Learning from History Relations between Japan, the U.S. and China;：The Anglo- Japanese
Alliance and The Four-Power Pacific Treaty
The Restructuring of the United States-Japan Security Relations（May 1996,
at th CSIS Washington D.C)
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance
of a common threat to Japan and the U.S., debate about Japan's security
has intensified and opinions have emerged in both Japan and the U.S concerning
the repeal of the U.S.- Japan security treaty. Compared with Europe, the
post cold war security environment in the Asia - Pacific area is extremely
unstable, and its complexity and fluidity are of concern. Asian stability
appears dependent on Japan, the U.S. and China. To secure the region, what
type of relationship should be maintained in the future by Japan and the
U.S. with China, which has a different social system?
Many elements were responsible for leading Japan into the
Pacific War. In the tripartite relationship between Japan, the U.S. and
China, the first and most fundamental element into the Pacific War was
the annulment by the U.S. of the Anglo-Japanese alliance,(1) and the second
was the conflict of interests between Japan and the U.S. in the Chinese
market, which were misguided concepts held by both countries. As it is
said "History is a vector to the future," history offers us a
very useful yardstick in predicting the future. The present situation seems
very similar to the period after World War I, when Germany was defeated
and disarmed and Russia was in turmoil because of the Russian Revolution.
Without a common threat to Japan or Great Britain, the Anglo-Japanese alliance
In this paper, I will analyze in retrospect what influence
was exerted on subsequent world peace by the annulment of the Anglo-Japanese
alliance,review the historical lessons of World War I for the course to
be taken by Japan for Asian peace once the U.S.- Japan security treaty
is annulled, and examine the importance of the U.S.-Japan security treaty
and Japan's relations with the U.S. and China.
1. Miscalculations of annulling the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
Here I would like to compare the reliability of bilateral
security system and multilateral security system to the world peace. When
World War I ended,the powerful Japan accumulated during the war changed
the balance of power between major nations in the Far East. The U.S., whose
interests in the Chinese market were curbed, became less influential. Japan
and the U.S. clashed on the Shantung issue at the Peace Conference in Paris,
and tensions intensified on the dispatch of troops to Siberia, and the
anti-Japanese restrictions on immigration. U.S. diplomatic policy toward
Japan after the war aimed at urging Japan to change its policies by directing
international criticism at Japan, and by denying the existence of the achievements
Japan had made in China during the war, under the slogan of the “Open-door".(2)
Meanwhile, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was diluted
in its significance, as the common enemies, Russia and Germany, were weakened,
and since Britain had made it clear to the U.S. that it had no intention
of carrying out its obligations under the alliance. Therefore the alliance
had become ineffective. To avoid international isolation, Japan wanted
to continue with the alliance and planned a cooperative arrangement with
the addition of the U.S. Britain also wanted to continue the alliance,
fearing that if it was abolished, Japan would become a threat to its dominions,
such as Australia and New Zealand, and also using it as a diplomatic channel
to settle conflicts of interest in China. On July 1, 1921, Foreign Secretary
Lord Curzon made a proposition to hold a Pacific conference between Japan,
the U.S., Britain and China to reconcile the alliance and British cooperation
with the U.S. The U.S., however, felt the threat of attack from the Atlantic
and Pacific ocean by the world leading British and the third-ranking Japanese
navies, respectively. Thus the U.S. attempted to sever ties between Japan
and Britain, asserting that the alliance is an exclusive treaty that mutually
recognizes their special interests. The U.S. believed Britain might support
Japan's aggressive policies, making it impossible for the U.S. and Britain
to take cooperative action.
Fearing Britain would take the initiative in the Pacific
conference, on July 11,1921, President Warren G. Harding called for a conference
to be held in Washington, D.C., and at this conference France was added
to prevent close ties between Britain and Japan. The Four-Power Pacific
Treaty was signed and simultaneously the Anglo-Japanese alliance was brought
to an end.The Four-Power Treaty, was a general agreement recognizing the
rights of the four signatories of the islands and territories in the Pacific
and should be mutually respected. And whenever a dispute arises that cannot
be settled diplomatically, a conference should be held to settle the issue.
