38th International Military History ConferenceInfluence of the Sun Tzu and Tosenkyo in the Imperial Japanese Navy - Rationalism ans Emotinalism in the WWII
Ｐｒｅｆａｃｅ
The Imperial Japanese Navy(hereafter IJN)'s tactics and weapon systems showed great diferences between the early stage and latter stage of the Pacific War. In the early stage, there was rationality, but the latter stage was predominated by emotionalism and there was no rationality in tactics and weapon systems. The IJN's war plan against U.S.Navy was a very systematic and rational one, named “Attrition Interception operation".（１） And in the early stage of the war, there was rationality and showed suplendid tactics of air-power projection from the sea to the land by carriers against Hawaii, Port Dawin and Ceyelon. But, in the latter stage of the war, IPN was occupied unrational thinking in their tactics and weapons, called suicide Kamikaze-Attack. After the defeat of Gadarucanal, especially after the Leyte Gulf, the IJN's tactics and weapon systems were greatly changed and lost rationality. Why there arosed such a great diference in the same organization. Why JIN could change their tactics for Kamikaze so easily and quickly in the latter stage of the War. What kind of military theory influenced on this rational strategy and on the later unrational strategy. The JIN's theory and thinkings were influenced from three stratgists and thier writings, Sun Tzｕ's Art of War, Alfred Thayer Mahan's Naval Strategy and Japanese ancient Tｏsenkyo〔Sutra of Combat〕.（２） This paper will consider how the IJN's tactics and weapon systems were established and changed influenced by these three strategist's thinking. And also why Japanese Navy could change her tactical concepts so quickly and easily at the latter stage of the War from military and naval doctrine and thinking.
1 Pacific War and the IJN's tactics and weapon systems
(1)The IJN's Operation Plan against U.S.Navy
The IJN-“sufficent to defend but insufficent to attack-had always followed the concept of “Attrition" plus “Interception" operation for its armaments, weapon systems, fleet formation, education and training ever since 1907 when it began to read the American Navy as its potential enenmy. This plan was originated in 1917, and formulated officialy in 1923 as the “Doctrine of the Imperial Armed Forces".（３） The operation plans which the IJN decided to adopt were to wipe out the American Fleet in the Far East at the onset of hostilities and jointly with the army to seize Luzon and Guam in order to destroy American strong holds in the Western Pacific;and then to adopt the following operations.（４）
1. Despatch submarines to the area where the American fleet was located to monitor its movements and should it set out, shadow it to keep track of its subsequent movements,while in the meantime attacking it repeatedly to diminish its strength.
2 Deploy a land-based naval air craft in the South Sea Mandated Islands to attack the enemy fleet, once it came within range of destruction,from the air in cooperation with the carrier-borne planes to further reduce the enemy's strength.
3 Carry out night attack, when the enemy fleet had entered an arena of decisive battle, with a advanced body of cruisers and destroyers,supported by fast battleships to deal a major blow to it;then after day
break excute a decisive battle with the entire force centered around battleship units to annihilate the enemy.
