38th International Military History Conference
Influence of the Sun Tzu and Tosenkyo in the Imperial Japanese Navy - Rationalism ans Emotinalism in the WWII
Preface
The Imperial Japanese Navy(hereafter IJN)'s tactics and
weapon systems showed great diferences between the early stage and latter
stage of the Pacific War. In the early stage, there was rationality, but
the latter stage was predominated by emotionalism and there was no rationality
in tactics and weapon systems. The IJN's war plan against U.S.Navy was
a very systematic and rational one, named “Attrition Interception operation".(1)
And in the early stage of the war, there was rationality and showed suplendid
tactics of air-power projection from the sea to the land by carriers against
Hawaii, Port Dawin and Ceyelon. But, in the latter stage of the war, IPN
was occupied unrational thinking in their tactics and weapons, called suicide
Kamikaze-Attack. After the defeat of Gadarucanal, especially after the
Leyte Gulf, the IJN's tactics and weapon systems were greatly changed and
lost rationality. Why there arosed such a great diference in the same organization.
Why JIN could change their tactics for Kamikaze so easily and quickly in
the latter stage of the War. What kind of military theory influenced on
this rational strategy and on the later unrational strategy. The JIN's
theory and thinkings were influenced from three stratgists and thier writings,
Sun Tzu's Art of War, Alfred Thayer Mahan's Naval Strategy and Japanese
ancient Tosenkyo〔Sutra of Combat〕.(2) This paper will consider how
the IJN's tactics and weapon systems were established and changed influenced
by these three strategist's thinking. And also why Japanese Navy could
change her tactical concepts so quickly and easily at the latter stage
of the War from military and naval doctrine and thinking.
1 Pacific War and the IJN's tactics and weapon systems
(1)The IJN's Operation Plan against U.S.Navy
The IJN-“sufficent to defend but insufficent to attack-had
always followed the concept of “Attrition" plus “Interception"
operation for its armaments, weapon systems, fleet formation, education
and training ever since 1907 when it began to read the American Navy as
its potential enenmy. This plan was originated in 1917, and formulated
officialy in 1923 as the “Doctrine of the Imperial Armed Forces".(3)
The operation plans which the IJN decided to adopt were to wipe out the
American Fleet in the Far East at the onset of hostilities and jointly
with the army to seize Luzon and Guam in order to destroy American strong
holds in the Western Pacific;and then to adopt the following operations.(4)
1. Despatch submarines to the area where the American fleet was located
to monitor its movements and should it set out, shadow it to keep track
of its subsequent movements,while in the meantime attacking it repeatedly to
diminish its strength.
2 Deploy a land-based naval air craft in the South Sea Mandated Islands to
attack the enemy fleet, once it came within range of destruction,from the
air in cooperation with the carrier-borne planes to further reduce the
enemy's strength.
3 Carry out night attack, when the enemy fleet had entered an arena of decisive
battle, with a advanced body of cruisers and destroyers,supported by fast
battleships to deal a major blow to it;then after day
break excute a decisive battle with the entire force centered around battleship
units to annihilate the enemy.
By the Washington and London Naval Limitation Treaty,
the IJN was reduced rations of battleship and axiliary ships against U.S.Navy.
Due to this limitation, the IJN sought to compensate for the inferior strength
around submarine and torpedo squadrons by crusiers and destroyers. Efficient
utilization of torpedo squadrons was emphasized, and the success of the
development of the long-lance (type-93 torpedo, range 40000 meter), brought
about a rapid advance in torpedo tactics around 1935. In around 1937 a
plan to modify three light cruisers into heavy torpedo equipped cruisers
- equiping with ten 4-barrel torpedo launching units total 40 torpedo was
incorporated in the annual naval defence plan.(5)
Based on this operational concept, and with the U.S.
