Learning from History Relations between Japan, the U.S. and China;:The Anglo- Japanese Alliance and The Four-Power Pacific Treaty

The Restructuring of the United States-Japan Security Relations(May 1996, at th CSIS Washington D.C)


Introduction

         Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of a common threat to Japan and the U.S., debate about Japan's security has intensified and opinions have emerged in both Japan and the U.S concerning the repeal of the U.S.- Japan security treaty. Compared with Europe, the post cold war security environment in the Asia - Pacific area is extremely unstable, and its complexity and fluidity are of concern. Asian stability appears dependent on Japan, the U.S. and China. To secure the region, what type of relationship should be maintained in the future by Japan and the U.S. with China, which has a different social system?

        Many elements were responsible for leading Japan into the Pacific War. In the tripartite relationship between Japan, the U.S. and China, the first and most fundamental element into the Pacific War was the annulment by the U.S. of the Anglo-Japanese alliance,(1) and the second was the conflict of interests between Japan and the U.S. in the Chinese market, which were misguided concepts held by both countries. As it is said "History is a vector to the future," history offers us a very useful yardstick in predicting the future. The present situation seems very similar to the period after World War I, when Germany was defeated and disarmed and Russia was in turmoil because of the Russian Revolution. Without a common threat to Japan or Great Britain, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was annulled.

        In this paper, I will analyze in retrospect what influence was exerted on subsequent world peace by the annulment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance,review the historical lessons of World War I for the course to be taken by Japan for Asian peace once the U.S.- Japan security treaty is annulled, and examine the importance of the U.S.-Japan security treaty and Japan's relations with the U.S. and China.

1. Miscalculations of annulling the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

          Here I would like to compare the reliability of bilateral security system and multilateral security system to the world peace. When World War I ended,the powerful Japan accumulated during the war changed the balance of power between major nations in the Far East. The U.S., whose interests in the Chinese market were curbed, became less influential. Japan and the U.S. clashed on the Shantung issue at the Peace Conference in Paris, and tensions intensified on the dispatch of troops to Siberia, and the anti-Japanese restrictions on immigration. U.S. diplomatic policy toward Japan after the war aimed at urging Japan to change its policies by directing international criticism at Japan, and by denying the existence of the achievements Japan had made in China during the war, under the slogan of the “Open-door".(2)

          Meanwhile, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was diluted in its significance, as the common enemies, Russia and Germany, were weakened, and since Britain had made it clear to the U.S. that it had no intention of carrying out its obligations under the alliance. Therefore the alliance had become ineffective. To avoid international isolation, Japan wanted to continue with the alliance and planned a cooperative arrangement with the addition of the U.S. Britain also wanted to continue the alliance, fearing that if it was abolished, Japan would become a threat to its dominions, such as Australia and New Zealand, and also using it as a diplomatic channel to settle conflicts of interest in China. On July 1, 1921, Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon made a proposition to hold a Pacific conference between Japan, the U.S., Britain and China to reconcile the alliance and British cooperation with the U.S. The U.S., however, felt the threat of attack from the Atlantic and Pacific ocean by the world leading British and the third-ranking Japanese navies, respectively. Thus the U.S. attempted to sever ties between Japan and Britain, asserting that the alliance is an exclusive treaty that mutually recognizes their special interests. The U.S. believed Britain might support Japan's aggressive policies, making it impossible for the U.S. and Britain to take cooperative action.

         Fearing Britain would take the initiative in the Pacific conference, on July 11,1921, President Warren G. Harding called for a conference to be held in Washington, D.C., and at this conference France was added to prevent close ties between Britain and Japan. The Four-Power Pacific Treaty was signed and simultaneously the Anglo-Japanese alliance was brought to an end.The Four-Power Treaty, was a general agreement recognizing the rights of the four signatories of the islands and territories in the Pacific and should be mutually respected. And whenever a dispute arises that cannot be settled diplomatically, a conference should be held to settle the issue.

