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THE PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE WAR (1896-98) AND JAPAN

The objective of this paper is to describe the Japanese assistance to the two Philippine independence uprisings. The first Philippine uprising was against Spain in 1896, and the second was against the United States following American annexation of the Islands in 1898. The Japanese involvement in the 1898 revolution was two-sided in that the Japanese government and navy officials supported the American annexation of the Philippines, while the Japanese army officials and a group of Pan-Asiaticists, known as the "shishi" supported the revolution despite its feeble strength. This paper discusses Japanese involvement in the Philippine uprisings and the influence of Japanese assistance on Japan's relationships with both the Philippines and United States thereafter.

I will present two conclusions: firstly, that direct Japanese assistance to Emilio Aguinaldo's insurrectionists, by way of the delivery of weapons and soldiers, was much less important or sinister than some historians have claimed; and secondly, that Japan did render indirect psychological assistance that was very important to the revolutionaries. Japan served as an example, being the first Asian society to become strong enough country which stand up against western imperialism.

I. Filipino's Admiration of Japan

Japan remained close to the outside world until the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century. When Japan opened her door to the world, almost all Asian countries were colonized by European powers. Upon abandoning her policy of isolation, newly emerged Japan tried to build a modern industrial country and strong armed forces to prevent European colonization. Japan accomplished this goal in a very short time. To the Filipinos, Japanese modernization and development gave them hope that fellow Asians could modernize and, above all, assert their national independence. Thus the Filipinos counted on Japan and held the hope that a rising Japan would help them expel Spain, and later, the United States. These feelings rose significantly after the Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). Many Filipinos had frequent contacts with the Japanese. A number of Filipinos had come to Japan to live, to study, and most importantly, to seek political support for Philippine independence. Many Filipino exiles were expelled from Europe to Japan. Even Jose Rizal, the Philippines's foremost national hero, sought asylum in 1888. In Japan, colonies for Filipino exiles were established in Yokohama, Tokyo, and other cities. With the influx of Asian exiles, many Japanese, especially members of the "shishi", opened their eyes and claimed independence of Asia against European imperialism, encouraging and cooperating with Asian peoples.

II. Visit of Cruiser Kongo and the First Uprising

The Philippine secret organization of the revolution was the Katipunan (Patriots League). It was founded on July 7, 1892 in the district of Tondo, an economically depressed community in Manila. This organization and the first Philippine
Revolution were both led by Andres Bonifacio. The "La Solidaridad," the official news paper of Filipino reformist printed articles on Japanese help for propaganda. In 1895, Jose Ramos, a son of a well-to-do family in Manila fled to Yokohama to seek aid from Japan.5

The first revolutionary actions took place on August 23, 1896. The timing of the outbreak of the Philippine uprising against Spain was purely coincidental with the visit of Japanese training cruiser Kongo. She entered Manila Bay, one year after the Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese War, and three months before the first uprising, in May 1896. The Philippine independence organization, Katipunan had been planning to send a delegation to Japan to ask for assistance from the Japanese Empire. Instead, its members approached the captain of the Kongo, Captain Sera Tasaku. He was invited to a welcome ceremony by the Filipinos, but he refused this proposal cordially, fearing the Spanish reaction. He did agree to meet with the Katipunan leaders. There are no reports or documents in Japan concerning this meeting, but from Filipino sources show that the meeting was arranged and interpreted by prominent Japanese merchant, Tagawa Moritaro, who was married to a Filipino, and knew Bonifacio very well. The meeting took place in a Japanese Bazaar, with three Japanese officials using assumed names. These persons included "Consul Goonorita" (at that time the consul was Shimizu), "Admiral Himara" (there was no admiral on board the Kongo at that time, but this name has same sound as the 'shishi' member Hirayama Shu who participated in the Philippine revolutionary army). A written agreement was produced by the two parties, wherein the Filipinos agreed to pay one and a half million pesos for the purchase of 100,000 rifles and 150 cannons of various caliber, along with ammunition.

