiralty communication to its
Foreign Office": The presence of a flotilla of Japanese destroyers
in those waters would be of the greatest value in view of the present demand
for Allied vessels of this type. Tentative enquiry has, from time to time,
been made of the Japanese naval attach as to whether his Government would
be likely to accede to a request for a flotilla of destroyers to be sent
to the West, but no indication has been given that the Japanese Government
are consider-ing the matter....It would not be necessary to specify the
Mediterranean as their destination, since they could, if preferred, be
employed in home waters, thus releasing others for the Mediterranean. My
Lords quite appreciate that it may, on political grounds, be thought inadvisable
to solicit the Japanese government for naval assistance in the West, but
the practical necessities of the naval situation make it necessary to ask
that the suggestion should be seriously considered.(24)
Having received the above notification on the 4th February,
Grey informed Inoue of the present situation of the Royal Navy, and then
asked quite informally if they could obtain the agreement of the Japanese
Government to despatch destroyers to the Mediterranean. Grey also telegraphed
the British Ambassador in Tokyo the purport of the Admiralty's request
that they understood that the Japanese Government would not be justified
in risking the loss of battleships by mines or submarines at so great a
distance from Japan. But they might be prepared to consider the use of
a flotilla of destroyers, which presumably involved much less risk to the
strength of the Japanese fleet.(25)
However, On 8th February, because of the rapidly growing
danger from German naval raiders at large from the Atlantic to the Indian
Ocean.(26) The British Admiralty changed the proposing area of the Japanese
Naval operation from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, in order to
protect the transport route between Australia and asked for Aden and destroyers
to assist in patrolling the Malacca Strait.(27) In reply, Minister Ishii
Kikujiro proposed the following conditions to Ambassador Greene if they
were to comply with the British request; firstly, the admittance of Japanese
immigrants by Australia and New Zealand, secondly, the Australian Government's
agreement to sign the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty, and thirdly, the
repeal of restrictions which prevented Japanese medical doctors from practising
in the British colonies.(28)
In addition, on the following day, Foreign Minister Ishii
wired a firm instruction to the Japanese Ambassador in London that he should
convey to the British Government that the agreement to provide the naval
assistance requested would not be passed in the Diet unless Britain accepted
Minister Ishii's proposal.(29) Negotiations were continued on the 21st
February, 17th and 23rd March. In view of Grey's efforts, Ishii finally
instructed Inoue on the 26th March to inform Grey that the Japanese Government
was prepared to comply with Britain's request.(30) On 30th March, the Japanese
Navy ordered two cruisers ("Tsushima" and“Tone") and four
destroyers to patrol in the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Strait and Java
Sea.(31)
(3)Request for the Mediterranean
There was no further request for Mediterranean aid until
December 1916. But after the Battle of Jutland, German naval efforts concentrated
more and more on submarine warfare. From this change of German naval operation
by December, Allied ships were being lost at the rate of 300.000 tons per
month. Due to this serious situation, the British Admiralty submitted a
request to Japan to send two light cruisers from the Sixth Squadron stationed
at Singapore, to the Cape of Hope and flotillas of destroyers to the Mediterranean.(32).
Upon receiving this request from the Admiralty, Grey instructed Greene
to sound out the Japanese Government. Greene visited the Foreign Minister
Motono Ichiro on 11th and Minister of the Navy, Admiral Kato Tomosaburo
on 15th January 1917, and he inquired if Japan could despatch cruisers
to the Cape of Hope and destroyers to the Mediterranean.
To this request, opinions in the Imperial Navy were divided.
One was in favour of positive policy, asserted by Rear Admiral Akiyama
Saneyuki, who had recently returned to Japan from his trip in Europe. He
emphasized the importance of cooperation and he insisted that Japan must
accept British request. If Japan could contribute more to the Allies, Japan
could get a position among the Allies after peace had been restored. He
also added that Japan could gain new anti-submarine tactics and weapons.
Another opinion supported a negative policy, asserted by Commander Nakamura
Ryuzo, Chief of the First Section(Operation) of the Naval General Staff.