Furthermore, the Nine Power Treaty, which protected Chinese
interests and defined principles of the open-door and equal opportunity
policies for the Chinese market was concluded. The U.S. annulled the Ishii-Lansing
Agreement,which had allowed Japan to hold special privileges in China.
Thus, by the events of the Washington conference, the U.S. succeeded in
not only annulling the Anglo-Japanese alliance, but also securing the safety
of the Philippines, and getting international recognition of the open-door
and equal opportunity policies, which had been a tradition since John Hay.
At this conference, Japan also signed the five-power naval
limitation treaty. In treaty Japan admitted a 60% disadvantage compared
with the U.S.and Britain. These three treaties established the so-called
Washington Treaty System as a comprehensive international cooperative peace
organization. However, the Four-Power Treaty, which expanded the powerful
bilateral treaty between Japan and Britain into a weak treaty between four
powers, was not able to prevent the occurrence of the Pacific War because
of its comprehensive nature.
Fredrick Moore, an American who served as adviser at the
Japanese embassy in Washington, D.C. for fourteen years, attributed the
annulment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance to the occurrence of the Pacific
War,and mentioned as follows(3)
“I felt strongly that it was a mistake in foreign policy for
the United States to press the British for a termination of their
Alliance with Japan. The Alliance could not menace us. The change that
it could was, I thought, false...The Japanese were shocked by its
termination........This was the beginning of the nation's turn
toward independent action........It opened the way psychologically for
cooperation with Germany. It is, I think, even probable that had
the Alliance between permitted to continue there would have been
enough restraint kept upon the Army by civilian and naval influence
in Japan believe, enough of such influence to prevent the alignment of
Japan with the Axis Powers. Because of the Alliance with Britain,
Japan took part in the First World War on the side of the Allies.
I am sure the termination of it was a blunder on the part of our people
2. Japanese Tendencies after the Annulment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
(1)Japan's isolation, reinforcement of its independent defense capability
and strengthening of German ties
What Japan did when she lost her strong partner. After
the annulment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which had been the vital
diplomatic axis since the opening of Japan to the outside world. What path
could Japan take? Japan was isolated and had to take the option of independent
armament. Vice Admiral Tetsutaro Satoh wrote,“Diplomatically, Japan must
pursue peace in the Pacific area. Since this peace falls on the shoulders
of Japan and the U.S., which are both located on the North Pacific, whatever
happens, Japan and the U.S. should not be hostile against each but must
maintain peace by mutual cooperation so long as they exist. For its achievement,
it is important to respect mutually."(4)
Yet, on the annulment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Sato's
assertions changed. In his On Defence, Revised published in 1934, he wrote,
“Every alliance or agreement is based on one's own interests and never
a pure spiritual combination. Therefore, whenever any difference arises
in interests, a friend yesterday will be discarded almost without hesitation."
He also asserted the necessity of self armament, stating, "Those who
have no real power on their own cannot remain independent. If a nation
relies on an alliance, it will be exploited by the other party and unable
to make use of it."(5)
Thus independent armament increased military strength,
strengthened the voice of the military, and led Japan to become a country
with a military leadership. At the Peace Conference at Versailles, the
clause for abolishing racial discrimination was rejected because of opposition
from Australia, a dominion of the allied country. Then the fortification
of Singapore began immediately after the alliance was brought to an end.
These developments portrayed an image of "ungrateful Britain"
to the Japanese people.(6) Humiliating memories and dis-satisfaction among
the soldiers who participated in joint maneuvers became an issue, thus
anti-British feeling increased even in the Navy, which was previously strong
pro-British. The reason for these aggravated anti-British feelings is explained
by the Japanese Navy, as follows(7):
"Until World War I, Britain took full advantage of its relationship
with Japan; fully employing Japan's military strength and goodwill
at all times,including the period of Imperial Russia's aggression to China,
restraining of the Indian independence movement, blocking of China's anti-foreign
activities, and protection of its dominions after it concentrated
its fleets in the North Sea. Once peace resumed, however, its
attitude suddenly changed and Britain refused to give Japan even the slightest
concessions. This led to the Japanese isolation at the Paris conference
and the demand for the ratios of 5-5-3 for battleships at the Washington
conference, the return of Shantung, the annulment of the Anglo-Japanese
alliance, the conclusion of the Nine Power Treaty, and eventually
to all-out oppression of Japanese trade."