Navy in mind, the IJN endeavored to develop large submarines with sufficient
range to cross the Pacific and return without refueling and also with enough
speed to shadow the U.S. fleet. In 1924 the IJN inaugurated the I-51, a
“cruising submarine",with a size of 1.400 tons, it could make 20
knots on the surface and 10 knots submerged.(6) The navy pursued other
ambitious projects in submarine warfare, in early 1930s, the most striking
of which was the construction to carry aircraft for improved reconnaisance
capability. In 1933 the navy began work on the midget submarine, which
for purposes of secrecy was called the“A”target (Kohyoteki). Tacticians
believed this weapon, if properly developed, would give the inferior Japanese
fleet in the decisive battle. In 1938 three submarine tenders for midgets,
first the Chiyoda, followed by the Nisshin and Chitose(all about 11.000
tons) were completed. The navy planned to use these vessels as seaplane
tenders in peacetime, but in war each would carry 12 midget submarines.
They would move into the path of the enemy fleet just before the decisive
battle and launch the midgets from astern at intervals of 1.000 meters
while steaming at 20 knots.(7)
In about 1935 the type 94 carrier bomber(D1A1,“Susie"),
a great advance over previous models, was officialy adapted. At about the
same time, longrange flying boats, land-based bombers and similiar craft
would be effective adjuncts of carrier-based forces. By 1936, the Type-96
land-based medium bomber(G3M2, “Nell"), which had a range of 6,000
km and was capable of both torpedo attack and bombing, was ready for service.
After the notification of renunciation of the Washington Treaty, greater
emphasis was given to land-based naval air power on the decision “try
to make the most of the geographical advantage which only we have.”(8)
The Third replenishment Plan of 1937 increased the air arm by 14 groups
to 53 groups. The Fourth Replenishment plan of 1939 added 75 for a total
of 128 groups. The Fifth Replenishment plan of 1940 provided 160 groups
for a grand sum of 288 groups. In the Fifth Replenishment Plan included
a major expansion of the land-based air forces and called for the deployment
of large and medium-size attack planes mainly in the “Micronesia"
or where they expected to be a decisive battle area.(9) According to
these devepolements, in 1938 a “Combined Naval Air Wing Rule" was
instituted to ensure efficient operation of the land-based naval air. In
January 1941 the Eleventh Naval Air Fleet was newly organized from land-based
air squadrons, to take an unified command of the land-based air units.
In April of the same year, the First Air Fleet was set up to coordinate
carrier based aircraft in large numbers.(10) Thus, the major role in
the interception-attrition operation shifted from submarines and advanced
body of torpedo squadron(cruisers and destroyers) to aircraft.
(2)Early Stage of the War - Conduct of Interception Operation
In early stage of the Pacific War, the IJN conducted
offensive operations so Interception-Attrition Operation was not applied.
It was in June 1944, at the Battle of the Marianas, the JIN actually carried
out this operation. After defeat at Midway and Gadalcanl, the IJN shifted
its strategic focus to the defensive operations. From early 1944, the IJN
deployed about 1,500 aircraft to the “Unsinkable Carrier Micronesia".(11)
The IJN counted on to “destroy at least one-third of the U.S. carriers"
with land-based naval air before the decisive battle between Japanese and
U.S.surface forces(12). But these air powers were destroyed by the
U.S.Carrier Task force's air-raid day in and day out, without making any
significant achievements. While the Mobile Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral
Ozawa Jisaburo launched 324 aircraft in five waves, because of out-of-range
attacks, only two groups(192 planes) could reach to the U.S. Task forces.
But they were detected by radar 150 miles off and almost all planes were
shot down by intecept-fighter and intense anti-aircraft fire employing
the VT (variable time)fuse.(13)
Followers of Mahan in the IJN believed implicitly in what they
called Mahan's “divine dictim" that “coast defense against naval
attack is comparatively easy because...ship...are at a recongnized disadvantage
contending against forts".(14) Their mistake was to apply this
to the relation of carrier-based-air to land-based air and assume that
the latter was superior to the former. In Micronesia, air bases were several
hundred miles apart. The IJN's land-based air-power was forced to yield
to a power upholding another Mahanian princilple(learned from Jomini),
that of “concentration and mobility." In other words, the U.S. Navy
prevailed because it was able to build an overwhelming force of carrier-borne
naval aircraft which was highly mobile and could be raidly concentrated.