He submitted to Rear Admiral Abo Kiyotane, Chief of the First Department
of the Naval General Staff, his opinion that “Japan must not send main
battle ships unless Japan itself were in danger, even if we were able to
gain tactical and technical gains.(33) While in Japan, a new cabinet was
formed by General Terauchi Masatake whose members favoured coopera-tion
with Allies with the expectation of a voice at the peace conference. Finally,
the Imperial Navy decided to despatch destroyer squadron to the Mediterranean
and presented the proposed following condition, to Ambassador Greene from
Minister Mototno on 2nd February:(34)
1.The “Tsushima" and the “Niitaka" to be sent to the Cape of Good Hope.
2.The “Akashi" and a detachment of destroyers, consisting of two
flottilas, under command of Rear
Admiral, to be sent to the Mediterranean.
3.Those vessels not to be placed under the command of the Admiral Commander-
in-Chief of the
British Naval Forces, but to act in co-operation with him or at his
request.
8.It is to be understood that any reinforcement of the Japanese ships now
to be sent will be impossible
under actual conditions of the Japanese Navy, and that the ships to
be based on Malta will not be
called upon to extend their operations beyond the Mediterranean(32)
(No.4, 5, 6, 7 conditions are omitted).
Conceding to the British request, the Japanese Government
finally decided on February 10th at the Cabinet meeting, to send a one
light cruiser “Akashi"and eight destroyers. The Eleventh destroyer
flotilla(later changed formation number to 24th Flotilla), four 650 tons
“Kaba" class, left Japan on 18th February 1917 to join the flagship
light cruiser “Akashi" and Tenth destroyer flotilla(later 23rd Flotilla)
in Singapore on 5th March. The Second Special Squadron left Singapore commanded
by Rear Admiral Sato Kozo for the Mediterranean on 11th March, arriving
at Malta on 16th April, via Colombo, Aden, and Port Said. Using Malta as
base, the Second Special Squadron thereafter discharged the most important
duties, of escorting Allied troopships until the end of war.(35)
By the end of April 1918, the losses of shipping again
became severe, and the British Navy asked for Japan twelve more destroyers.
Then on 1st May, Ambassador Greene handed Minister Motono a confidential
private letter stating that a large number of ships were being lost by
the Germany's unrestricted submarine campaign. Therefore, the British needed
as much Japanese naval assistance as possible in European waters.(36) In
addition, on 5 May, the King and Queen invited the Japanese Ambassador
and his wife to Windsor Castle, where King George V asked for more destroyers
to be sent the Mediterranean. Furthermore, on 13th May, Greene again asked
Motono for further assistance.(37) However, because of lack of big destroyers,
the Japanese Navy expressed unwillingness to despatch twelve destroyers.
Instead, the Japanese Government decided to send four newly constructed
“Momo" class 850 ton destroyers at the 23rd of May Cabinet meeting,
in the expectation that Britain would supply the materials required for
the construction of substitute destroyers. Motono also added that Japan
could not send any more destroyers, due to the lack of appropriate ocean
type destroyers.(38) On 25 June, the Fifteenth Flotilla left Japan and
arrived in Malta in August 1917.
On 6th June, the British Navy asked the Japanese naval
attach, Rear Admiral Funakosi Kajishiro, for the Japanese Navy's 1.800
sailors to be employed on the British fourteen destroyers and six sloops,
stating that the British Government would bear all expenses.(39) Ambassador
Chinda Sutemi in London counselled Japan to comply with this demand on
21st June. Naval Attach Funakosi and Rear Admiral Sato also stated similar
positive advice.(40) There arose opposition within the Navy again, but
finally, the Japanese Navy accepted to send two trawlers, “Tokyo"
(Japanese name “Tokyo") and “Miningsby" ("Saikyo")
of the Royal Navy on 11th June, and two British H-class destroyers “Nemesis(Sendan"),
and “Minstrel(Kanran) in September and in October 1917.(41) On 21st October,
the British Navy again asked to the Japanese Naval Attach for two cruisers
to the Mediterranean but the Imperial Navy refused. Ambassador Chinda met
Minister Sir Arthur James Balfour on 13th November and clearly denied request,
repeating that to send battle-cruiser to European waters would cause the
depletion of the national defence.(42)
In addition, on 23rd February and 9th June, having received
Admiral Gough-Calthorpe's communication for further assistance, Rear Admiral
Sato telegraphed this message adding his opinion that the sending of another
destroyer, would be effective tactical research for anti-submarine warfare.