Nevertheless, the Japanese Navy continued to introduce
social and political systems and arms from Britain. This was indicated
by the message sent from Naval Minister, Admiral Tomosaburo Kato, who stayed
in Washington as the plenipotentiary for the conference. It read, “Henceforth
a system of civilian ministers will appear, therefore we must prepare for
it. It should be similar to the British system"(8), indicating that
the Japanese Navy had a stronger affinity with Britain than Germany. However,
the annulment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance changed this relationship.
Since the British door was closed to Japanese officers following the annulment
of the alliance, the Japanese Navy gradually changed its destination for
study abroad and technical transfer. From 1867 to 1923, the year when the
alliance was annulled, 186 Naval officers (including 19 future admirals)
were sent to Great Britain, while those sent to Germany numbered 53 (including
6 later admirals). After the annulment, the ratio reversed: those sent
to Germany reached 59 officers but postings to Britain decreased to 45.
As a result,the number of those who returned from Germany gradually increased
in the Navy, and anti-British feelings and wariness escalated.
In 1934, the year the Washington treaty became ineffective
or effective, awareness of the “1935 crisis" was heightened concerning
the next disarmament conference scheduled for 1935. At that time, Captain
Tomohiko Yamashita and Lieutenant Commander Hidehiko Waraya, who had studied
in Germany, promoted an alliance with Germany, asserting Germany, whose
armaments were restricted, would be the only country to support Japan's
claim for equal armaments at the disarmament conference. They also declared
ahead of other countries, Japan should abandon receiving reparations from
Germany, promote pro-Japanese feelings in Germany, and turn the disarmament
conference to its advantage by collaborating with Germany to break the unequal
armament of nations.(9)
The rejection of the clause for restricting racial discrimination
at the Peace Conference at Versailles and the unfavorable Japanese naval
ratio compelling by an apparent conspiracy by the U.S. and Britain at the
Washington and London conferences brought the Japanese Navy, which was
increasingly dissatisfied with the Washington Treaty System, closer to
Germany. During 1939-40, a period in which crucial events altered Japan's
destiny, the pro-German power represented by those who had studied in Germany
including: Fleet Admiral Prince Fushimi, chief of the Naval General Staff;
Rear Admiral Nobutake Kondo, deputy chief of the Naval General Staff; Captain
Eisuke Yamamoto; Captain Hideo Kojima; Captain Yoshio Yamamoto; Captain
Tadao Yokoi; Commander Shigeru Fujii; Commander Katsuo Shiba; and those
who became pro-German after having studied in Germany, including Captain
Shingo Ishikawa. These individuals represented a diving force in the main
stream of the Navy, and had a large hand in its decision to declare war.
(2) The rise of Asiaism
When World War I broke out, Germany exploited racial independence
movements in India to destabilize the region. Germany sent propaganda documents
and arms into India. Similar to Japan's anti-Vietnam War group,who helped
American deserters escape during the Vietnamese War, some Japanese felt
sympathy with the German plot or cooperated for profit. When Indians such
as A.M. Taraknath Das, the alleged assailant of the Viceroy of India Baron
Charles H. Hardinge, and Bhagwan Singh and Rash Bihari Bose took refuge
in Japan despite British demands for their extradition, nationalists called
"noble-minded patriots," Tsuyoshi Inukai of the Kokumin-to Party
and Takejiro Tokonami of the Seiyu-kai Party, criticized the government
for no relevant clause being contained in the alliance regarding extradition.
They claimed extradition of foreigners without substantial reasons would
downgrade Japan's prestige, and the Seiyukai Party, a non-government party,
also used it as a reason to attack the government with the Kokumin-to Party,
on the grounds that these Indians were political refugees.(10)
When World War I ended and Japan was isolated internationally,
anti-British feelings which were touched off by Britain's high-handed Indian
Policy intensified following the Indian refugee extradition issue. At this
time, Das asserted that Japan, China and India should form a collaborative
federation of Asian nations to defend themselves against U.S. and European
colonialist oppression and prepare themselves for the coming racial competition.