By the Washington and London Naval Limitation Treaty, the IJN was reduced rations of battleship and axiliary ships against U.S.Navy. Due to this limitation, the IJN sought to compensate for the inferior strength around submarine and torpedo squadrons by crusiers and destroyers. Efficient utilization of torpedo squadrons was emphasized, and the success of the development of the long-lance (type-93 torpedo, range 40000 meter), brought about a rapid advance in torpedo tactics around 1935. In around 1937 a plan to modify three light cruisers into heavy torpedo equipped cruisers - equiping with ten 4-barrel torpedo launching units total 40 torpedo was incorporated in the annual naval defence plan.（５）
Based on this operational concept, and with the U.S. Navy in mind, the IJN endeavored to develop large submarines with sufficient range to cross the Pacific and return without refueling and also with enough speed to shadow the U.S. fleet. In 1924 the IJN inaugurated the I-51, a “cruising submarine",with a size of 1.400 tons, it could make 20 knots on the surface and 10 knots submerged.（６） The navy pursued other ambitious projects in submarine warfare, in early 1930s, the most striking of which was the construction to carry aircraft for improved reconnaisance capability. In 1933 the navy began work on the midget submarine, which for purposes of secrecy was called the“A”target (Kｏhyｏteki). Tacticians believed this weapon, if properly developed, would give the inferior Japanese fleet in the decisive battle. In 1938 three submarine tenders for midgets, first the Chiyoda, followed by the Nisshin and Chitose(all about 11.000 tons) were completed. The navy planned to use these vessels as seaplane tenders in peacetime, but in war each would carry 12 midget submarines. They would move into the path of the enemy fleet just before the decisive battle and launch the midgets from astern at intervals of 1.000 meters while steaming at 20 knots.（７）
In about 1935 the type 94 carrier bomber(D1A1,“Susie"), a great advance over previous models, was officialy adapted. At about the same time, longrange flying boats, land-based bombers and similiar craft would be effective adjuncts of carrier-based forces. By 1936, the Type-96 land-based medium bomber(G3M2, “Nell"), which had a range of 6,000 km and was capable of both torpedo attack and bombing, was ready for service. After the notification of renunciation of the Washington Treaty, greater emphasis was given to land-based naval air power on the decision “try to make the most of the geographical advantage which only we have.”（８） The Third replenishment Plan of 1937 increased the air arm by 14 groups to 53 groups. The Fourth Replenishment plan of 1939 added 75 for a total of 128 groups. The Fifth Replenishment plan of 1940 provided 160 groups for a grand sum of 288 groups. In the Fifth Replenishment Plan included a major expansion of the land-based air forces and called for the deployment of large and medium-size attack planes mainly in the “Micronesia" or where they expected to be a decisive battle area.（９） According to these devepolements, in 1938 a “Combined Naval Air Wing Rule" was instituted to ensure efficient operation of the land-based naval air. In January 1941 the Eleventh Naval Air Fleet was newly organized from land-based air squadrons, to take an unified command of the land-based air units. In April of the same year, the First Air Fleet was set up to coordinate carrier based aircraft in large numbers.（１０） Thus, the major role in the interception-attrition operation shifted from submarines and advanced body of torpedo squadron(cruisers and destroyers) to aircraft.
(2)Early Stage of the War - Conduct of Interception Operation
In early stage of the Pacific War, the IJN conducted offensive operations so Interception-Attrition Operation was not applied. It was in June 1944, at the Battle of the Marianas, the JIN actually carried out this operation. After defeat at Midway and Gadalcanl, the IJN shifted its strategic focus to the defensive operations. From early 1944, the IJN deployed about 1,500 aircraft to the “Unsinkable Carrier Micronesia".（１１） The IJN counted on to “destroy at least one-third of the U.S. carriers" with land-based naval air before the decisive battle between Japanese and U.S.surface forces（１２）. But these air powers were destroyed by the U.S.Carrier Task force's air-raid day in and day out, without making any significant achievements. While the Mobile Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburｏ launched 324 aircraft in five waves, because of out-of-range attacks, only two groups(192 planes) could reach to the U.S. Task forces. But they were detected by radar 150 miles off and almost all planes were shot down by intecept-fighter and intense anti-aircraft fire employing the VT (variable time)fuse.（１３）
Followers of Mahan in the IJN believed implicitly in what they called Mahan's “divine dictim" that “coast defense against naval attack is comparatively easy because...ship...are at a recongnized disadvantage contending against forts".（１４） Their mistake was to apply this to the relation of carrier-based-air to land-based air and assume that the latter was superior to the former. In Micronesia, air bases were several hundred miles apart. The IJN's land-based air-power was forced to yield to a power upholding another Mahanian princilple(learned from Jomini), that of “concentration and mobility." In other words, the U.S. Navy prevailed because it was able to build an overwhelming force of carrier-borne naval aircraft which was highly mobile and could be raidly concentrated. Furthermore, this U.S.Task force neutralized the “Invincible Aircraft Carrier Micronesia" and was able to break into the“absolute defense sphere" much more quickly than the IJN had imaged. It is worthy of note also that American advances, in particular their amphibious assaults, were faciliated by a factor to which Mahan had given only causual attention, that is, heavy naval gunfire against fortifications ashore.（１５）
(3)Latter stage of the war - Sucide Weapon Systems
The first Kamikaze(Special Divine Winds) was organized at the Mabalacat air field in Philippines on 20 October 1944, by Vice Adimral Onishi Takijiro, father of the Japanese naval air, against a U.S. Fleet in Leyte Gulf. Five Zero fighters, each carrying a 250 kilogram bomb, attacked U.S.carriers aiming to stop air operation for a while. But after this, Kamikaze attack became ordinary in the navy. For the next 10 months, from Leyte until Japan's surrender in August 1945, the IJN devoted 2525 pilots and Army devoted 1388 pilots.（１６） These suicide attack squadrons were formed and also weapons were developed officially, but applications to Kamikaze was individual decision, and these suicide attacks were promoted by young officers.