Furthermore, this U.S.Task force neutralized the “Invincible Aircraft
Carrier Micronesia" and was able to break into the“absolute defense
sphere" much more quickly than the IJN had imaged. It is worthy of
note also that American advances, in particular their amphibious assaults,
were faciliated by a factor to which Mahan had given only causual attention,
that is, heavy naval gunfire against fortifications ashore.(15)
(3)Latter stage of the war - Sucide Weapon Systems
The first Kamikaze(Special Divine Winds) was organized
at the Mabalacat air field in Philippines on 20 October 1944, by Vice Adimral
Onishi Takijiro, father of the Japanese naval air, against a U.S. Fleet
in Leyte Gulf. Five Zero fighters, each carrying a 250 kilogram bomb, attacked
U.S.carriers aiming to stop air operation for a while. But after this,
Kamikaze attack became ordinary in the navy. For the next 10 months, from
Leyte until Japan's surrender in August 1945, the IJN devoted 2525 pilots
and Army devoted 1388 pilots.(16) These suicide attack squadrons were
formed and also weapons were developed officially, but applications to
Kamikaze was individual decision, and these suicide attacks were promoted
by young officers.
Before the first Kamikaze, in December 1943, desperated-minded
young submariners, Lt(jg) Kuroki Hiroshi and Ens Nishina Sekio perisisted
to promote the idea of developing a human torpedo call Kaiten to the Chief
of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Nagano Shushin as an ultimate weapon.
They proposed that a Type 93 torpedo for surface ships could be converted
into a kind of homing human-driven torpedo. But, their suggestions were
not given much consideration, because these idea did not include an escape
mechanism for the pilots. However discorageing news of the war, especially
the shocking defeat of the Marianas tended to push ahead for the development
and use of this human torpedo. On 26 February 1944, this idea was accepted
and manufacuring of an experimental human torpedo was ordered, and on 28
May officialy adapted and named Kaiten(The term Kaiten had special meaning
in Japanese. It conveyed a broad feeling about making the impossible, such
as turning impending defeat into victory). On 10 July the first Special
Submarine Training Base for the Kaiten was opened in Otsusima, Tokuyama
Bay, in the Inland Sea. On 13 September Special Attack Department was organized
in the Ministry of the Navy.(17)

The first Kaiten attack was conducted by 3 cruising submarines, with tweleve Kaiten on 20 November 1944 to Ulthi Atoll. From this attack about 110 Kaitens were deployed until Okinawa, but results were poor, because of the high losses suffered by carrier submarine.(18)
Meanwhile in the air, suicide manned glider Oka equipped with high explosives and propelled by jet, was also recommended by young officer Ensign Ota Shoichi in July 1944. On 23rd September exprimental Oka was manufactured by German technical aide of Me-262A which was transported by Submarine. On 10th October Oka Special Wing, 721 Wing was formed and in 17 March 1945, Oka was officialy aproved as a weapon and 21 March, first Oka squadron(17 planes) attacked U.S. Task Force off Kyushu. Beside, Kamikaze, Kaiten and Oka, the IJN developed a variety of suicide weapons, midget submarines(Kohyoteki) and small submarine with wing(Kairyu), suicide motor boat(Sinyo) and human carrying mine(Fukuryu). These weapons and number of production is as follows.(19)

Name(remarks) Number of Production
Ko-hyoteki(Midget Submarine) 230
Kairyu(Midget Submarine) 224
Sinyo(Motor boat) 6200
Oka(Jet glider) 755
kituka(Small propeller plane) Just completed June 1945
Shinryu(Rocket glider) not completed
Baika(Small Jet plane) not completed
2 Background of these weapons-Transition of the IJN's military doctrines
Why Japanese Navy could change so easily from calculated
and very logical interception-attrition tactics to Kamikaze tactics? Why
Japanese could continue Kamikaze attacks? Many reasons are introduced concerning
this, but I would like point out 6 factors. First is originated in the
Japanese climate and religion of Sinto and Budism, Second is the strong
patriotic spirit and loyality from their “Mura(village)" consciousness
which is rooted from isolated small society. The third is a sense of family
in the household. From there the consciouness of “Haji" and “On"
which was mentioned by Ruth Benedict in “The Chrysanthemun and the Sword".(20)
The fourth motivation of Kamikaze is the tradition of the Samurai-spirit
and affection to the village(small community) forced them to die themselves
when they defeated, they try to vanish with their villagers and village.