But the Japanese Navy did not comply with it.(43) But the Allies, having
seen how the Japanese destroyers had provided invaluable support, there
arose another requirement from the Italian and French Navies.(44) However,
the Japanese Navy did not comply saying that they had no more vessels available
since their naval forces had already been sent to the Pacific, the Indian
Ocean, Australian waters, the Mediterranean and recently to Vladivostok
and that the situation in Siberia, the unsteady conditions in China and
the danger of possible German raid in Eastern waters prevented the Japanese
Navy from sparing any additional forces.(45) By these continuous refusals,
there a rosed not only antipathy to Japan, but also the suspicion that
Japan might be conserving her naval strength in the long term for future
use against Britain.(46)
(4)Evaluation and activities of the Second Special Squadron
The Second Special Squadron arrived in the Mediterranean
at the height of the submarine crisis in 1917. They escorted troopships
from Alexandria to Marseilles, from Alexandria to Taranto, and from Malta
to Salonica. The total numbers of escorts reached 348 times and escorted
vessels totalled 788, carrying about 70.000 soldiers plus 7075 persons
rescued from attacked vessels.(47) The Japanese Navy spent 72 percent of
their time at sea compared with 60 percent by the British and about 45
percent by the French and Italian Navy.(48) The number of working days
reached 26 days per month and its operation distance reached 6,000 nautical
miles in a month.
Number of vessels escorted by the Japanese Squadron
|
Total No. |
Warships |
Transports |
Britain |
644 |
21 |
623 |
France |
100 |
0 |
100 |
Italy |
18 |
0 |
18 |
Others |
26 |
0 |
26 |
Total |
788 |
21 |
767 |
During the war, On 11 June 1917, “Sakaki" was attacked
by German submarine which killed 59 of the crew and wounded 22. The Second
Special Squadron fought 36 times against German submarines from 15 April
1917 to 2 November, but were unable to sink any.(49) How did Britain assess
the Japanese Navy's contribution in the Mediterranean? Before evaluation,
I would like see what were the Allies Naval capabilities in the Mediterranean.
The naval situations in the Mediterranean, according to Commander-in-Chief
of British Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral G.C. Dickens to Captain K.G.B.Dewar,
Assistance Director, Plans Division was as follows.(50)
“People who study our situation at home might come to
the conclusion that we are not all badly off for anti-submarine forces.
That the total produced by Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece
and U.S. are formidable enough. All this is, however illusory. Italy's
share, except in certain narrow circumstances is infinitesimal. Bar the
protection of traffic creeping round her shores, and the protection is
of a poor standard, Italy will offer nothing towards any sort of the anti-submarine
warfare we like to wage, defensive or offensive. If she did, her Navy is
so inefficient that her assistance would be of little value. France has
not a large number of efficient craft for anti-submarine purposes, and
though the French are eager to do all they can, they are on the whole incapable
of runing a sound naval campaign. Their organization is not practical,
and they somehow think on unsound lines, and no sooner do you imagine you've
roped them in to a concentrated effort, than off they go diffusing their
forces in every possible way. The Japanese are of course splendid, but
their numbers are small. The efficient Greek ships are so few that they
may be left out of the calculation. At present we have no sea-going American
forces in the Mediterranean. They all work from Gibraltar out into the
Atlantic."