Before the first Kamikaze, in December 1943, desperated-minded young submariners, Lt(jg) Kuroki Hiroshi and Ens Nishina Sekio perisisted to promote the idea of developing a human torpedo call Kaiten to the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Nagano Shｕshin as an ultimate weapon. They proposed that a Type 93 torpedo for surface ships could be converted into a kind of homing human-driven torpedo. But, their suggestions were not given much consideration, because these idea did not include an escape mechanism for the pilots. However discorageing news of the war, especially the shocking defeat of the Marianas tended to push ahead for the development and use of this human torpedo. On 26 February 1944, this idea was accepted and manufacuring of an experimental human torpedo was ordered, and on 28 May officialy adapted and named Kaiten(The term Kaiten had special meaning in Japanese. It conveyed a broad feeling about making the impossible, such as turning impending defeat into victory). On 10 July the first Special Submarine Training Base for the Kaiten was opened in Otsusima, Tokuyama Bay, in the Inland Sea. On 13 September Special Attack Department was organized in the Ministry of the Navy.（１７）
The first Kaiten attack was conducted by 3 cruising submarines, with tweleve Kaiten on 20 November 1944 to Ulthi Atoll. From this attack about 110 Kaitens were deployed until Okinawa, but results were poor, because of the high losses suffered by carrier submarine.（１８） Meanwhile in the air, suicide manned glider Oka equipped with high explosives and propelled by jet, was also recommended by young officer Ensign Ota Shoichi in July 1944. On 23rd September exprimental Oka was manufactured by German technical aide of Me-262A which was transported by Submarine. On 10th October Oka Special Wing, 721 Wing was formed and in 17 March 1945, Oka was officialy aproved as a weapon and 21 March, first Oka squadron(17 planes) attacked U.S. Task Force off Kyushu. Beside, Kamikaze, Kaiten and Oka, the IJN developed a variety of suicide weapons, midget submarines(Kｏhyｏteki) and small submarine with wing(Kairyu), suicide motor boat(Sinyｏ) and human carrying mine(Fukuryu). These weapons and number of production is as follows.（１９）
Name(remarks) Number of Production
Ko-hyoteki(Midget Submarine) 230
Kairyu(Midget Submarine) 224
Sinyo(Motor boat) 6200
Oka(Jet glider) 755
kituka(Small propeller plane) Just completed June 1945
Shinryｕ(Rocket glider) not completed
Baika(Small Jet plane) not completed
2 Background of these weapons-Transition of the IJN's military doctrines
Why Japanese Navy could change so easily from calculated and very logical interception-attrition tactics to Kamikaze tactics? Why Japanese could continue Kamikaze attacks? Many reasons are introduced concerning this, but I would like point out 6 factors. First is originated in the Japanese climate and religion of Sintｏ and Budism, Second is the strong patriotic spirit and loyality from their “Mura(village)" consciousness which is rooted from isolated small society. The third is a sense of family in the household. From there the consciouness of “Haji" and “On" which was mentioned by Ruth Benedict in “The Chrysanthemun and the Sword".（２０） The fourth motivation of Kamikaze is the tradition of the Samurai-spirit and affection to the village(small community) forced them to die themselves when they defeated, they try to vanish with their villagers and village. Fifth is the education of the nation of the before war. It was teached that the heads of the household si father and the father of the Japan is the Emperor.But I would like to discuss the JIN's strategic thinking and strategists who influenced this transition of tactics.