Fifth is the education of the nation of the before war. It was teached
that the heads of the household si father and the father of the Japan is
the Emperor.But I would like to discuss the JIN's strategic thinking and
strategists who influenced this transition of tactics.
(1)Establishing Era - Sun Tzu

The newly born army adapted its weapons and tactics from those of France,
later from Germany, the navy from England. In 1888, Naval War College was
founded and Lt Commander Simamura Hayao(later Admiral, Minister of Navy),
began lectures of strategy and tactics based on western strategy and tactics
and the experience of the Sino-Japanese War, but at that time strategy
and tactics were not firmly established. Lt commander Sato Tetutaro(later
Vice Admiral), and Aiyama Masayuki (later Vice Admiral) were key persons
who established new naval strategy and tactics of the new navy. Sato developed
mainly national and naval strategy and Akiyama developed mainly naval tactics
and operational doctrines. Sato was sent to Britain, Akiyama was sent
to America. There, they learned about western strategy and tactics, however
they had a fundamental knowledge of Japanese old art of war, which were
based on Sun Tzu, Sun Lueh and Wu Tzu, so their military strategies
and tactics were foundementally built on those masters, especially on Sun
Tzu's “Subdue the enemy without fighting".(21)
Sato was the most celebrated expositor of Sun Tzu he
wrote the“Comprehensive Translation of Sun Tzu", and in the forward
he stated that Sun Tzu's Art of War that from ancient times to now, among
the western and eastern arts of war, Sun Tzu's Art of War was the most
profound and best book for strategy,(22) and if you wish to study profound
and most effective art of war, you must study Sun Tzu and Sun Lueh.(23)
In 1892, he wrote Teikoku kokuboron(Imperial Nationl Defence) applying
Sun Tzu's Pacifism. In this book, he insisted that the true defence was
never to let the foe land.(24) He emphasized sea defence and foresaw
a maritime developing, he denied development for continent. Later Teikoku-kokuboron
become the fundamental text for naval officer, and also it was widely circulated
amang the people.
While Lt Commander Akiyama was sent to America and there
he learned from Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, and applying the Japanese
old art of war of Koshu-Gungaku(Koshu-Military Doctorine) and ancient
pirate tactics for his tactics. He paticipated the Battle of Tushima as
an operational staff of Admiral Togo's Combined Fleet. He said that the
famous tactics applied in the Battle of Tushima, the “T-Turn" was
an application of the “Kuruma-Gakari(Rotaiting Wheel Attack) tactics"
of the Koshu-Gunki(Koshu-Military Text).(25) After the Russo-Japanese
War he accomplished mainly naval tactical and operational doctrines, by
his experiences. But as Akiyama also had a deep knowledge of Sun Tzu,
he insisted that Japan was a nation of perfect virtue, and so must not
wage a western genocidal art of war. He insisted that Japanese military
doctrine must based on Sun Tzu's “subdue the enemy without fighting".(26)
The new navy and army concentrated their efforts on adapting western weapons
and tactics, and finaly Japan could win the Russo-Japanese War, but they
never applied Carl von Clausewitz's theory of “War is an act of force,
and there is no logical limit to be the application of that force“.(27)
After the victory of the campaign of Mukden by army and the Battle of Tushima
by the navy, the Japanese goverment agreed to America's offer to chair
a pecae conference in Portsmouth. Thus not only military leaders, but also
the political leaders of the Meiji era used strategy from Sun Tzu's Art
of War, which they had learned from Goden and Yamaga-Gungaku(Military
Art).(28)
(
2)Sun Tzu and Mahan in the Imperial Navy

After World War T, Mahan's maxim “The sound general principle
that the enemy's fleet, if it probably can be reached, is the objectives
paramount to all others, because the control of the sea, by reducing the
enemy's fleet, is the determining consideration in a naval war"(29)
prevailed in the IJN. Meanwhile, after World War T, the IJN ranked as
third navy of the world and called “Big three." By this pride and
confidence, there arose strong wishes for develop-ment of their own strategy
and tactics. This tended to consider the ancient masters relevant to modern
and Sun Tzu's Art of War was reviewed to develop new strategy and tactics.