A letter signed on 22 July by Tindalo, which was the pen name of a Filipino in Japan, and addressed to certain M.A.Ypip, Esq. (Jose Ramos, an active revolutionary leader) argued for the formation of a Filipino-Japanese association to overthrow the Spanish rule in the Islands. According to the plan, the Japanese government would send ships, money, men, and ammunition to the Philippines. Another record of interview, from the introduction of "The Katipunan" occurred as follows:

"When the Japanese cruiser Kongo visited the port of Manila in May 1896, the Supreme council of the Katipunan went to salute its commander in the upstairs of the Bazar Japanese situated in the Plaza de Paradero Moraga, and handed him a manuscript setting forth their desire for the aid and assistance of Japan towards the gaining of independence for the Filipinos. The commander received them well and even regaled them with iced drinks and coffee, but did not dare to accept the document, limiting himself to the taking of a copy of it and promising to transmit their desires to the Emperor. He also invited them to make a voyage to his country. But nothing has since been heard of the commander."6

The scholar, Francis St. Clair, wrote that this description of events is probably accurate, but "to be received in interview" and "to be heard with attention" are very different things.7 Three months after the Kongo's visit, the first uprising began, but no assistance was rendered from Japan. Still, the Kongo encountered the moral of the Filipinos' revolutionary forces. On the 11th of September, 1896, Katipunan Headquarters transmitted the following message to its branch chiefs:

"In the urgent letter received today from the General [Aguinaldo] concrete notice is given that today there have anchored the warships proceeding from Japan to our assistance, and it is said that they are now just on the other side of the Corregidor.87"

According to a Philippine source, Fio Valenzuela went as a representative of the Filipino revolutionary organization, in June of 1896, to consult with the martyred Jose Rizal, about the possibility of obtaining the weapons in Japan. Rizal is quoted as having said:

"When I was in Japan, a Japanese minister put at my disposal three merchant ships with which to transport arms to the Philippines. I wrote a rich Filipino in Manila, asking him to lend me 200,000 pesos for the purpose of purchasing firearms and ammunitions, but he refused to give me the loan, and so I returned here so that I could manage to procure all that is necessary for our emancipation.88"

Within a month, the rebellion spread to eight nearby provinces in Manila. But after the initial successes in battle against the Spaniards, poorly trained and poorly equipped Revolutionary army was defeated. Bonifacio, the founder of the stipunam, was deposed and executed, and leadership passed to Emilio Aguinaldo. Then, on 14 December 1897, Katipunan accepted the "Pact of Biac na Batol" agreement and Aguinaldo and thirteen leaders of the revolution were exiled to Hongkong on December of 30 that year.

III. Second Uprising and Japan

A. Attitude of the Japanese Government

The Spanish-American War broke out on 24 April 1898. On May 9, the revolutionary committee of Hongkong met and decided to ask for assistance from Japan. But this decision was overruled, at the May 13th meeting, by Aguinaldo's group, which believed that the United States had no intentions of annexing the Philippines. They then decided to collaborate with the Americans. Aguinaldo returned to Manila on May 17 on an American warship, established a Revolutionary government and formally proclaiming Philippine independence on June 12. Then newly established government sent Malino Ponce, Jose Aquijudrino, and Faustino Lichauco to Japan to secure the recognition of Philippine revolution and independence.2 However, the attitudes of Japanese government and officials was cool. Japan refused not only military assistance, but also diplomatic recognition. Aguinaldo also miscalculated American intentions, and was betrayed. When Manila was captured by American troops on August 14, the Filipino Revolutionary army was not allowed to enter Manila city. The surrender document was signed by U.S. Major-General Wesley Merritt and his Excellency Don Ferrin Jaundales, acting General-Chief of the Spanish army. Furthermore, by the Spain, was ceded to the United States for a payment of twenty million U.S. dollars.

Feeling betrayed, Aguinaldo took up arms against the United States. Within a month, armed struggle took place between the Filipinos and American troops. At that time, the revolutionary Philippine government solicited military aid from Japan. But during that era, Germany, France, and Russia were advancing to the Far East and preparing to take advantage of the weakness of China. In 1895, one year before the first uprising, Japan had been forced to return the Liaotung Peninsula to China as a result of joint pressure of these European countries after Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War.