Diplomatically, King George V. expressed to the Japanese
Ambassador his gratitude and admiration for the Japanese Navy's contribution.(51)
Also, the British senior naval Officer-in-Charge in Malta, Rear Admiral
George Ballard reported to the Admiralty that “all destroyers and sloops
based on Malta have been reserved ever since my arrival on the station,
but even so the number did not suffice to avoid many delays until the arrival
of a Japanese Flotilla at Malta in April 1917, whose assistance has been
invaluable".(52) And also, he reported that “French standards of
efficiency are certainly lower than British however, and Italian standards
are lower still. With the Japanese it is otherwise. Admiral Sato's destroyer
are kept in a highly serviceable condition and spend at least as large
a proportion of their time at sea as our own, which is far from being the
case with the French or Italian vessels of any class. The Japanese moreover
are very independent in all matters of administration and supply whereas
the French will never do anything for themselves if they can get it done
for them."(53)
Admiral Somerest Gough-Calthorpe, the British Mediterranean
Commander-in-Chief also expressed regard that “Rear Admiral Sato has always
placed the Japanese destroyers at my disposal for escort work and I find
their officers make no difficulties and have picked up their duties very
satisfactorily."(54) But, because of racial prejudice, or rivalling
of the British Navy against the Imperial Navy, or international situation
after the war, the Japanese Naval contribution was not fairly evaluated.
The staff of Malta, Captain Murry Pipon criticized that “Although the
Japs very good when they knew exactly what they had got to do and all went
according to plan, but inferior to our men when unforeseen situations cropped
up.”(55) Admiral Sir John R.Jellicoe also looked upon Japanese Navy with
racial prejudice that “It is very improbable that the Japanese would consent
to any of their battle-cruisers joining the Grand Fleet, and even if they
did, it is doubtful whether they would be a match for German battle-cruisers
when manned by Japanese."(56)
It was after the World War that the Second Special Squadron
was given fair reputation through the writing of Prof. Ivan Nish and Paul
G. Halpern. Nish evaluated that “If we try to assess Japan's naval contribution
to the allied effort, we have to conclude that it was considerable in the
last stages of the war. It was by no means the sole cause of allied success
in meeting the submarine onslaught; but it has to be numbered as one factor
alongside the contribution of American destroyers and the success of the
British convoy system. Her contribution in the Mediter-ranean and the Indian
Ocean was a great relief to the Royal Navy. Finally, Japan's naval assistance
was more valuable to Britain than to other members of the Entente who were
less dependent on keeping open trade channels."(57) Paul G.Halpern
evaluated that the Japanese were nominally independent, but actually carried
out whatever orders they received from the British Commander-in-Chief at
Malta. The Japanese in fact worked very closely with the British, particularly
in escorting troopships. They soon gained an excellent reputation. Their
ships were new and well-handled, and the British paid them the ultimate
compliment.....This Japanese contribution of fourteen destroyers at a critical
moment in the war against submarines has been largely forgotten, but under
the circumstances it was far from negligible".(58)
3.Why Japan despatched Destroyers and why not Battle-Cruiser to the European Waters
(1) Anti-Japanese feeling and Relation with United States
Why did Japan accept despatching destroyers to the Mediterranean?
Prime Minister Terauchi Takeshi explained to Rear Admiral Sato the reason
for the decision when Sato visited the Prime Minister upon his departure.(59)
the Prime Minister told him that the reason was not just to fulfil Japan's
duty under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, nor to meet the demand of Britain.
He said, we accepted firstly, if Germany continues to use such violent
operations, as a major power of the world, it is our duty and responsibility
to take strong measure against Germany in the name of justice and humanity.
Secondly, our Allies are in great danger, suffering from German submarines.
We cannot ignore this situation by any means. It is our duty to save the
Allies. If we let them die without our making any attempt to save our Allies,
we will lose not only our interests which we have gained, but will also
suffer the great pain of defeat. We cannot just sit back and watch this
situation. We have therefore decided to despatch the squadron under your
command. I cannot give you a large number of ships now as the Navy is short
of suitable destroyers, but I hope you will do your best to show the honour,
and to expand the influence of our country." But, Prime Minister Terauchi's
explanation was one sided and only a surface reason. There were complex
reasons why Japan accepted despatching naval forces to Europe and why the
Japanese Navy had been reluctant to do so.