In 1917, General Ochiai Toyosaburo wrote Comprehensive Sun Tzu, insisting
that “It is regretable that western thinking dominates Japan and eastern
masters were neglected. We must review ancient oriental masters to develop
our own strategy and tactics.(30) The navy assigned Sun Tzu as a selected
book to distribute and to read to every ship and facility. In text or speeches
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result
of a hundred battles", or “As water has no constant form, there are
in war no constant conditions"(31) were often quoated to emphasize
the importance of intelligence and to planners of the remind a importance
of creating a new strategy and tactics. Following is the list of distribution
of the three famous books, Mahan's Naval Strategy, Clausewitz's On War,
and Sun Tzu's Art of War. Though Clausewitz's On War and Mahan's Naval
Strategy were distributed only to schools, regional-headquarters and squadron-flagships,
but Sun Tzu's Art of War was distributed even to destroyers. Following
distribution list(32) shows how the JIN had a higher regard for Sun
Tuz's Art of War for Clausewitz's On War and Mahan's Naval Strategy in
early 1930s.
Distribution list of books in Japanese Navy(1931)
|
Larger than Cruiser |
Destroyer |
Squdron HQ |
Fleet Flotta |
School |
Land Force |
Regional HQ |
Sun Tzu |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
Mahan |
○ |
|
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
(3)Tosenkyo and the Imperial Japanese Navy
In the Imperial Armed Forces which had to fight America and
Soviet - the richest country in the world with inferior arms, must enphasized
spiritual strength, must believe “Spiritual strength is greater than physical
strenght" by “Seishin Kyoiku(Spiritual Eucation)". The “Seishin-Kyoiku"
of the soldier and sailor is based primarily upon the Emperor Meiji's Imperial
Rescrip,(33) which considered loyalty as the essential duty of the
soldier and sailor. None is more important to the Japanese. As a soldier
and sailor must be loyal, so he must be obedient to the Emperor. It's aim
within the army and navy was to build a religious - like devotion to the
Son of Heaven. “You, yourself, are nothing.You must give all to your Emperor".
Soldier and sailor must obey implicity the commands of his officers because
the officers speak as the mouth piece of the Emperor himself. Later in
the 1930s, under the sway of the nationalistic mood, Naval War College
began to teach the Japanese oldest combat doctrines very spiritual and
religious “Tosenkyo". If I introduce some maxim from Sun Tzu and
Tosenkyo, Sun Tzu teach us that;
(1)Subdue enemy without fighting.
(2)If You know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result
of a hundred battles.
(3)With many calculations, one can win, with few one cannot.
But the Tosenkyo criticize Sun Tzu that “Chinese doctrine
stated conspiracy, but Japanese doctrine teach fair and square,"“Sun
Tzu's Art of War afraid fighting and cowardice" and teach us quite
opposit maxim.(34)
(1)Fight without fear, because we have justic and right will win in
the end.
(2)In war, we can not obtain full informations of the enemy, in such
a case, judge with spiritual inspiration(or awakend)
(3)For conduct of war, you must not caluculate, just do your best.
(4)Do not fear a superior enemy, because even a small insect can win
big enemy sometimes. This teach us that even inferior force,
we could get a victory.

Thus Sun Tzu's Art of War was venerated as a classic, and gradualy it was considered out of date by the nationalistic younger officers, and thus hardly worth study in an era of mechanized weapons. Forthermore, an Ultra nationalistic mode made Emperor as a “Living God", and also made Japan as a “Nation of God". As a living Deity his will cannot be questioned. His commmands are hallowed. Consequently, Japanese army and navy repeated hypnotically “We must win as the Gods have given us victory in the past, so will they give us victory in the future". Thus Imperial Armed Forces attached more importance to improvement of tactical skill than conduct of war or strategic thinking, thus gradually the spiritual readiness was formed among the Imperial Armed Forces.