        Furthermore, the Nine Power Treaty, which protected Chinese interests and defined principles of the open-door and equal opportunity policies for the Chinese market was concluded. The U.S. annulled the Ishii-Lansing Agreement,which had allowed Japan to hold special privileges in China. Thus, by the events of the Washington conference, the U.S. succeeded in not only annulling the Anglo-Japanese alliance, but also securing the safety of the Philippines, and getting international recognition of the open-door and equal opportunity policies, which had been a tradition since John Hay.

        At this conference, Japan also signed the five-power naval limitation treaty. In treaty Japan admitted a 60% disadvantage compared with the U.S.and Britain. These three treaties established the so-called Washington Treaty System as a comprehensive international cooperative peace organization. However, the Four-Power Treaty, which expanded the powerful bilateral treaty between Japan and Britain into a weak treaty between four powers, was not able to prevent the occurrence of the Pacific War because of its comprehensive nature.

       Fredrick Moore, an American who served as adviser at the Japanese embassy in Washington, D.C. for fourteen years, attributed the annulment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance to the occurrence of the Pacific War,and mentioned as follows(3)

     “I felt strongly that it was a mistake in foreign policy for the United States to press the British    for a termination of their Alliance with Japan. The Alliance could not menace us. The change that    it could was, I thought, false...The Japanese were shocked by its termination........This was the       beginning of the nation's turn toward independent action........It opened the way psychologically for     cooperation with Germany. It is, I think, even probable that had the Alliance between permitted to     continue there would have been enough restraint kept upon the Army by civilian and naval         influence in Japan believe, enough of such influence to prevent the alignment of Japan with the     Axis Powers. Because of the Alliance with Britain, Japan took part in the First World War on the      side of the Allies. I am sure the termination of it was a blunder on the part of our people and        Government."


2. Japanese Tendencies after the Annulment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
(1)Japan's isolation, reinforcement of its independent defense capability and strengthening of German ties


         What Japan did when she lost her strong partner. After the annulment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which had been the vital diplomatic axis since the opening of Japan to the outside world. What path could Japan take? Japan was isolated and had to take the option of independent armament. Vice Admiral Tetsutaro Satoh wrote,“Diplomatically, Japan must pursue peace in the Pacific area. Since this peace falls on the shoulders of Japan and the U.S., which are both located on the North Pacific, whatever happens, Japan and the U.S. should not be hostile against each but must maintain peace by mutual cooperation so long as they exist. For its achievement, it is important to respect mutually."(4)
  
        Yet, on the annulment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Sato's assertions changed. In his On Defence, Revised published in 1934, he wrote, “Every alliance or agreement is based on one's own interests and never a pure spiritual combination. Therefore, whenever any difference arises in interests, a friend yesterday will be discarded almost without hesitation." He also asserted the necessity of self armament, stating, "Those who have no real power on their own cannot remain independent. If a nation relies on an alliance, it will be exploited by the other party and unable to make use of it."(5)

        Thus independent armament increased military strength, strengthened the voice of the military, and led Japan to become a country with a military leadership. At the Peace Conference at Versailles, the clause for abolishing racial discrimination was rejected because of opposition from Australia, a dominion of the allied country. Then the fortification of Singapore began immediately after the alliance was brought to an end. These developments portrayed an image of "ungrateful Britain" to the Japanese people.(6) Humiliating memories and dis-satisfaction among the soldiers who participated in joint maneuvers became an issue, thus anti-British feeling increased even in the Navy, which was previously strong pro-British. The reason for these aggravated anti-British feelings is explained by the Japanese Navy, as follows(7):

    "Until World War I, Britain took full advantage of its relationship with Japan; fully employing Japan's    military strength and goodwill at all times,including the period of Imperial Russia's aggression to       China, restraining of the Indian independence movement, blocking of China's anti-foreign activities,    and protection of its dominions after it concentrated its fleets in the North Sea. Once peace       resumed, however, its attitude suddenly changed and Britain refused to give Japan even the        slightest concessions. This led to the Japanese isolation at the Paris conference and the demand    for the ratios of 5-5-3 for battleships at the Washington conference, the return of Shantung, the    annulment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the conclusion of the Nine Power Treaty, and          eventually to all-out oppression of Japanese trade."