It was due to the international situation, especially the
Japanese-American relations, which impelled Japan to prepare for American
aggressive policy toward Japan. American public opinion gradually worsened
after the Russo-Japanese War. During the years, before America entered
the war, anti-Japanese feelings became highly antagonistic as a result
of German propaganda which aimed to separate and cut the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance. The Germans also turned American opinion to become anti-British
using the concept of racial prejudice of the “Yellow Peril". Captain
Edward H. Rymer, British Naval attach, explained this relation as Japan
being really “a nut between British and American crackers" in his
report.(60) This Japanese uneasiness, however, was not understood by Britain
and the Allies. So there arose very strong criticism and suspicion among
Allies. The First Sea Lord, Vice Admiral Sir Henry B. Jackson, wrote in
1916 that Japan's attitude gave rise to some suspicion as to its action
after the war when Britain might be exhausted by its efforts.(61)
Also, the British Naval Attache, Capt. Edward H. Rymer
criticized in his report that;"The Japanese people, the vast majority
of whom have always looked upon the war as one between European nations,
with useful local pickings, ...the Japanese do not know the meaning of
gratitude, nor have they any intention of making any considerable self
sacrifice for any other nation...It may be truly said that Japan is drunk
with money and dazed with dreams of the leadership of the Pacific."(62)
British General Staff also distributed similar memorandum among the Government
authorities that;“Alliance is not free from attraction to the Japanese,
who are aware that their aspiration to make themselves masters of the Pacific
must be opposed by Great Britain as well as by the United States."
“It is abundantly proved that the Japanese Government meant to avoid at
all costs anything but a symbolic participation in hostilities.(63)
These exaggerations which blamed Japan for selfish pursuit
of her own national interests, were one of the reason why despatch vessels
were applied in the Mediterranean. After Japan obtained Tsing Tao and the
German owned Pacific Islands, she was satisfied to wait the fruits of war,
only supplying Russia with weapons and ammunitions and obtaining Russian
gold. Moreover, Japan gained profit by exporting her goods to markets which
had previously been those of the British and other Allies. Japan endeavoured
to moderate the anti-Japanese feeling aroused among the Allies. After arriving
in the Mediterranean, the activities of the Second Special Squadron was
often given favourable reports in newspapers. For example, the Times reported
in headline of Japan's “Speedy arrival and seamanlike handling,"
Good seamanship and greatest rapidity of action".(64) The Japanese
Naval Attache for Italy also spoke to an American pressman that during
the month of operation that the Japanese Navy had sunk 15 German submarines
in cooperation with the American Navy.(65) These reports might have helped
to depress the anti-Japanese feeling which arose among the Allies.
(2)Acquisition of the German Pacific islands
In addition to the above reasons, Japan strongly wished
to realize the acquisition of the German Pacific Islands. When Japan occupied
the North German-- owned Islands, on 1st December 1914, Minister Kato handed
to Ambassador Greene a confidential Memorandum in which he stated that
having regard to the very wide operations in which Imperial navy is and
has been engaged in cooperation with the British navy, the nation would
naturally insist on retaining permanently all the German islands lying
north of the equator, and the Imperial Government would rely on support
of His Majesty's Government when the proper time arrived for the fulfilment
of the above object.(66) On 19th October 1915, at the signing of the London
Declaration, Japan again expressed its claim to the possession of the German
Pacific Islands. (67)
Then at the negotiation over the despatch of a squadron to
the Mediterranean, Japan again requested guarantee to acquire of the German
Pacific Islands and inheritance of the German interests in Shuntung Peninsula.