In late 1930s, “Kogun (Emperor's Armed Forces)"
concept governed the navy, so moral, spiritual factors were emphasized.
And for conduct of war, fair, square and with Makoto(Honesty and Sincerity)
were given importance as kogun military doctrines.(35) This tended
to diminsh logical thinking, and only loyality, spiritual strength and
devotion to the Emperor were stressed, and gradually Sun Tzu's reasonable
and rational thinking was ignored.
3 Sun Tzu and entering the Pacific War
The historical process that brought Japan into the Pacific
War includes many elements, such as the conclusion of the Tripartie Pact,
Japan's fascination with Germany's overwhelming victories at the western
front, and American pressure on Japan, particularly the reduction of oil
supplies. However, that was mainly based on two factors. One was the so-called
“gradual decline" argument, which held that if no positive action
was taken that the navy would run out of fuel bit by bit and the ratio
of its forces to those of America would worsen rapidly as time went on.
The other, more important, was Japan's fascination with Germany's overwhelming
victories and miscaluculation, overconfidence in the interception-attrition
operation.
At an Imperial Conference on 6th September 1941, Admiral
Nagno Osami(Chief of the Naval General Staff, expressed his confidence
in the interception-attrition operation by saying,“It is my conviction
that if we conduct this operation in the sea area we have designated for
battle, the operation of aircraft,etc. will give us victory.(36) At
a Liason Conference(Conference with General Staff and member of the Cabinet)
on 1st November, he insisted very strongly “now, we must declare war against
America. If hesitate we will lose chance",(37) and on 4th at the
Supreme War Council meeting he voiced his convictions more strongly, “I
have confidence that we have the best prospects for victory in the first
stage of operations and in interception operation." He also claimed,“If
America approaches on the offensive, there will be a battle for the Micronesia
islands. We will fight with the advantage of interior lines, inflict great
damage on the American fleet, and cause them to withdraw. If in this fashion
we repeatedly wage advantageous battle for the islands in all places, it
will be possible for us to maintain an invincible posture for a long period.(38)
It is widely belived among the naval officers that Japanese
navy can not conduct protracted war with America, but Japanese leaders
caluculated that a year or more would be needed for full American mobilization.
And that by the time that new ship reinforcements would be sent to the
U.S.Pacific Fleet, the Japanese defence perimeter in the western Pacific
would be strong enough to deter or repel American attack. And “we stand
a chance of victory in the initial operations, the interception operation,
and if the initial operations are executed properly, it will be possible
to fully prepare ourselves for a long drawn-out war.(39) The conviction
grew among the staff of the Naval General Headquarters that even though
Japan was materialy inferior, using interception operation it had a better
than 50 percent chance of victory.(40)
Japan entrusted her destiny to the leaders who did too
few caluculations before war and lost war, against Sun Tzu's maxim “With
many calculations, one can win;with few one cannot".(41) And also,
Japanese political and military leaders were to count on victory by Germany.
However, from one month before the Japanese declaration of war, the German
army was surfering in Moskva, and on 5th of December, Soviet army begin
offensive operation in the East front and German army were already defeated.
If Japanese politico-military leaders applied Sun tzu's maxim that “If
you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a
hundred battle",(42) knowing of Germany's defeat in Moskva, the
IJN should not have attacked Pearl Harbor. They knew neither their enemies
nor themselves.
Closing
Until the Second World War, Clausewitz's principles “War
is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of
that force." “A clash of forces freely operating and obedient to
no law but their own," eventually reachs destruction.(43) This
total destruction of one side by the other dominated the world, and created
great destruction to the world. But after the termination of cold war,
increse of low density conflicts, and a usage of the armed forces faced
many limitations. In such a environment, Sun Tzu's maxim “subdue the
enemy without fighting" increasing, and his concentrated essence of
wisdom on the conduct of war, more effective than western military theories
to accomplish national object, become all the more important as an “Art
of War(Peace)”for the Twenty-first Century".