Soong Tsung Faug, a professor of St. George University in Shanghai contended
that the Anglo-Japanese alliance was a mistake and Japan should work for
the benefit of all Asians.(11) These comments by Das and Soong intensified
Asiaism in Japan and feelings that Japan should align itself with its Asian
neighbors. In this respect, Shumei Okawa wrote an article “The present
state and the future of national movements in India,"and contended
Indian people detest British tyranny, desire independence and place expectations
on Japan. Japanese people must bravely take this grand task. Japan as the
Asian leader must acquire real power to spread justice throughout the world.
Japan cannot confront the great European powers alone, but also cannot acquire real allies in Europe. Therefore, it would be natural for Japan to seek allies in Asia." (12) This thought of “Along with Asia," sympathy with Indians under British tyranny, Japan's international isolation, and economic pressure by the creation of exclusive trading blocks, gave rise to the Greater Asia concept. In Japan's desire for advancing southward resulted in subsequent “New Order Diplomacy" and “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", and eventually led to the “Greater East Asia War".
3. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and Relationships between Japan, the U.S. and China
(1)The Chinese market and relationships between Japan, the U.S. and China
As indicated by the fact that Admiral Matthew C. Perry's expedition to Japan was to open trade with China, expansion of trade with China, which has a large population, had been a continuing national policy of the United States. The U.S., as a late comer into the Chinese market behind the great powers, advocated the principles of open-door and equal opportunities. Meanwhile, Japan, which had the greatest interests in China, resisted strongly. That is, since Perry, Japan and the U.S. had fought each other over the Chinese market. Capitalizing on World War I, during which time the European powers could not protect their interests in China, Japan resorted to yen diplomacy, investing \676 million (\376 million form local governments and private businesses and \300 million for direct projects) to secure an advantageous position.(13)
Furthermore, the number of trading houses increased from
955 at the outbreak of the war to 4,483 in 1918 when World War I ended.(14)
Japan's sudden entry into the Chinese market became a reason for Japan
and Britain to sever ties, and intensified animosity between Japan and
the U.S. When the war ended and the mutual enemy disappeared, British industry
urged the annulment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, contending that Japan
breached the "alliance for mutual interests." Soldiers and diplomats,
who were dissatisfied with Japan's cooperation with Britain during the
war, pushed for annulment, and in the British Parliament arguments intensified
concerning ending the alliance, stating that Japan was planning to invade
China, thereby abusing the alliance.(15)
On the other hand, the U.S. invested a large amount of money earned during the war into the Chinese market, and its investments during the 1930-1940 period exceeded its investment in Japan and the total amount was more than twice that invested in Japan.
U.S. investments in Japan and China(16)
(In thousands of U.S.dollars)
Meanwhile, the Japanese economy, which had continued to
prosper, suffered from the global depression and the endemic recession
that followed the end of the war as well the subsequent blow afflicted
by the Great Kanto Earthquake. As a result, Japan quickly lost the foreign
currency it had accumulated during the war. Japan's loans to China and
the interest on them also were imperiled by restoration movements of national
interests inspired by intensified Chinese nationalism and the rise of national
capital. Concerning these interests, confrontation and confusion continued
between Japan and China, which eventually resulted in the Manchurian Incident.
Large economic expectations were placed on the Chinese market, but history
states that Japanese and American investments did not bring any profits,
and only produced friction among the United States, Great Britain and Japan.
From John Hay's “Open Door Declaration" to the World War , Chinese
market was a dream. But, after cold war, this dream again prevail over
American and Japanese economical circles.