(1)Establishing Era - Sun Tzｕ
The newly born army adapted its weapons and tactics from those of France, later from Germany, the navy from England. In 1888, Naval War College was founded and Lt Commander Simamura Hayao(later Admiral, Minister of Navy), began lectures of strategy and tactics based on western strategy and tactics and the experience of the Sino-Japanese War, but at that time strategy and tactics were not firmly established. Lt commander Satｏ Tetutarｏ(later Vice Admiral), and Aiyama Masayuki (later Vice Admiral) were key persons who established new naval strategy and tactics of the new navy. Satｏ developed mainly national and naval strategy and Akiyama developed mainly naval tactics and operational doctrines. Satｏ was sent to Britain, Akiyama was sent to America. There, they learned about western strategy and tactics, however they had a fundamental knowledge of Japanese old art of war, which were based on Sun Tzｕ, Sun Lｕeh and Wu Tzｕ, so their military strategies and tactics were foundementally built on those masters, especially on Sun Tzｕ's “Subdue the enemy without fighting".（２１）
Satｏ was the most celebrated expositor of Sun Tzｕ he wrote the“Comprehensive Translation of Sun Tzｕ", and in the forward he stated that Sun Tzｕ's Art of War that from ancient times to now, among the western and eastern arts of war, Sun Tzｕ's Art of War was the most profound and best book for strategy,（２２） and if you wish to study profound and most effective art of war, you must study Sun Tzｕ and Sun Lｕeh.（２３） In 1892, he wrote Teikoku kokubｏron(Imperial Nationl Defence) applying Sun Tzｕ's Pacifism. In this book, he insisted that the true defence was never to let the foe land.（２４） He emphasized sea defence and foresaw a maritime developing, he denied development for continent. Later Teikoku-kokubｏron become the fundamental text for naval officer, and also it was widely circulated amang the people.
While Lt Commander Akiyama was sent to America and there he learned from Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, and applying the Japanese old art of war of Kｏshｕ-Gungaku(Kｏshｕ-Military Doctorine) and ancient pirate tactics for his tactics. He paticipated the Battle of Tushima as an operational staff of Admiral Togo's Combined Fleet. He said that the famous tactics applied in the Battle of Tushima, the “T-Turn" was an application of the “Kuruma-Gakari(Rotaiting Wheel Attack) tactics" of the Kｏshｕ-Gunki(Kｏshｕ-Military Text).（２５） After the Russo-Japanese War he accomplished mainly naval tactical and operational doctrines, by his experiences. But as Akiyama also had a deep knowledge of Sun Tzｕ, he insisted that Japan was a nation of perfect virtue, and so must not wage a western genocidal art of war. He insisted that Japanese military doctrine must based on Sun Tzｕ's “subdue the enemy without fighting".（２６） The new navy and army concentrated their efforts on adapting western weapons and tactics, and finaly Japan could win the Russo-Japanese War, but they never applied Carl von Clausewitz's theory of “War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to be the application of that force“.（２７） After the victory of the campaign of Mukden by army and the Battle of Tushima by the navy, the Japanese goverment agreed to America's offer to chair a pecae conference in Portsmouth. Thus not only military leaders, but also the political leaders of the Meiji era used strategy from Sun Tzｕ's Art of War, which they had learned from Gｏden and Yamaga-Gungaku(Military Art).（２８）
(2)Sun Tzｕ and Mahan in the Imperial Navy
After World War Ⅰ, Mahan's maxim “The sound general principle that the enemy's fleet, if it probably can be reached, is the objectives paramount to all others, because the control of the sea, by reducing the enemy's fleet, is the determining consideration in a naval war"（２９） prevailed in the IJN. Meanwhile, after World War Ⅰ, the IJN ranked as third navy of the world and called “Big three." By this pride and confidence, there arose strong wishes for develop-ment of their own strategy and tactics. This tended to consider the ancient masters relevant to modern and Sun Tzｕ's Art of War was reviewed to develop new strategy and tactics. In 1917, General Ochiai Toyosaburｏ wrote Comprehensive Sun Tzｕ, insisting that “It is regretable that western thinking dominates Japan and eastern masters were neglected. We must review ancient oriental masters to develop our own strategy and tactics.（３０） The navy assigned Sun Tzｕ as a selected book to distribute and to read to every ship and facility. In text or speeches “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles", or “As water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions"（３１） were often quoated to emphasize the importance of intelligence and to planners of the remind a importance of creating a new strategy and tactics. Following is the list of distribution of the three famous books, Mahan's Naval Strategy, Clausewitz's On War, and Sun Tzｕ's Art of War. Though Clausewitz's On War and Mahan's Naval Strategy were distributed only to schools, regional-headquarters and squadron-flagships, but Sun Tzｕ's Art of War was distributed even to destroyers. Following distribution list（３２） shows how the JIN had a higher regard for Sun Tuz's Art of War for Clausewitz's On War and Mahan's Naval Strategy in early 1930s.