Minister Motomo expressed at the negotiation that “since Japan had declared
that it would return Kiaochow to China, the aspiration of the Japanese
people were directed to the German Islands in the Pacific, and ....they
appear to the Japanese people as the only moment of their sacrifices in
the war, and ...if the islands did not become a possession, Japanese public
indignation might reach an unexpected pitch. Ambassador Chinda in London
was instructed to approach the British Government on this matter and he
succeed in obtaining British guarantee of support for Japan's claim to
the South Pacific Islands at the peace conference.(68)
On 2nd February 1917, Minister Balfour expressed to Ambassador
Chinda his willingness to comply, and on 13th he replied that the British
Government would guarantee support of Japan's claim to the islands north
of the Equator on condition that Japanese Government also would support
Britain's claim to the islands south of the equator. On 16th February,
a similar memorandum was sent to Foreign Minister Motono.(69)
4. After effects of despatch to the Mediterranean
As has been mentioned above, the Allies felt that Japan
felt it always asked for compensation in what they regarded as marked contrast
to her small assistance, and that the Japanese sea power projected to the
Mediterranean was commented as being “only a drop in the bucket"
by the British Navy. But the Second Special Squadron accomplished great
success in diplomatically supporting the national interest. During and
after the war, these destroyers visited 53 ports around France, Britain,
Italy, Belgium and Greece.(70) In London, they participated in the victory
parade and could show that Japan had cooperated with Britain. In Paris,
Japanese sailors showed their existence not only to the citizens of Paris,
but also to the delegates of the Peace Conference. One of the member to
the Paris conference, Ambassador to Italy Hayashi Gonnosuke told Admiral
Sato that by the Japanese activities in the Mediterranean, Japan was able
to show her loyalty as an Ally and obtain understanding of the Japanese
contribution to this war. Hayashi said,"We could show that Japan supported
the Allies as an ´entente´ and thus obtain position as one of five big
powers at the Paris Peace Conference.(71)
Among the Japanese crew, however, there was much resentment
against the British Navy, as the crew were always put on alert. They faced
constant strong winds and rough sea and they were closed in rolling small
destroyers. As a result, they were sick, and some committed suicide due
to mental disorder. Lookouts fell into the sea thrown by high waves. There
arose uneasiness among the crew and many complaints were made to Admiral
Sato, as he complied to all of British requests. They blamed Admiral Sato
and Britain that “the commander was servile, we were mercenaries,"
we were like the lackeys of the British Navy." (72)
Then at the Peace Conference, the clause for abolishing
racial discrimination was rejected because of opposition from Australia,
a British dominions. The unfavourable Japanese naval ratio compelled by
an apparent conspiracy by the U.S. and British at the Washington and London
conference, the fortification of Singapore immediately after the cancellation
of the Alliance developed portrayed an image of “ungrateful Britain"
to the Japanese people.(73) The reason for these aggravated anti-British
feelings is explained by the Japanese Navy, as follows(74).
“Until World War I, Britain took full advantage of its relationship
with
Japan; fully employing Japan's military strength and goodwill
at all times,
including the period of Imperial Russia's aggression to China,
restraining of
the Indian independence movement, blocking of China's anti-foreign
activities,
and protection of its dominions after it concentrated its fleets
in the North Sea.
Once peace resumed, however, its attitude suddenly changed and
Britain
refused to give Japan even the slightest concessions. This
led to the Japanese
isolation at the Paris conference and the demand for the ratios
of 5-5-3 for
battleships at the Washington Conference, the return of Shantung,
the annulment
of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the conclusion of the Nine
Power Treaty, and
eventually to all-out suppression of Japanese trade."
Footnote
(1)No.91, Appendix 1(Received on 2nd night in August), Gaimusho(The Ministry
of Foreign Affairs),eds., Nihon Gaiko Bunsho(Documents on Japanese Foreign
Affairs)--Taisho Sannen,vol.3(Hereafter cited as No. NGB3-3)(Hara-Shobo,1966),
p.95, Doc.3〔35666〕, Ann Trotter, ed., British Documents on Foreign Affairs:Reports
and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Series E. Asia,
1914-1939, Part, Vol, Japan, August 1914-1915, hereafter cited as Doc.
BDFA -1(Washington:University Publications of America, 1991), p.1.
(2)No.94(4 August 1914),NGB3-3, p.99.
(3)Doc.5〔36531〕Grey to Greene(4 August 1914) BDFA -1, No.95(4 August 1914), NGB3-3, p.99,〔 〕 means original document number of the British Public Office.
(4)No.91, Appendix 2(Received 3 August), NGB3-3, p.96.Doc.2.〔35865〕Grey
to Greene(3 August 1914), BDAF -1, p.1.
(5)No.101(7 August 1914), No.104(Inoue to Kato 7 August)NGB3-3, pp.102-105,
Doc〔37530〕 Barclay to Grey(8 August 1914), FO(Documents of Public Record
Office London),371-2016.
(6)No.110(9 August 1914), No.112, NGB3-3, pp.111-113.
(7)No.114(10 August 1914), Ibid., pp.116-117, Doc.28〔37691〕,Grey to Greene, BDFA -1, p.12.