(2)China's political power and relationships between Japan, the U.S. and China
Prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War, the American
people became increasingly friendly and sympathetic to China because of
the influence of Chinese culture, the journalism represented by Pearl Buck's
The Good Earth,missionaries sent to China and Chinese Americans known as
overseas Chinese.They also felt sympathy for the “underdogs" who
would resist Japanese aggression, and they were hostile to Japan, which
was then a stabilizing power in Asia, and from the influence of the Anti-Japanese
media. Eespecially escalated anti-Japanese feeling by Henry Luce who built
a publishing empire by magazine Time, Fortune, and Life. In the Chinese
history of diplomacy, China has always employed Sun-tzu's Art of war, which
maintains “War is the wrong means, the enemy should be lured with money
and be beaten by creating a disturbance".(17)
During the cold war days, China used it in an attempt to
annul the Japan-U.S. security treaty, and during the recent Taiwan issue,
China checked U.S. approaches to be closer to Taiwan, using the tactics
of Sun-tzu's Art of war, stating: “The people's liberation army is ready
to launch one ballistic missile every day for 30 consecutive days at Taiwan." To
Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense Freeman it stated “For the American
leadership, surely Los Angeles is more important than Taiwan."Toward
Taiwan, during Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the U.S. in June
1995, the general election held in November 1995 and the presidential election
in March 1996, China hurled violent criticisms at Lee and the promoters
of independence by mobilizing the mass media and by conducting menacing
military maneuvers such as missile launches and landing practice in the
seas near Taiwan. This criticism was intended to block Lee's reelection
and continued until the general election. Extremely skillful and violent,the
attacks included the quotes "Lee Teng-hui is the worst criminal"
and "It is the historical responsibility of the Chinese living on
both sides of the strait to sweep Lee Teng-hui away into the trash can
Toward Japan, China continues to place on Japan the responsibilitiy
for the war and uses it as the political card to check Japan's growth as
a great power. China also tries to heighten anti-Japanese opinions in Asia
and reduce Japan's influence in Asia as well as sever Japan-U.S. ties.
The scenario China fears the most is Japan and the U.S. will maintain a
strong alliance, blocking Chinese supremacy in Asia. Japan and the U.S.,
whose national policies are influenced by public opinions based on democratic
principles, should be cautious of Chinese politics employing Sun-tzu's
art of war. Both Japan and the U.S., which only strive for short-term political
targets, share a history that ended in a war through mutual misunderstanding
and increasing hostility caused by China's skillful maneuvering of opinions.
In this way, China embodied its will by diplomatically
employing Sun-tzu's art of war, which advises “to defeat the enemy without
fighting"(19), with emphasis placed on force and conspiracy. Since
the end of the cold war, comprehensive diplomatic measures, politics and
economics instead of military affairs have become important. Japan and
the U.S. should recognize anew that Sun-tzu's art of war is an eternal
weapon, and once again assess it from a new standpoint.
(3)China's territorial ambition
The greatest problem indicated in Chinese recent history
is Chinese awareness of itself as a great power based on its domination
of Asia until the 18th century. It is a country that intended to gain supremacy
by expanding its territories like Russia and France as a continental state.
At present, since its land frontiers are fixed, only Tibet is under control. However,
on the seas, where borders are less accurately defined, China territorially
claimed the Paracel Islands in 1974 and Spratly Islands in 1988. Further,
when the U.S. left the Philippines, China built a refuge for fishing boats
in the Spratly Islands, which is claimed by the Philippines.These are further
proof that China is advancing on the seas. China enacted the “Law of the
territorial and adjoining waters of People's Republic of China" in
February 1992, in which, Article 2 stipulates that “the Chinese continent
and its coastal islands includes Taiwan and its islands including Uotsuri-shima,
the Pescadores, Dongsha Qundao, the Paracel islands, the Spratly islands,
and other islands belonging to Taiwan." Thus, unilaterally declaring
the possession of these regions and the rules for the passage of ships,
China is showing its insatiable desire for acquiring oceanic resources."(20)
We should be cautious because the Chinese Navy's strategy
has a continental inclination. China maintains and operates its naval forces
based on a theory very similar to the living space concept called “Lebensraum"
of Karl Haushofer. He asserts that “The nation is a living organization
that will perish without continuous feeding. Therefore, it is natural that
a nation will try to acquire the necessary resources for survival.(21)
Adolf Hitler used this theory to justify the annexation of Poland and Austria.