Distribution list of books in Japanese Navy(1931)
| Larger than Cruiser | Destroyer | Squdron HQ | Fleet Flotta | School | Land Force | Regional HQ | |
| Sun Tzu | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Mahan | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Clausewitz | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
(3)Tｏsenkyｏ and the Imperial Japanese Navy
In the Imperial Armed Forces which had to fight America and Soviet - the richest country in the world with inferior arms, must enphasized spiritual strength, must believe “Spiritual strength is greater than physical strenght" by “Seishin Kyoiku(Spiritual Eucation)". The “Seishin-Kyoiku" of the soldier and sailor is based primarily upon the Emperor Meiji's Imperial Rescrip,（３３） which considered loyalty as the essential duty of the soldier and sailor. None is more important to the Japanese. As a soldier and sailor must be loyal, so he must be obedient to the Emperor. It's aim within the army and navy was to build a religious - like devotion to the Son of Heaven. “You, yourself, are nothing.You must give all to your Emperor". Soldier and sailor must obey implicity the commands of his officers because the officers speak as the mouth piece of the Emperor himself. Later in the 1930s, under the sway of the nationalistic mood, Naval War College began to teach the Japanese oldest combat doctrines very spiritual and religious “Tｏsenkyo". If I introduce some maxim from Sun Tzｕ and Tｏsenkyｏ, Sun Tzｕ teach us that;
(1)Subdue enemy without fighting.
(2)If You know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.
(3)With many calculations, one can win, with few one cannot.
But the Tｏsenkyｏ criticize Sun Tzｕ that “Chinese doctrine stated conspiracy, but Japanese doctrine teach fair and square,"“Sun Tzｕ's Art of War afraid fighting and cowardice" and teach us quite opposit maxim.（３４）
(1)Fight without fear, because we have justic and right will win in the end.
(2)In war, we can not obtain full informations of the enemy, in such a case, judge with spiritual inspiration(or awakend)
(3)For conduct of war, you must not caluculate, just do your best.
(4)Do not fear a superior enemy, because even a small insect can win big enemy sometimes. This teach us that even inferior force, we could get a victory.
Thus Sun Tzｕ's Art of War was venerated as a classic, and gradualy it was considered out of date by the nationalistic younger officers, and thus hardly worth study in an era of mechanized weapons. Forthermore, an Ultra nationalistic mode made Emperor as a “Living God", and also made Japan as a “Nation of God". As a living Deity his will cannot be questioned. His commmands are hallowed. Consequently, Japanese army and navy repeated hypnotically “We must win as the Gods have given us victory in the past, so will they give us victory in the future". Thus Imperial Armed Forces attached more importance to improvement of tactical skill than conduct of war or strategic thinking, thus gradually the spiritual readiness was formed among the Imperial Armed Forces.In late 1930s, “Kｏgun (Emperor's Armed Forces)" concept governed the navy, so moral, spiritual factors were emphasized. And for conduct of war, fair, square and with Makoto(Honesty and Sincerity) were given importance as kｏgun military doctrines.（３５） This tended to diminsh logical thinking, and only loyality, spiritual strength and devotion to the Emperor were stressed, and gradually Sun Tzｕ's reasonable and rational thinking was ignored.