(8)No.120 and No.122(11 August 1914)NGB3-3, pp.120-121,122-123, Doc.40〔38600〕, Memorandum Communicated by the Japanese Ambassador(11 August 1914), BDFA-1, p.17.
(9)No.127 Aide Memooire(12 August 1914),NGB3-3, pp.126-127, Doc.124〔38600〕Grey
toGreene(11 August 1914), p.17.
(10)No.140(13 August 1914), No.143(14 August 1914),NGB3-3, pp.130-131, p136.
(11)No.155(15 August 1914), NGB3-3, pp.146-147, Doc.55〔38494〕Grey to
Greene(13 August 1914), BDAF -1, p.24.
(12)Kaigun-Gunreibu〔Naval General Staff〕ed.,Taisho Sannen itaru Yonen
Kaigun-Senshi 〔Naval History of 1914-15〕(Kaigun-Gunreibu, 1920),vol.T,
p.69, hereafter cited as Kaigun-senshi 1914-15(T).
(13)No.203(18 August 1914),NGB3-3, pp.182-183.
(14)Kaigun-senshi 1914-15(T), op. cit., pp.400-401
(15)No.604. No.605(3 September 1914), NGB3-3, p.631-632.
(16)No.612, No.613, No.614(9 September 1914), Ibid., pp.635-637.
(17)No.619 Appendix 2(4 November 1914), Ibid., p.641.
(18)No.621 Appendix 1 and 2(14 November 1914), Ibid., pp.647-651.
(19)No.624(15 November 1914), Ibid, pp.655-656.
(20)No.628(18 November 1914), Ibid., p.658.
(21)No.630(25 November 1914), Ibid., pp.659-660.
(22)Adide for Naval Minister, ed., Rengo sakusen-kosho-tuzuri〔File for
Allied Negotiation for Cooperation〕, National Institute for Defence Studies.
(23)No.121(13 January 1915), NGB4-3-Jokan(hereafter cited Jo), p.235.
(24)Doc.125〔20396〕, Admiralty to Foreign Office(2 February 1916), BDFA -2, p.113.
(25)Doc.127〔26549〕, Grey to Greene(4 February 1916),Ibid.,p.114, No.317(4 February
1916), NGB5-3, pp.382-383.
(26)Doc.129〔24943〕, Admiralty to Foreign Office(8 February 1916), BDFA -2, p.116.
(27)No.318, Inoue to Ishii(9 February 1916), NGB5-3, p.382-383.
(28)No.319, Inoue to Ishii(10 February 1916), Ibid, p.382.
(29)No.321, Ishii to Inoue(19 February 1916), Ibid., p.385.
(30)No.322, No.324, No.325, Ibid.,pp.385-389.
(31)Gunreibu eds., Taisho Yonen-Kunen Kaigun Senshi〔Naval History 1915-18〕,vol.T, hereafter cited as Sankunen Senshi, pp.25-29.
(32)Doc.212〔256472〕, Admiralty to Foreign Office(19 December 1916),BDFA -2, p.176.
(33)Gunrei-bu(General Naval Staff)eds., Kimitu Taisho San-kunen Kaigun Senshi Hoi
(Secret Naval History 1915-1920 Supplement, hereafter cited as Kimitu Senshi
Hoi, pp.23-30.
(34)No.97, Memorandum(2 February 1917), NGB6-3, pp.99-100.
(35)San-kunen Senshi(U), Ibid., pp.288-313, Kino Shuichiro, Nihon Kaigun Chichukai
Enseiki〔The Japanese Navy's Expedition to the Mediterranean〕(Hara Shobo,1974),
pp.320-333.
(36)Doc〔88517〕, Admiralty to Foreign Office(30 April 1917)FO.371-2950.
(37)No.106, Chinda to Motono(7 May 1917), No.108, Greene to Motono(13 May 1917) NGB6-3., pp.110-111, 113-114.
(38)No.110, Motono to Greene(25 May 1917), Ibid,., p.113-116.
(39)Yon Kunen Senshi(1), Ibid., pp.100-101.
(40)No.114, Chinda to Motono(21 June 1917), NGB6-3., p.122-123.
(41)Yon-Kunen Sensi(U), Ibid., pp.57-58.