In the April 3, 1987 issue of the People's Liberation Army Daily,(22) an
article titled “In search of a reasonable three dimensions strategic frontier"
by Xu Guang-Yu appeared, an outline of which is as follows:
"A strategic frontier is the living space of a nation
and its people, and
it is extremely important for the nation to pursue its
strategic frontier to
assure its security and development. The extent of the
will change depending on a change in the comprehensive
capability of the
nation. In the past, the Soviet Union and the U.S. had
spheres of influence far exceeding their geographical boundaries
employing military force. The 3-D space covering land,
ocean, space and the
undersea area indicates the spread of Chinese strategic
assures its security and successful development, as the
space for security,
survival, science-and-technology and economy, and signifies
i nterests should expand up to the front line of the thus
expanded sphere of
i nfluence and the boundaries should be expanded strategically."
The Chinese Navy today has many problems militarily, economically
and technologically. And, China needs foreign investment to maintain its
current economic growth, therefore it seems to be a remote possibility
that it may take military action in the near future. Yet Prof. Shigeo Hiramatsu
of Kyorin University states in his article in a Brief History of China,
a text book for the middle school students, published in 1952, the following
19 area are claimed as “the Chinese territories lost to imperialistic
powers during 1840-1919, and this claimed areas may reflect China's traditional
concept for restoring the territories back to the height of their prosperity."(23)
(1)Semipalatinsk (2)Pamir (3)Sikkim (5)Assam (6)Nepal
(8)Andaman Islands (9)Malaya (10)Thailand (11)Sulu Islands (14)Tibet
(15)Ryukyu (16)Korea (17)Siberia (18)Maritime Province
Now a days, to establish a security system in Asia, it
is increasingly contented in the Asian countries that to reinforce the
framework from the bilateral U.S.-Japan security system to a multilateral
security system, emboldened by the confidence gained from rapid economic
development in Asia. Thus the U.S. - Japan security system is at a crossroads.
At this transition point, we must remained that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
was bilateral strong alliance and the Four Power Treaty was multilateral
treaty and this weak Four Power Treaty could not prevent the Pacific War. In
concluding this paper, I would like to quote the following section from
Winston Churchill's "The Second World War: The Gathering Storm."
"The United States made it clear to Britain that the
continuance of her alliance with Japan, to which the Japanese had punctiously
conformed, would constitute a barrier in Anglo-Japanese relations. Accordingly
this alliance was brought to an end. The annulment caused a profound impression
in Japan, and was viewed as the spurning of an Asiatic Power by the Western
world. Many links were sundered which might afterwards have proved of decisive
value to peace. At the same time, Japan could console herself with the
fact that the downfall of Germany and Russia had, for a time, raised her
to the third place among the world's naval Powers, and certainly to the
highest rank. Although the Washington Naval Agreement prescribed a lower
ratio of strength in capital ships for Japan than for Britain and the United
Sttes(five:five:three), the quota assigned to her was well up to her building
and financial capacity for a good many years, and she watched with an attentive
eye the two leading naval Powers cutting each other down far below what
their resources would have permitted and what their responsibilities enjoined.
Thus, both in Europe and in Asia, conditions were swiftly created by the
victorious Allies which, in the name of peace, cleared the way for the
renewal of war."
1.Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a military alliance between Great Britain
and Japan, concluded in 1902 and lasting until 1923. It played a major
role in political and military developments in the Far East, especially
until the close of World War. The alliance was the “Marrow" of Japanese
foreign policy. It had projected Japan during years of rapid economic growth.
Thus the termination of the alliance in August 1923 was something of a
psychological blow for the Japanese. Japan was to remain without allies
until the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1940.
For two decades the Anglo-Japanese alliance was an essential element in
the Far Eastern policies of its signatories. It enabled Japan to challenge
Russian expansion successfully without fear of French intervention and
to realize it own expansionist aims in Korea. It helped Britain to advance
its interests in China while reducing the expenses involuved. It also won
great prestige for Japan, as it was the first modern alliance between an
Asian nation and an advanced Western nation, even if it was not as much
an equal treaty as a pact between a junior and senior partner.