3 Sun Tzｕ and entering the Pacific War
The historical process that brought Japan into the Pacific War includes many elements, such as the conclusion of the Tripartie Pact, Japan's fascination with Germany's overwhelming victories at the western front, and American pressure on Japan, particularly the reduction of oil supplies. However, that was mainly based on two factors. One was the so-called “gradual decline" argument, which held that if no positive action was taken that the navy would run out of fuel bit by bit and the ratio of its forces to those of America would worsen rapidly as time went on. The other, more important, was Japan's fascination with Germany's overwhelming victories and miscaluculation, overconfidence in the interception-attrition operation.
At an Imperial Conference on 6th September 1941, Admiral Nagno Osami(Chief of the Naval General Staff, expressed his confidence in the interception-attrition operation by saying,“It is my conviction that if we conduct this operation in the sea area we have designated for battle, the operation of aircraft,etc. will give us victory.（３６） At a Liason Conference(Conference with General Staff and member of the Cabinet) on 1st November, he insisted very strongly “now, we must declare war against America. If hesitate we will lose chance",（３７） and on 4th at the Supreme War Council meeting he voiced his convictions more strongly, “I have confidence that we have the best prospects for victory in the first stage of operations and in interception operation." He also claimed,“If America approaches on the offensive, there will be a battle for the Micronesia islands. We will fight with the advantage of interior lines, inflict great damage on the American fleet, and cause them to withdraw. If in this fashion we repeatedly wage advantageous battle for the islands in all places, it will be possible for us to maintain an invincible posture for a long period.（３８）
It is widely belived among the naval officers that Japanese navy can not conduct protracted war with America, but Japanese leaders caluculated that a year or more would be needed for full American mobilization. And that by the time that new ship reinforcements would be sent to the U.S.Pacific Fleet, the Japanese defence perimeter in the western Pacific would be strong enough to deter or repel American attack. And “we stand a chance of victory in the initial operations, the interception operation, and if the initial operations are executed properly, it will be possible to fully prepare ourselves for a long drawn-out war.（３９） The conviction grew among the staff of the Naval General Headquarters that even though Japan was materialy inferior, using interception operation it had a better than 50 percent chance of victory.（４０）
Japan entrusted her destiny to the leaders who did too few caluculations before war and lost war, against Sun Tzｕ's maxim “With many calculations, one can win;with few one cannot".（４１） And also, Japanese political and military leaders were to count on victory by Germany. However, from one month before the Japanese declaration of war, the German army was surfering in Moskva, and on 5th of December, Soviet army begin offensive operation in the East front and German army were already defeated. If Japanese politico-military leaders applied Sun tzｕ's maxim that “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battle",（４２） knowing of Germany's defeat in Moskva, the IJN should not have attacked Pearl Harbor. They knew neither their enemies nor themselves.
Ｃｌｏｓｉｎｇ
Until the Second World War, Clausewitz's principles “War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force." “A clash of forces freely operating and obedient to no law but their own," eventually reachs destruction.（４３） This total destruction of one side by the other dominated the world, and created great destruction to the world. But after the termination of cold war, increse of low density conflicts, and a usage of the armed forces faced many limitations. In such a environment, Sun Tzｕ's maxim “subdue the enemy without fighting" increasing, and his concentrated essence of wisdom on the conduct of war, more effective than western military theories to accomplish national object, become all the more important as an “Art of War(Peace)”for the Twenty-first Century".
Ｆｏｏｔ Ｎｏｔｅ
1 Ref. my “Japanese Naval Preparation for World War Ⅱ"(U.S.Naval War College Review, vol.LIV, No.2, Spring 1991), pp.63-81.