        Nevertheless, the Japanese Navy continued to introduce social and political systems and arms from Britain. This was indicated by the message sent from Naval Minister, Admiral Tomosaburo Kato, who stayed in Washington as the plenipotentiary for the conference. It read, “Henceforth a system of civilian ministers will appear, therefore we must prepare for it. It should be similar to the British system"(8), indicating that the Japanese Navy had a stronger affinity with Britain than Germany. However, the annulment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance changed this relationship. Since the British door was closed to Japanese officers following the annulment of the alliance, the Japanese Navy gradually changed its destination for study abroad and technical transfer. From 1867 to 1923, the year when the alliance was annulled, 186 Naval officers (including 19 future admirals) were sent to Great Britain, while those sent to Germany numbered 53 (including 6 later admirals). After the annulment, the ratio reversed: those sent to Germany reached 59 officers but postings to Britain decreased to 45. As a result,the number of those who returned from Germany gradually increased in the Navy, and anti-British feelings and wariness escalated.

        In 1934, the year the Washington treaty became ineffective or effective, awareness of the “1935 crisis" was heightened concerning the next disarmament conference scheduled for 1935. At that time, Captain Tomohiko Yamashita and Lieutenant Commander Hidehiko Waraya, who had studied in Germany, promoted an alliance with Germany, asserting Germany, whose armaments were restricted, would be the only country to support Japan's claim for equal armaments at the disarmament conference. They also declared ahead of other countries, Japan should abandon receiving reparations from Germany, promote pro-Japanese feelings in Germany, and turn the disarmament conference to its advantage by collaborating with Germany to break the unequal armament of nations.(9)

        The rejection of the clause for restricting racial discrimination at the Peace Conference at Versailles and the unfavorable Japanese naval ratio compelling by an apparent conspiracy by the U.S. and Britain at the Washington and London conferences brought the Japanese Navy, which was increasingly dissatisfied with the Washington Treaty System, closer to Germany. During 1939-40, a period in which crucial events altered Japan's destiny, the pro-German power represented by those who had studied in Germany including: Fleet Admiral Prince Fushimi, chief of the Naval General Staff; Rear Admiral Nobutake Kondo, deputy chief of the Naval General Staff; Captain Eisuke Yamamoto; Captain Hideo Kojima; Captain Yoshio Yamamoto; Captain Tadao Yokoi; Commander Shigeru Fujii; Commander Katsuo Shiba; and those who became pro-German after having studied in Germany, including Captain Shingo Ishikawa. These individuals represented a diving force in the main stream of the Navy, and had a large hand in its decision to declare war.

(2) The rise of Asiaism

       When World War I broke out, Germany exploited racial independence movements in India to destabilize the region. Germany sent propaganda documents and arms into India. Similar to Japan's anti-Vietnam War group,who helped American deserters escape during the Vietnamese War, some Japanese felt sympathy with the German plot or cooperated for profit. When Indians such as A.M. Taraknath Das, the alleged assailant of the Viceroy of India Baron Charles H. Hardinge, and Bhagwan Singh and Rash Bihari Bose took refuge in Japan despite British demands for their extradition, nationalists called "noble-minded patriots," Tsuyoshi Inukai of the Kokumin-to Party and Takejiro Tokonami of the Seiyu-kai Party, criticized the government for no relevant clause being contained in the alliance regarding extradition. They claimed extradition of foreigners without substantial reasons would downgrade Japan's prestige, and the Seiyukai Party, a non-government party, also used it as a reason to attack the government with the Kokumin-to Party, on the grounds that these Indians were political refugees.(10)

        When World War I ended and Japan was isolated internationally, anti-British feelings which were touched off by Britain's high-handed Indian Policy intensified following the Indian refugee extradition issue. At this time, Das asserted that Japan, China and India should form a collaborative federation of Asian nations to defend themselves against U.S. and European colonialist oppression and prepare themselves for the coming racial competition. Soong Tsung Faug, a professor of St. George University in Shanghai contended that the Anglo-Japanese alliance was a mistake and Japan should work for the benefit of all Asians.(11) These comments by Das and Soong intensified Asiaism in Japan and feelings that Japan should align itself with its Asian neighbors. In this respect, Shumei Okawa wrote an article “The present state and the future of national movements in India,"and contended Indian people detest British tyranny, desire independence and place expectations on Japan. Japanese people must bravely take this grand task. Japan as the Asian leader must acquire real power to spread justice throughout the world.