2.Open Door - The U.S. first espoused this “Open Door Policy", September-November 1899, concept of equality of commercial opportunity for trade with China by Secretary of State John Hay.
3. F.S.G.Pigott, Broken Thread (Aldershot:Gale & Polden Limited,1950),p.148.
4.Satho Tetutar, Teikoku Kokubo Siron (On Imperial Defense) (Suiksha,1908),pp.26-27. (Japanese publisher is Tokyo unless directed).
5. Satho Tetutar, Kokub Sinron (On Defence, Revised) (Minyu sha, 1934),p.115.
6.It Masanori, S tei Kas -Tekikoku(Hypothesis Enemy)(Sasaki-Shutupanbu, 1926), pp.296-257.
7.. Imperial Navy Intelligence Division, “Why Anti-British Feeling become strong in Japan", Okubo Tatumasa,ed, Showa Shakai Keizaishi(History of Social-Economical History of the Showa-Period),(Dait Bunka Kenkyusho、1989),Vol. .,pp.133.
8.Kokusai-Seiji-Gatukai, eds, Taiheiyo Sens he no Michi(Path to the Pacific War) (Asahi-Shinbun, 1988), p.7.
9.Capt.Yamashita Tomohiko, Waraya Hidehiko,“Proposal to cooperate with Germany", It Takasi, ed., Zoku Gendaisi-Siry (5) Kat Kanji Nituki(Continuance Modern Historical Documents (5) Diary of Kato Kanji(Misuzu-Shob, 1994), pp.557-563.
10.Document No.269, Gaimu-Sho(Minstry of Foreign Affairs)ed., Nihon Gaik
-Bunsho Taisho Seris 5(Japanese Diplomatic Documents, Taisho 5(Hara-Shob,
1967), Vol 5. p,7.
11.Report on Indian A.M.Taraknath Das(27 May 1917), Report on Soong Tsung Faug, a Professor of St.George University in Shanghai(13 June 1917),Anti-British Indian File,(Doc. No.184.108.40.206.3), Diplomatic Archive(Tokyo).
12.Okawa Shumei, "The present stae and the future of national movements in India" Hashimoto Bunzo ed., Okawa Shumei Shu(Collection of Okawa Shumei)(Chikuma-Shob 1975), p.13.
13.Katuta Tatuo, Chugoku to Katuta Shukei(China and Katuta)(Daiamond Sha,
14.Towa Kenkyusho(East Asian Institute)ed., Nihon no Tai Chugoku Tousi(Japanese Investigation to China(Hara Shob , 1981), p.32.
15.Ian H.Nish.Alliance Decline:A study in Anglo-Japanese Relations,1908-1923 (London:The Athlone Press, 1969), p.277-287.
16.Mira Wilkins,“The Role of U.S. Business", Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, eds., Pearl Harbor as History:Japanese American Relations,1931-1941(New York:Colombia University Press, 1973), p.374, Table 6.
17.Samuel B. Griffith, Trans.and ed., Sun Tzu's The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.66-68.
18.Yomiuri Shinbun(Yomiuri Newspaper)(25 Jan.1996), Sankei Shinbun(Sankei News-paper(10 Nov.1995).
19.Griffith, op.cit., p.77.
20.Hiramatu Sigeo, Yomigaeru Ch goku Kaigun(Rise of Chinese Navy,(Keis Shobo, 1991), pp.147-168.
21.Kawano Osamu, Chiseigaku Nyumon(Fundamental Geopolitics(Hara Shob,1981), pp.35-46.
22. Xu Guang-Yu, “In search of a resonable three dimension strategic frontier", Liberation Army(3 April 1987), op.cit., Hiramatu, pp, 168-172.
23. Hiramatu Sigeru, “Chinese Navy and Rasing of Chinese Thinking",Sin Bouei Ronsh (New Defense Bulletin, Vol.20, No.3, December 1992),pp.26-27.
24. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War:Gathring Storm (Lndon:Cassell
＆ Co. Ltd, 1948), vol.1, p.13.