2 Tｏsenkyo is the oldest Japanese “Art of War," which was writen by Ooe no Makifusa(1041 -1111). For Tｏsenkyｏ refer: Nakashiba Suejun, Tｏsenkyｏ no Kenkyｕ〔Study on Tｏsenkyｏ〕(Miyakoshi-Taiyｏdｏ, 1944).
3 Before the Second World War, Japanese Defence Plan was consist of “Teikoku- Kokubｏ-Hｏsin(Imperial Defence Policy)" which generally designated foundamental Defence Policy and potential enemy, and “Shoyｏ-heiryoku(Required Forces by Defence Policy)"and “Teikokugun no Yｏhei-kｏryｏ(Imperial Defence Guidline)". These were reviced in 1818, 1923 and 1936.
4 Bｏeikenkyｕsho(National Institute for Defence Studies:hereafter NIDS). ed.,Senshi Sｏsho Series Hawai Sakusen〔The Hawaii Operation〕(Asagumo Shinbunsha,1979), p.38.
5 NIDS.ed., Sensi Sｏsho Kaigun-Gunsenbi〔Naval Preparadness〕(Asagumo-Shinbunsha,1959), Vol.Ⅱ, p.163, p.191. 6 Fukui Shizuo,Nihon no Gunkan〔Japanese Naval Vessels〕(Kyｏdｏ-Shutupan-Sha, 1956),
pp.164-168.
7 NIDS.ed., Senshi Sｏshi Series Sensuikan Senshi〔History of the Japanese Submarines〕 (Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1979), p.36.
8 “Kokubｏ Shoyｏheiryoku〔Required Forces by Defence Policy〕",Teikoku-Kokubｏ-Hｏshin-Tsuzuri〔Imperial Defence Policy File〕Febrary to May,1936, NIDS Archives.
9 Kaigun Gunsenbi, Ibid., vol.Ⅰ, pp.511-543, 581-583, 542-543.
10 Kaigun Hensan Iinkai〔Navy editing Commitee〕,ed.,Kaigun〔Navy〕 Vol.13:Kaigun kｏkｕtai〔Naval Air Corps〕(Seibunsha, 1981), p.60.
11 Reliable sources give differing estimates of the number of Japanese aircraft on this occasion. According to Capt.Nakazawa of the Air Staff of the Combined Fleet, whose numbers were 136 at Saipan, 35 at Truk, 109 at Biak area, 155 Palau, total 435 on 11 June;see NIDS. ed.,Senshi-Sｏsho Mariana Oki Kaisen〔The naval battle off the Marianas〕(Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1968), pp.520-21. While Capt.Toshikazu Omae estimated a total of 540 planes as follows:4 on Chichijima, 35 on Saipan, 67 on Tinian, 70 on Guam, 67 on Truk, 40 on Yap, 134 on Palaus, 25 on Davao, 40 on Cebu, 42 on Kaoe and Wasile, Harumahera, and 16 at Sorong and Babo(Vogelkop);see Samuel E.Morison, Unitet States Naval Operations in World War Ⅱ, 15 vols.(Boston: Little Brwon, 1947-1962), vol.8:219.
12 Minoru Genda, Kaigun Kｏkｕtai Shimatusi Sentｏhen〔A record of how it was in the naval air corps:Section on Combat〕(Bungeishunjｕ-Sha,1962), p.224.
13 Mariana Oki Kaisen, Ibid., pp.566-637.
14 Alfred Thayer Mahan,Naval Strategy(Boston:Little Brown and Co,1911), pp.139,435. 15 Philip A.Crowl,Alfred Thayer Mahan:The Naval Historian,Peter Paret,ed.,Makers of Modern Strategy:From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age(Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University,1978), p.455-456.
16 Number of planes and pilots, there are many sources and they give different
numbers, concerning to the Kamikaze refer to Warner Denis, Docment Kamikaze
(Sydeny, 1982) and Morimoto Tadao,Totukｏ〔Special Attack〕(Bungeishunjｕ Sha 1992).
17 NIDS.,ed, Senshi Sｏsho Series Daihonei Kaigunbu･Rengｏkantai〔Naval Section of the
Imperial Staff･Combined Fleet(Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1971),vol.Ⅳ, pp.327-347.