Japan, because of her weakness, needed American support to protect her interests from these European powers, especially as she was facing immediate
threat from Russian southward advance and German eastward advance in the
Far east. The Japanese government did not wish to see a strong European power
fill the Spanish vacancy in the Philippines. The introduction of a friendly
American power into Asia was viewed favorably. It was United States which had
opened Japan to the modern world, and at that time, the United States and
Great Britain were the only powers that had shown friendly attitude by
supporting the Japanese desire to revise her unequal treaties. In such
considerations caused the Japanese government to immediately deny any official
sympathy for or involvement with the Philippine revolution. Japan declared
strict neutrality on the 2nd of May 1898, and maintained a friendly attitude
in towards the United States. The attitude of Japan can be summarized by the
following telegram which was transmitted on the 18th of July to T.J. Nakagawa,
first secretary of the Japanese legation at Washington, who was serving acting
minister during the absence of minister Hoshi Toru;
"Owing to considerations arising from proinquity Japanese Govt. are naturally
anxious and from the important commercial interests of Japan in the Islands
that good government should be maintained in those possessions.
Japanese Govt. well know that permanent occupation by the United States
would mean nothing less than such government but it is generally believed that
the native populations of those possessions are incapable of orderly self
government. Under these circumstances the Japanese Government are naturally
anxious and would be gratified to learn of the intention of the United States
regarding the final disposition of those possessions. Hostilities between Spain and the United States ceased on August 12, then, 1st and 8th of September. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aoki Shuzō transmitted
following telegram to the Minister of Japan in Washington;
"The Imperial Govt. are without territorial ambition in the direction of the
Philippine Islands. But they are anxious for the preservation of the peace of the
Orient and the maintenance of a just balance of power in the Far East. The
extension of the sovereignty of the United States over those possessions would
furnish a complete solution of the question which would be entirely acceptable
to Japan."
"If the United States did not expect to annex the Philippine, Japan should have
a voice in determining the Status of the Islands. Japan would be quite willing
to share the responsibility of governing the Philippines, if the American
government so desired." The American Secretary of State, was informed of above intentions on September 8. While, in order to protect Japanese subjects and to observe the
Spanish-American War, the Japanese government dispatched to Manila Bay the
cruisers Matsushima, Nanwa, and Akitsuima alternately. On the 10th of May,
Akitsuima arrived Manila with Consular Misu kumekichi (on that time consul
was not assigned regularly), Lieutenant Colonel Akashi Motojirō, Captain Yosida
Masujirō and several newspaper men on board. At that time, many newspapers
asserted that England and Japan must support the United States, for fear that
Germany might obtain the Philippines. The acquisition of the Philippines by
European power was considered a menace to peace in the Orient. Also, the
commanding officer of the Akitsuima, Saito Minoru (later and Prime Minister), reported that German and France showed sympathy to Spain.
Germany, in particular, had an interest in the Spanish cause because it was
attempting to gain control of the Philippines through a secret agreement
between Germany and Spain concerning the disposition of the Islands.

In such a international situation, the Japanese navy showed cooperative and
sympathetic attitude toward the United States Navy. For example, when the
German naval commander, Admiral von Diederichsen, suggested joint protection
of the Commodore George Dewey's tight blockade of Manila Bay, the
commanding officer Saitō refused. Concerning the Japanese attitude, Commodore
Dewey wrote, "The good-will of the Japanese government was shown by the
discretion and courtesy of the Japanese Navy, which was always represented by
one or more vessels in Manila Bay during the tedious and trying days of the
blockade." The Japanese government not only provided fuel, but also accepted
the unloading of American army horses and mules at Kobe and Nagasaki for
rest in transit to the Philippines. Furthermore, when one of these ships, the
Morgan City, struck a rock in the Japan Inland Sea, the Japanese navy sent the
fastest cruiser Yoshino to render possible assistance. The Navy department also
expressed their anxiousness and willingness to do any further assistance in
anyway possible. (14) The Japanese attitude toward America is symbolized in the
telegram from the Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long, to Commodore Dewey on April 2; "Only the Japanese ports are available as storehouse should
advise storehouse at Nagasaki, Japan for the base of supports or supply steamer
to accompany the squadron." (15)
Throughout the Philippines Independence War of 1898, the Japanese government
continued to support American policy, in the hopes that an hostile power would
not occupy the Philippines. Yet, when the United States was wondering whether
or not to stay in the Philippines, the Japanese government expressed readiness
to take over the islands either singlehandedly, or in conjunction with either Great
Britain or the United States.

B. Japanese Non Military Assistance

While the official Japanese attitude favored the United States, there were many
in Japan who supported the Philippine independence movements. It was the
Japanese army and the newly activated Japanese Taiwan army that was most
concerned, and felt itself to be most directly interested, in Philippine affairs.
Immediately after the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, Army General
Head quarters sent Captain Tetsuawa Uchi as a military observer. He landed in
Philippines as an American troops. In addition, the Taiwan army dispatched
Lieutenant Colonel Kusuo Yoshihiko. Following Colonel Kusuo, Captain
Sakamoto Hirō (who later became a Diet member) was selected and be sent to
Manila. He left Taiwan in March of 1897 to live in Manila, posing as the
manager of a trading company and as correspondent for Japanese newspapers.
Sakamoto attended the Kaptain's staff meeting and become deeply involved
with Filipino concerns.