Japan cannot confront the great European powers alone, but also cannot acquire real allies in Europe. Therefore, it would be natural for Japan to seek allies in Asia." (12) This thought of “Along with Asia," sympathy with Indians under British tyranny, Japan's international isolation, and economic pressure by the creation of exclusive trading blocks, gave rise to the Greater Asia concept. In Japan's desire for advancing southward resulted in subsequent “New Order Diplomacy" and “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", and eventually led to the “Greater East Asia War".


3. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and Relationships between Japan, the U.S. and China
(1)The Chinese market and relationships between Japan, the U.S. and China

        As indicated by the fact that Admiral Matthew C. Perry's expedition to Japan was to open trade with China, expansion of trade with China, which has a large population, had been a continuing national policy of the United States. The U.S., as a late comer into the Chinese market behind the great powers, advocated the principles of open-door and equal opportunities. Meanwhile, Japan, which had the greatest interests in China, resisted strongly. That is, since Perry, Japan and the U.S. had fought each other over the Chinese market. Capitalizing on World War I, during which time the European powers could not protect their interests in China, Japan resorted to yen diplomacy, investing \676 million (\376 million form local governments and private businesses and \300 million for direct projects) to secure an advantageous position.(13)

        Furthermore, the number of trading houses increased from 955 at the outbreak of the war to 4,483 in 1918 when World War I ended.(14) Japan's sudden entry into the Chinese market became a reason for Japan and Britain to sever ties, and intensified animosity between Japan and the U.S. When the war ended and the mutual enemy disappeared, British industry urged the annulment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, contending that Japan breached the "alliance for mutual interests." Soldiers and diplomats, who were dissatisfied with Japan's cooperation with Britain during the war, pushed for annulment, and in the British Parliament arguments intensified concerning ending the alliance, stating that Japan was planning to invade China, thereby abusing the alliance.(15)

On the other hand, the U.S. invested a large amount of money earned during the war into the Chinese market, and its investments during the 1930-1940 period exceeded its investment in Japan and the total amount was more than twice that invested in Japan.

        U.S. investments in Japan and China(16)
           (In thousands of U.S.dollars)
          Country  1930  1936  1940
China 129,768 90,593 46,136
Japan 61,450 46,694 37,671

        Meanwhile, the Japanese economy, which had continued to prosper, suffered from the global depression and the endemic recession that followed the end of the war as well the subsequent blow afflicted by the Great Kanto Earthquake. As a result, Japan quickly lost the foreign currency it had accumulated during the war. Japan's loans to China and the interest on them also were imperiled by restoration movements of national interests inspired by intensified Chinese nationalism and the rise of national capital. Concerning these interests, confrontation and confusion continued between Japan and China, which eventually resulted in the Manchurian Incident. Large economic expectations were placed on the Chinese market, but history states that Japanese and American investments did not bring any profits, and only produced friction among the United States, Great Britain and Japan. From John Hay's “Open Door Declaration" to the World War , Chinese market was a dream. But, after cold war, this dream again prevail over American and Japanese economical circles.