(42)No.153, Chinda to Motono(14 Nobember 1917), NGB6-3, pp.157-158, Yon-Kunen
Senshi(T), pp.58-59, 101.
(43)Telegram No.4(23 February 1918), No.19(9 June 1918), from Rear Admiral Sato, Daini Tokumu-kantai Hatsuden Tuzuri〔Telegraph File of the Second Special Squadron〕,National Institute for Defence Studies.
(44)No.47, Matui to Uchida(20 September 1918), No.48, Ish in to Uchida(3
October 1918),NGB7-3, pp.90-91.
(45)Telegraph from Vice Navy Minister to Admiral Sato(1 March, 20 June 1918), Telegram File Second Special Squadron,National Institute for Defence Studies.
(46)Ian Nish, Alliance in Decline:A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations 1908-23(London;Athlone Press, 1972), p.227.
(47)Yon-Kunen Senshi(U), Ibid., pp.314-316.
(48)Henry Newbolt, History of the Great War:Naval Operation(London:Longman's
Green and Co.,1931), vol.V, pp.83-84.
(49)DaiNi Tokumu Kantai〔Second Special Squadron〕eds.,Enseiki〔Expedition Records〕 (Daini Tokumu Kantai, 1919), p.316.
(50 )Paul G.Halpern, The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean 1915-1918(London:Temple
Smith,1987), p.469.
(51)No.106, Chinda to Motono(7 May 1917),NGB6-3, pp.110-111.
(52)The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, op,cit.,p.279.
(53)Ibid., p.282.
(54)Ibid.,p.290.
(55)Pipon's Letter to Mader(25 March 1968), Arthur J.Mader, From the Dreadnought to Scapa
Flow-The Royal Navy in Fisher Era,1904-1919(London:Oxford University Press, 1970), p.37.
(56)Nish, Ibid., p.227.
(57)Nish, Ibid., pp.228-229.
(58)Paul,G.Halpern, A History of World War(Annapolis:Naval Institute Press,1994), p.393.
(59)Sato Kozo, “Oshu Taisenchu Chichukai niokuru Teikoku Kaigun no Sakusen〔Activities of
the Imperial Navy in the Mediterranean during the World War〕(Naval
Academy, 1994),pp.20-21.
(60)Doc〔46022〕, Rymer to Admiralty, “War at Japan 1914-191-"(11
March 1918), FO.371/3233, XC3347, pp.122, Public Record Office,London.
(61)Doc〔148769〕, Japanese General Foreign Policy(22 October 1918), FO.371/3816 XC3509.
(62)“War at Japan 1914-191-",Ibid.
(63)Doc〔26389〕“Japanese Activities in China and India"(19 May 1916), FO.371/2647
(64)Enseiki, Ibid., p.46, Henry Newbolt, History of the Great War:Naval
Operations (Longmans, Green and Co.1920), vol. , p.457.
(65)The London times, ed., The Times History of the War(London:London Times
Publishing
Co.,1919), p.458.
(66)No.653, Appendix 3(1 December 1914), NGB4-3-Ge, pp.677.
(67)No.32, Motono to Ishii(31 August 1915), NGB4-3 Jo, p.31-32.
(68)No.102, Appendix(20 March 1917), NGB6-3, pp.103-106.
(69)Doc.219〔26707〕, Memorandum Communicated by Japanese Ambassador(2 February
1917), BDFA -2., pp.197-198.
(70)Refer, San-Kunen Senshi(T), pp.285-348, Enseiki,Ibid., pp.109-166.
(71)Sato, Ibid, p.9.
(72)Kondo Eiichiro, Chichukai Ensei Nittuki〔Diary of Mediterranean Expedition〕,
National Institute for Defence Studies, p.36.
(73)Ito Masanori,Soutei Tekikoku〔Hypothesis Enemy〕(Sasaki-Shutupan-Bu,1926), pp.296-297.
(74)Imperial Intelligence Division,“Why anti-British feeling becomes strong
in Japan," Kubo tatumasa,ed.,Showa Shakai Keizai Shi〔History of
Social-Economical Showa Period) (Daito Bunka Kenkyuusho, 1989),Vol.V.,
pp.133.