Foot Note
1 Ref. my “Japanese Naval Preparation for World War U"(U.S.Naval
War College Review, vol.LIV, No.2, Spring 1991), pp.63-81.
2 Tosenkyo is the oldest Japanese “Art of War," which was writen
by Ooe no Makifusa(1041 -1111). For Tosenkyo refer: Nakashiba Suejun,
Tosenkyo no Kenkyu〔Study on Tosenkyo〕(Miyakoshi-Taiyodo, 1944).
3 Before the Second World War, Japanese Defence Plan was consist of “Teikoku- Kokubo-Hosin(Imperial Defence Policy)" which generally designated foundamental Defence Policy and potential enemy, and “Shoyo-heiryoku(Required Forces by Defence Policy)"and “Teikokugun no Yohei-koryo(Imperial Defence Guidline)". These were reviced in 1818, 1923 and 1936.
4 Boeikenkyusho(National Institute for Defence Studies:hereafter NIDS).
ed.,Senshi Sosho Series Hawai Sakusen〔The Hawaii Operation〕(Asagumo
Shinbunsha,1979), p.38.
5 NIDS.ed., Sensi Sosho Kaigun-Gunsenbi〔Naval Preparadness〕(Asagumo-Shinbunsha,1959),
Vol.U, p.163, p.191. 6 Fukui Shizuo,Nihon no Gunkan〔Japanese Naval Vessels〕(Kyodo-Shutupan-Sha,
1956),
pp.164-168.
7 NIDS.ed., Senshi Soshi Series Sensuikan Senshi〔History of the Japanese Submarines〕 (Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1979), p.36.
8 “Kokubo Shoyoheiryoku〔Required Forces by Defence Policy〕",Teikoku-Kokubo-Hoshin-Tsuzuri〔Imperial
Defence Policy File〕Febrary to May,1936, NIDS Archives.
9 Kaigun Gunsenbi, Ibid., vol.T, pp.511-543, 581-583, 542-543.
10 Kaigun Hensan Iinkai〔Navy editing Commitee〕,ed.,Kaigun〔Navy〕 Vol.13:Kaigun kokutai〔Naval
Air Corps〕(Seibunsha, 1981), p.60.
11 Reliable sources give differing estimates of the number of Japanese
aircraft on this occasion. According to Capt.Nakazawa of the Air Staff
of the Combined Fleet, whose numbers were 136 at Saipan, 35 at Truk, 109
at Biak area, 155 Palau, total 435 on 11 June;see NIDS. ed.,Senshi-Sosho
Mariana Oki Kaisen〔The naval battle off the Marianas〕(Asagumo Shinbunsha,
1968), pp.520-21. While Capt.Toshikazu Omae estimated a total of 540 planes
as follows:4 on Chichijima, 35 on Saipan, 67 on Tinian, 70 on Guam, 67
on Truk, 40 on Yap, 134 on Palaus, 25 on Davao, 40 on Cebu, 42 on Kaoe
and Wasile, Harumahera, and 16 at Sorong and Babo(Vogelkop);see Samuel
E.Morison, Unitet States Naval Operations in World War U, 15 vols.(Boston:
Little Brwon, 1947-1962), vol.8:219.
12 Minoru Genda, Kaigun Kokutai Shimatusi Sentohen〔A record of how
it was in the naval air corps:Section on Combat〕(Bungeishunju-Sha,1962),
p.224.
13 Mariana Oki Kaisen, Ibid., pp.566-637.
14 Alfred Thayer Mahan,Naval Strategy(Boston:Little Brown and Co,1911),
pp.139,435. 15 Philip A.Crowl,Alfred Thayer Mahan:The Naval Historian,Peter
Paret,ed.,Makers of Modern Strategy:From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age(Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University,1978),
p.455-456.
16 Number of planes and pilots, there are many sources and they give different
numbers, concerning to the Kamikaze refer to Warner Denis, Docment Kamikaze
(Sydeny, 1982) and Morimoto Tadao,Totuko〔Special Attack〕(Bungeishunju Sha 1992).