(2)China's political power and relationships between Japan, the U.S. and China

         Prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War, the American people became increasingly friendly and sympathetic to China because of the influence of Chinese culture, the journalism represented by Pearl Buck's The Good Earth,missionaries sent to China and Chinese Americans known as overseas Chinese.They also felt sympathy for the “underdogs" who would resist Japanese aggression, and they were hostile to Japan, which was then a stabilizing power in Asia, and from the influence of the Anti-Japanese media. Eespecially escalated anti-Japanese feeling by Henry Luce who built a publishing empire by magazine Time, Fortune, and Life. In the Chinese history of diplomacy, China has always employed Sun-tzu's Art of war, which maintains “War is the wrong means, the enemy should be lured with money and be beaten by creating a disturbance".(17)

        During the cold war days, China used it in an attempt to annul the Japan-U.S. security treaty, and during the recent Taiwan issue, China checked U.S. approaches to be closer to Taiwan, using the tactics of Sun-tzu's Art of war, stating: “The people's liberation army is ready to launch one ballistic missile every day for 30 consecutive days at Taiwan." To Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense Freeman it stated “For the American leadership, surely Los Angeles is more important than Taiwan."Toward Taiwan, during Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the U.S. in June 1995, the general election held in November 1995 and the presidential election in March 1996, China hurled violent criticisms at Lee and the promoters of independence by mobilizing the mass media and by conducting menacing military maneuvers such as missile launches and landing practice in the seas near Taiwan. This criticism was intended to block Lee's reelection and continued until the general election. Extremely skillful and violent,the attacks included the quotes "Lee Teng-hui is the worst criminal" and "It is the historical responsibility of the Chinese living on both sides of the strait to sweep Lee Teng-hui away into the trash can of history".(18)

        Toward Japan, China continues to place on Japan the responsibilitiy for the war and uses it as the political card to check Japan's growth as a great power. China also tries to heighten anti-Japanese opinions in Asia and reduce Japan's influence in Asia as well as sever Japan-U.S. ties. The scenario China fears the most is Japan and the U.S. will maintain a strong alliance, blocking Chinese supremacy in Asia. Japan and the U.S., whose national policies are influenced by public opinions based on democratic principles, should be cautious of Chinese politics employing Sun-tzu's art of war. Both Japan and the U.S., which only strive for short-term political targets, share a history that ended in a war through mutual misunderstanding and increasing hostility caused by China's skillful maneuvering of opinions.

        In this way, China embodied its will by diplomatically employing Sun-tzu's art of war, which advises “to defeat the enemy without fighting"(19), with emphasis placed on force and conspiracy. Since the end of the cold war, comprehensive diplomatic measures, politics and economics instead of military affairs have become important. Japan and the U.S. should recognize anew that Sun-tzu's art of war is an eternal weapon, and once again assess it from a new standpoint.


(3)China's territorial ambition

         The greatest problem indicated in Chinese recent history is Chinese awareness of itself as a great power based on its domination of Asia until the 18th century. It is a country that intended to gain supremacy by expanding its territories like Russia and France as a continental state. At present, since its land frontiers are fixed, only Tibet is under control. However, on the seas, where borders are less accurately defined, China territorially claimed the Paracel Islands in 1974 and Spratly Islands in 1988. Further, when the U.S. left the Philippines, China built a refuge for fishing boats in the Spratly Islands, which is claimed by the Philippines.These are further proof that China is advancing on the seas. China enacted the “Law of the territorial and adjoining waters of People's Republic of China" in February 1992, in which, Article 2 stipulates that “the Chinese continent and its coastal islands includes Taiwan and its islands including Uotsuri-shima, the Pescadores, Dongsha Qundao, the Paracel islands, the Spratly islands, and other islands belonging to Taiwan." Thus, unilaterally declaring the possession of these regions and the rules for the passage of ships, China is showing its insatiable desire for acquiring oceanic resources."(20)

         We should be cautious because the Chinese Navy's strategy has a continental inclination. China maintains and operates its naval forces based on a theory very similar to the living space concept called “Lebensraum" of Karl Haushofer. He asserts that “The nation is a living organization that will perish without continuous feeding. Therefore, it is natural that a nation will try to acquire the necessary resources for survival.(21) Adolf Hitler used this theory to justify the annexation of Poland and Austria. In the April 3, 1987 issue of the People's Liberation Army Daily,(22) an article titled “In search of a reasonable three dimensions strategic frontier" by Xu Guang-Yu appeared, an outline of which is as follows:

       "A strategic frontier is the living space of a nation and its people, and
        it is extremely important for the nation to pursue its strategic frontier to
        assure its security and development. The extent of the strategic frontier
        will change depending on a change in the comprehensive capability of the
        nation. In the past, the Soviet Union and the U.S. had expanded their
        spheres of influence far exceeding their geographical boundaries by
        employing military force. The 3-D space covering land, ocean, space and the
        undersea area indicates the spread of Chinese strategic boundaries. This
        assures its security and successful development, as the space for security,
        survival, science-and-technology and economy, and signifies the national
i       nterests should expand up to the front line of the thus expanded sphere of
i       nfluence and the boundaries should be expanded strategically."

        The Chinese Navy today has many problems militarily, economically and technologically. And, China needs foreign investment to maintain its current economic growth, therefore it seems to be a remote possibility that it may take military action in the near future. Yet Prof. Shigeo Hiramatsu of Kyorin University states in his article in a Brief History of China, a text book for the middle school students, published in 1952, the following 19 area are claimed as “the Chinese territories lost to imperialistic powers during 1840-1919, and this claimed areas may reflect China's traditional concept for restoring the territories back to the height of their prosperity."(23)

  (1)Semipalatinsk   (2)Pamir   (3)Sikkim     (5)Assam         (6)Nepal   (7)Burma
  (8)Andaman Islands (9)Malaya  (10)Thailand   (11)Sulu Islands     (14)Tibet
  (15)Ryukyu      (16)Korea  (17)Siberia    (18)Maritime Province (19)Sakhalin

Conclusion

        Now a days, to establish a security system in Asia, it is increasingly contented in the Asian countries that to reinforce the framework from the bilateral U.S.-Japan security system to a multilateral security system, emboldened by the confidence gained from rapid economic development in Asia. Thus the U.S. - Japan security system is at a crossroads. At this transition point, we must remained that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was bilateral strong alliance and the Four Power Treaty was multilateral treaty and this weak Four Power Treaty could not prevent the Pacific War. In concluding this paper, I would like to quote the following section from Winston Churchill's "The Second World War: The Gathering Storm." (24)

        "The United States made it clear to Britain that the continuance of her alliance with Japan, to which the Japanese had punctiously conformed, would constitute a barrier in Anglo-Japanese relations. Accordingly this alliance was brought to an end. The annulment caused a profound impression in Japan, and was viewed as the spurning of an Asiatic Power by the Western world. Many links were sundered which might afterwards have proved of decisive value to peace. At the same time, Japan could console herself with the fact that the downfall of Germany and Russia had, for a time, raised her to the third place among the world's naval Powers, and certainly to the highest rank. Although the Washington Naval Agreement prescribed a lower ratio of strength in capital ships for Japan than for Britain and the United Sttes(five:five:three), the quota assigned to her was well up to her building and financial capacity for a good many years, and she watched with an attentive eye the two leading naval Powers cutting each other down far below what their resources would have permitted and what their responsibilities enjoined. Thus, both in Europe and in Asia, conditions were swiftly created by the victorious Allies which, in the name of peace, cleared the way for the renewal of war."