As a result of the American betrayal of Philippine independence, American-Philippine relations became cool. The Filipino revolutionaries counted on Japan
more and more as they maintained a lingering hope that Japan would help them
get rid of the Africans. With the change of situation, all reports from Manila
were increasingly sympathetic to the Philippine independence. On 15 August
1898, immediately after the end of the Spanish-American War, Sakamoto
transmitted a most urgent telegram to the Taiwan Army Headquarters that the
Philippine Revolutionary army was in danger of being overthrown by the United
States army and that Japan should not stand idly by. If one battalion of the
Japanese army could be deploy to assist, Aguinaldo's forces could hold Manila
and Philippine freedom would be assured. Lieutenant Colonel Akashi also reported
to the Army General Headquarters that Japan must help the Filipinos in some way.  

Captain Teikizawa reported that it would be difficult to recover from the discouraging situation, but it was not late to provide assistance to the Revolutionary army.  

Even a diplomat, Japanese Consul Misu at Manila, reported his sympathy for the Filipinos, citing the content of a conversation with representatives of the revolutionary government on the 1st of September, consul Misu reported his opinion using Sandiego's word that:  

"We wish for independence under Japanese protection. But it was very regrettable that and a pity that Japan, being such a great country in Asia, did not assist our independence war. We understood that Japan faced a very difficult situation, but as a powerful Asian country, Japan had power and we expected Japanese assist."  

Furthermore, Consul Misu added to his comment that Japan's failure to respond to the request for assistance would diminish Filipinos' admiration for Japan. He also requested that the Japanese government extend courtesy and warm consideration to the visiting delegation of the Philippine revolutionary committee to Japan.  

Because many Japanese were fundamentally sympathetic to the Filipinos, articles by Mariano Ponce, a representative of the revolutionary government, were reported by some Japanese newspapers and the magazines. These articles reported incidents of American barbarism such as their looting of houses, raping of women, and villages set afire. One of the popular newspaper Yorozu Chubou, also reported the following on 15 December:  

"If it was divine Providence, as Admiral Dewey believes and also every God-fearing people does, that he and his men escaped unhurt, while the loss on the side of the Spaniards was so heavy, will not the same Providence deal in a similar way with the Americans? Forgetting the immortal declaration of their forefathers, that all men are created equal, and contrary to their promise that they do not fight for territorial aggrandizement, they wish to annex the Philippine Islands and make slaves of their inhabitants. As Filipinos are in every way fitted to govern themselves and they crave for independence at the risk of their lives. Whereas the Americans, turning a deaf ear to all their protests and they refuse to obey, they slaughter them by the thousands. In fact the Americans are repeating what the Spaniards did towards the poor Filipinos."

C. Japanese Military Assistance

Mariano Ponce was introduced to several members of the "Shishi," Japanese Pan Asianist Miyazaki Terazō and Hirayama Shu, by the Chinese reformer Sun Yat Sen, who later become the first President of the Republic of China. These "shishi" members introduced Ponce to a Daiset member, Inukai Tuyoshi, who later became Prime Minister. Inukai deeply sympathized with the Philippine cause and introduced Ponce to Nakamura Yaroku, a Daiset member belonging to the antigovernment party. Nakamura approached members of the top level of the Japanese army, who were more enterprising and concerned about the Philippines than politicians were. General Katsu Taro, the Minister of the Army, General Kawakami Soreko, Chief of the General Staff, were at first opposed to assisting the Filipino revolutionaries, believing that the possible American perception of Japan as a threat would produce serious negative consequences for Japanese American relations. Japan was very weak in its international relations with Russia, Germany, and France. In such a situation, intimate Japanese-American relations were essential for Japan. However, Kawakami finally permitted the release of weapons for the Filipino revolutionary government, commenting that "the Philippines independence will not be realized by this uprising, but the life of a nation is eternal. We must not lose Filipinos' admiration of Japan" this matter in terms of fifty or one-hundred years' span. We must not lose Filipinos' admiration of Japan.