17 NIDS.,ed, Senshi Sosho Series Daihonei Kaigunbu・Rengokantai〔Naval Section of the
Imperial Staff・Combined Fleet(Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1971),vol.W, pp.327-347.
18 Refer to kouzu Naoji, Ningen Gyorai Kaiten〔Human Torpedo Kaiten〕(Toshoshuppan-
Kai, 1988) and Kaiten Editing Committee, eds., Kaiten(Editing Committee, 1982).
19 Kaigun Gunsenbi, Ibid., vol.U, pp.184-189.
20 Concerinig the Japanese habits of acting and thinking refer to Ruth
Venedict,Chrysanthemum and the Sword:Paterns of Japanese Culture(Tokyo:Charles
E. Tuttle Co.1974).
21 Samuel B.Griffith, Sun Tzu's the Art of War(Londn:Oxford University Press,1963), Chpter 3 Offensive Strategy, p.79.
22 Sato Tetutaro, Iyaku Sonshi〔Translation of Sun Tzu〕(Naval War College,1918),p.1.
23 Sato Tetutaro,Kaigun Senri-gaku〔Theory of Naval Operations〕(Naval
War College,1912), p.27.
24 Sato Tetutaro, Teikoku Kokuboron〔Imperial Defence〕(Suikosha, 1892), p.182.
25 Akiyama Saneyuki Kai Ed., Akiyama Saneyuki〔Akiyama Saneyuki-Kai,1933), p.329.
26 Ibid., pp.324-325.
27 Carl von Clausewitz, Trans. Hans W.Gatzke, Principles of War(Pennsylvania:The Stockpole
Company, 1960), p.45.
28 Tokunaga Sakae, Sonshi no Shinjitu〔Trueth of Sun Tzu〕(Self Defence Force
Maritime Staff College, 1962), p.439.
29 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Strategy ; Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of military operations on land(Boston:Little brown, 1911),p.189.
30 Toyosaburo Ochiai, Sonsi-Reikai〔Comprehensive Sun Tzu〕(Gunji Kyoiku
Sha,1919),p.2.
31 Sun Tzu's Art of War, Chapter 3 Offensive Strategy, p.77, Chapter Weakness
and Strengths, p.101.
32 Imperial Naval Education Bureau Ed.,List of Selected Book for Distribution
(Imperial Navy Education Bureau, 1931), p.11, p.20.
33 Emperor Meiji's Imperial Rescript as follows;
The soldier and the sailor should
1. Consider loyalty their essential duty.
2. Should be strict in observing propriety.
3. Should esteem valour.
4. Should highly value faithfulness and righteousness.
5. Should make simplicity their aim.
34 Sasamori Junzo,ed.,Nihon no Seiten〔Pure Japanese Sutra of Combat〕Tosenkyo (Nihon-Shutupan -Hosokikaku,1992),
pp.49,52,59,63,104-105,159-160.
35 For Kogun concept refer, Hillis Lory, Japan's Military Masters (Viking
Press, 1943. Reprinted, Greenwood Press, 1973).
36 Nihon Kokusai Seji Gakkai,ed., Taiheiyou Senso e no Michi, Bekkan,Shiryohen(The
road to the Pacific War, Appendix volume, Documents section)(Asashi Shimbunsha, 1988), p.512, p.545.
37 Ibid., p.550.
38 Ibid.,p.557.
39 Fukudome Shigeru, Shikan Shinjuwan kogeki(A private view of the Pearl
Pearl Harbor Attack)(JiyuAjia Sha,1955), p.135.
40 Fukudome Shigeru, Kaigun no Hansei〔Reflection on Pacific War〕(Nihon
Shuppan Kyodosha, 1951), pp.119-120.
41 Sun Tzu's Art of War, Chapter 1 Estimates.
42 Ibid., Sun Tzu the Art of War, chapter V, Offensive Strategy, p.77.
43 Peter Paret, “Clausewitz", Peter Paret ed. Makers of Modern Strategy
- From Machiavelli to the Nuclear War(Princeton:Princeton University Press,
1986),pp.179-180.