Foot Note

1.Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a military alliance between Great Britain and Japan, concluded in 1902 and lasting until 1923. It played a major role in political and military developments in the Far East, especially until the close of World War. The alliance was the “Marrow" of Japanese foreign policy. It had projected Japan during years of rapid economic growth. Thus the termination of the alliance in August 1923 was something of a psychological blow for the Japanese. Japan was to remain without allies until the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1940. For two decades the Anglo-Japanese alliance was an essential element in the Far Eastern policies of its signatories. It enabled Japan to challenge Russian expansion successfully without fear of French intervention and to realize it own expansionist aims in Korea. It helped Britain to advance its interests in China while reducing the expenses involuved. It also won great prestige for Japan, as it was the first modern alliance between an Asian nation and an advanced Western nation, even if it was not as much an equal treaty as a pact between a junior and senior partner.
2.Open Door - The U.S. first espoused this “Open Door Policy", September-November 1899, concept of equality of commercial opportunity for trade with China by Secretary of State John Hay.
3. F.S.G.Pigott, Broken Thread (Aldershot:Gale & Polden Limited,1950),p.148.
4.Satho Tetutar, Teikoku Kokubo Siron (On Imperial Defense) (Suiksha,1908),pp.26-27. (Japanese publisher is Tokyo unless directed).
5. Satho Tetutar, Kokub Sinron (On Defence, Revised) (Minyu sha, 1934),p.115.
6.It Masanori, S tei Kas -Tekikoku(Hypothesis Enemy)(Sasaki-Shutupanbu, 1926), pp.296-257.
7.. Imperial Navy Intelligence Division, “Why Anti-British Feeling become strong in Japan", Okubo Tatumasa,ed, Showa Shakai Keizaishi(History of Social-Economical History of the Showa-Period),(Dait Bunka Kenkyusho、1989),Vol. .,pp.133.
8.Kokusai-Seiji-Gatukai, eds, Taiheiyo Sens he no Michi(Path to the Pacific War) (Asahi-Shinbun, 1988), p.7.
9.Capt.Yamashita Tomohiko, Waraya Hidehiko,“Proposal to cooperate with Germany", It Takasi, ed., Zoku Gendaisi-Siry (5) Kat Kanji Nituki(Continuance Modern Historical Documents (5) Diary of Kato Kanji(Misuzu-Shob, 1994), pp.557-563.
10.Document No.269, Gaimu-Sho(Minstry of Foreign Affairs)ed., Nihon Gaik -Bunsho Taisho Seris 5(Japanese Diplomatic Documents, Taisho 5(Hara-Shob, 1967), Vol 5. p,7.
11.Report on Indian A.M.Taraknath Das(27 May 1917), Report on Soong Tsung Faug, a Professor of St.George University in Shanghai(13 June 1917),Anti-British Indian File,(Doc. No.1.3.1.4.3), Diplomatic Archive(Tokyo).
12.Okawa Shumei, "The present stae and the future of national movements in India" Hashimoto Bunzo ed., Okawa Shumei Shu(Collection of Okawa Shumei)(Chikuma-Shob 1975), p.13.
13.Katuta Tatuo, Chugoku to Katuta Shukei(China and Katuta)(Daiamond Sha, 1972), pp.5-6.
14.Towa Kenkyusho(East Asian Institute)ed., Nihon no Tai Chugoku Tousi(Japanese Investigation to China(Hara Shob , 1981), p.32.
15.Ian H.Nish.Alliance Decline:A study in Anglo-Japanese Relations,1908-1923 (London:The Athlone Press, 1969), p.277-287.
16.Mira Wilkins,“The Role of U.S. Business", Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, eds., Pearl Harbor as History:Japanese American Relations,1931-1941(New York:Colombia University Press, 1973), p.374, Table 6.
17.Samuel B. Griffith, Trans.and ed., Sun Tzu's The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.66-68.
18.Yomiuri Shinbun(Yomiuri Newspaper)(25 Jan.1996), Sankei Shinbun(Sankei News-paper(10 Nov.1995).
19.Griffith, op.cit., p.77.
20.Hiramatu Sigeo, Yomigaeru Ch goku Kaigun(Rise of Chinese Navy,(Keis Shobo, 1991), pp.147-168.
21.Kawano Osamu, Chiseigaku Nyumon(Fundamental Geopolitics(Hara Shob,1981), pp.35-46.
22. Xu Guang-Yu, “In search of a resonable three dimension strategic frontier", Liberation Army(3 April 1987), op.cit., Hiramatu, pp, 168-172.
23. Hiramatu Sigeru, “Chinese Navy and Rasing of Chinese Thinking",Sin Bouei Ronsh (New Defense Bulletin, Vol.20, No.3, December 1992),pp.26-27.
24. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War:Gathring Storm (Lndon:Cassell & Co. Ltd, 1948), vol.1, p.13.