Eventually, Ponce's request was answered, but there were great difference in the quantity of arms on load for ship from 6,000,000 rounds of ammunition, 10,000 Murata rifles (Japanese army's standard rifle), 1 fixed canon, 10 field guns, 7 field glasses, 1 pressering machine for gunpowder, 1 machine and materials for the manufacture of ammunition, to only 5,000,000 rounds of ammunition. At first, these weapons were dispersed to the Okura-Gumi company, then sold to the German Trading Company Wiesenburg, who were paid 500,000 yen to deceive America. Nakamura also bought an old 2,000 tons ship, the Nunobiki-Maru, from the Mitai-Bussan Trading Company for 38,000 yen. On the 19 July, 1899, she sailed out of Nagasaki harbor bound for Casiguran Sound on the northeast coast of Luzon having cleared customs with a crew of thirty-four men and Second Lieutenant Nagano Yoshitsura, Misumachi Kessakki, petty officer Nakamori Saburo, and one Filipino pilot Manuel Paroging, and a large amount of weapons. However, on July 21, near Saddle Island, off Shanghai, heavy weather caused the Nunobiki-Maru to sink. While all passengers escaped in three boats, only six of the lower class crews were picked up by the steamer Kukiou and Menelaus. All the military volunteers died, along with the very important military supplies. It is said that a second weapons assistance program was prepared and an attempted was made to send them to the Philippines, but, because of the American exclusionary blockade, the prepared weapons were unloaded in Taiwan, then transferred to the Chinese reformer Sun Yat-Sen groups.

Meanwhile, on May 20, American Minister to Japan, A.E. Buck, visited the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Viscount Aoki Sui, with a telegram from the United States Consul General at Hong Kong saying that a supply of arms, 80,000 dollar for Philippines insurgents had left Tokyo last week for Luzon via Formosa. On November 15, again Minister Buck protested that: "Japanese steamer Nunobiki maru which was reported lost near Saddle Island in July last, ... It was rumored, had on board ammunitions of war for the Insurgents of the Philippine Islands." Japanese government should be thoroughly investigated that Japan's unalterable friendship to the United States and the strict enforcement of her laws may be demonstrated beyond question. Beside Nunobiki-Maru, some Japanese army officers and men attempted to join with Filipino revolutionary forces. On June 14, 1899, Captain Hara Tori, an active army, officer and a former staff member of the Army Headquarters in Taiwan, reserve Sub-Lieutenant Isatomi Asaïro, petty officers Nakamori Saburo, Nishiuchi Shinteto, Miyai Keizo, and "Shihi" Hirayama, who represented political matters left Japan for Manila via Hongkong, arriving in Manila in late June by another steamer to participate in the Revolutionary army. They were resigned from the Japanese army so they could help in a private capacity to avoid American protest. Though they encountered many difficulties, they finally arrived at the headquarters of the Filipino Revolutionary army and met General Aginaldo in Batasan. However, the three petty officers were not allowed to participate in real combat operations because they could not speak Tagalog (the native language). Therefore, they were ordered to return. However, because of the incident of the Nunobiki-Maru and the Captain Hara's possessions, which included a gift from Inukai Tuyoshi for Aginaldo and a letter, and which were
found and confiscated by the American army, Consul Misu was claimed by General Elwell S. Otis, Commander of the American forces in the Philippines. The latter read that Inukai 'Wishes to express his sympathy and admiration to President Aguinaldo, and as a token of his honour to present him with a Japanese sword, which he hopes the President will be good enough to accept. The cause which the President so nobly supports, and the policy which he so courageously pursues, can not fail be appreciated by any one who has the welfare of the Orientals as his heart, from this reason M. Ki Inukai sincerely wishes the President's success'. Because of these incidents, the American kept strict surveillance on the Japanese. Two Japanese petty officer were lost, and only Sergeant Nishiiichi managed to escape to Hongkong on August 19. But, Captain Hara and the remaining men continued to fight, cooperating with General Artemio Mascado, one of the field commander of the Revolutionary army up to the time of the Revolutionary army's surrender. At the end, Captain Hara and others escaped to Japan with extreme difficulty. However, it is said that their assistance had little effect on war.