18 Refer to kouzu Naoji, Ningen Gyorai Kaiten〔Human Torpedo Kaiten〕(Toshoshuppan-
Kai, 1988) and Kaiten Editing Committee, eds., Kaiten(Editing Committee, 1982).
19 Kaigun Gunsenbi, Ibid., vol.Ⅱ, pp.184-189.
20 Concerinig the Japanese habits of acting and thinking refer to Ruth Venedict,Chrysanthemum and the Sword:Paterns of Japanese Culture(Tokyo:Charles E. Tuttle Co.1974).
21 Samuel B.Griffith, Sun Tzｕ's the Art of War(Londn:Oxford University Press,1963), Chpter 3 Offensive Strategy, p.79.
22 Satｏ Tetutarｏ, Iyaku Sonshi〔Translation of Sun Tzｕ〕(Naval War College,1918),p.1.
23 Satｏ Tetutarｏ,Kaigun Senri-gaku〔Theory of Naval Operations〕(Naval War College,1912), p.27.
24 Satｏ Tetutarｏ, Teikoku Kokubｏron〔Imperial Defence〕(Suikｏsha, 1892), p.182.
25 Akiyama Saneyuki Kai Ed., Akiyama Saneyuki〔Akiyama Saneyuki-Kai,1933), p.329.
26 Ibid., pp.324-325.
27 Carl von Clausewitz, Trans. Hans W.Gatzke, Principles of War(Pennsylvania:The Stockpole Company, 1960), p.45.
28 Tokunaga Sakae, Sonshi no Shinjitu〔Trueth of Sun Tzｕ〕(Self Defence Force
Maritime Staff College, 1962), p.439.
29 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Strategy ; Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of military operations on land(Boston:Little brown, 1911),p.189.
30 Toyosaburｏ Ochiai, Sonsi-Reikai〔Comprehensive Sun Tzｕ〕(Gunji Kyｏiku Sha,1919),p.2.
31 Sun Tzｕ's Art of War, Chapter 3 Offensive Strategy, p.77, Chapter Weakness and Strengths, p.101.
32 Imperial Naval Education Bureau Ed.,List of Selected Book for Distribution
(Imperial Navy Education Bureau, 1931), p.11, p.20.
33 Emperor Meiji's Imperial Rescript as follows;
The soldier and the sailor should
1. Consider loyalty their essential duty.
2. Should be strict in observing propriety.
3. Should esteem valour.
4. Should highly value faithfulness and righteousness.
5. Should make simplicity their aim.
34 Sasamori Junzｏ,ed.,Nihon no Seiten〔Pure Japanese Sutra of Combat〕Tｏsenkyｏ (Nihon-Shutupan -Hｏsｏkikaku,1992), pp.49,52,59,63,104-105,159-160.
35 For Kｏgun concept refer, Hillis Lory, Japan's Military Masters (Viking Press, 1943. Reprinted, Greenwood Press, 1973).
36 Nihon Kokusai Sｅji Gakkai,ed., Taiheiyou Senso e no Michi, Bekkan,Shiryｏhen(The
road to the Pacific War, Appendix volume, Documents section)(Asashi Shimbunsha, 1988), p.512, p.545.
37 Ibid., p.550.
38 Ibid.,p.557.
39 Fukudome Shigeru, Shikan Shinjuwan kｏgeki(A private view of the Pearl Pearl Harbor Attack)(JiyｕAjia Sha,1955), p.135.
40 Fukudome Shigeru, Kaigun no Hansei〔Reflection on Pacific War〕(Nihon Shuppan Kyｏdｏsha, 1951), pp.119-120.
41 Sun Tzｕ's Art of War, Chapter 1 Estimates.
42 Ibid., Sun Tzｕ the Art of War, chapter Ⅲ, Offensive Strategy, p.77.
43 Peter Paret, “Clausewitz", Peter Paret ed. Makers of Modern Strategy - From Machiavelli to the Nuclear War(Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1986),pp.179-180.