IV. The problem that arose after the Uprising

In regards to Japanese assistance to Filipino revolutionaries, Professor Enrique J. Corpus, concluded in his analysis of the Japanese and Philippine Revolution that "The Filipino agents failed to secure the recognition of Philippine belligerency, much less of Independence by the Japanese government Mariano Ponce was not even received publicly nor given an audience by the Japanese Foreign Office. The protest of Aguinaldo of January 5, 1889 against the Treaty of Paris seemed to have been given to the press only and not to official Tokyo. Also Francis St. Clair, author of The Katima, criticized lack of Japanese assistance to the revolutionaries. He wrote that, from beginning end: "I am strongly of the opinion that the supposed assistance, whether in the form of arms and ammunition, or in that of financial or moral support, was a deliberate imposture, and that those credulous person who contributed with their hard earned money towards the sums said to have been utilized for propaganda in Japan were defrauded, not only out of the money they gave to the funds, but also of what they might legitimately hope for as a result of the expediencies of the said funds. It is a well known fact that the hopes of the people were kept up by many statements which were absolutely unfounded; the assertions of Cortes Ramos and others who reformed the duties of the embassy to Japan were most probably of this nature." This was probably what occurred or resulted from the Japanese attitudes and assistance towards the Philippines uprisings. Indeed, weapons and ammunitions were sunk, only six volunteers from the Japanese army joined the Revolutionary army, and some sympathetic news was reported in Japanese newspapers, which had no influence on world wide sympathy. Ponce's writing or speeches did not receive publicity in leading newspapers, nor was he recognized as a diplomatic representative of the revolutionary government by the Japanese Foreign Office. Japan played an extremely minor role. But, Filipinos sources agree that the participation of six Japanese was a stimulus to rebel morale, and it was reported widely in Spanish newspapers that Japanese war veterans were assisting the Revolutionary army. Also, the Japanese government gave Filipino agents in Japan full protection despite Spanish and American pressure. Furthermore, throughout the colonial era the Filipino people viewed the Japanese as possible saviours. They saw the Japanese as liberators from western colonialism. The first really meaningful reaction to Japan came during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 following the destruction of the Russian fleet by Admiral Togo in the Battle of Tsushima. This remarkable Japanese triumph sent a wave of nationalism feeling and Asian pride surging on a number of young Filipinos. The eight-eight class of law in the Escuela de Derecho, led by future Justice Antonio Horilleno, future Assemblyman Isidro Vamenta, and future Commissioner of Non-Christian Tribes Teopietro Guingona sent a telegram to the Japanese Consul Narita Coró in Manila. Enrique Corpus a student of Philippine political History and later a member of Philippine congress expressed his feeling that "They thought that the time had come when Orientals could hold their own against the Europeans." The American annexation of the Philippines caused hot disputes in the United States and within the American Navy. Naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan claimed that American surplus production had to seek new external markets and that the most promising was to be found in China. To exploit these possibilities, Mahan advocated American control of the Panama Canal, Hawaii, and the Philippines as stepping stones to the "great prize: the Asian markets." The arguments in favor of imperialism in the United States Navy centered on the important role envisioned for the Philippines in the future expansion of American commerce in the Far East, and in the moral obligation of the United States to uplift and civilize barbarous peoples. The acquisition of the Philippines added another reason for annexing Hawaii and Samoa as coaling stations for the approach to the Philippines for America. These new outposts, especially the Philippines sustained the naval power projection which was essential to the support of American commerce in the Far East, but in turn the outposts had to be defended. The American authorities, especially the army in the islands, displayed a growing concern about Filipino-Japanese contacts and ordered increased surveillance. On December 28, 1900, General Arthur MacArthur reported to Washington concerning some insurgent papers captured in Cavite Province. According to General MacArthur's dispatch, a meeting was held on the 11th of October, between General Mariano Trias, Secretary of the Treasury, and the Japanese Consul. MacArthur reported that; 'Consul advised that Trias visit Japan. Filipino representatives which they might be forced to make to end of Formosa, some 60 or 70 miles away. Washington would be more agreeable if made to Japan, which as a nation of kindred blood would not be likely to assert superiority. Consul said Japan desired coaling station, freedom to trade and building railways." He also wrote that the incident was not "an ancient history", but relatively to present day problems for the following reason. A pleasant morning's journey in a launch due north Appari, the northermost town of Luzon, you can, on a clear day, with a good field glass, the southern end of Formosa, some 60 or 70 miles away. Japan can land an army on American soil at Appari any time she wants to, overnight - an army several times that of the Total American force now in the Philippines, or likely ever to be there. From Appari it is 70 miles up the river to Tuguegarao, 40 more to Iligan, and 90 more, all fairly good marching, to Bayombong, in Neua Viscaya's province which lies in the heart of the
watershed of Central Luzon Aparri is an absolutely unfortified sea port, at which Japanese could land an army overnight from the southern end of Formosa so that today Japan can take Manila inside of two weeks any time she wants to. However, before the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), due to the rivalry between Russia in Manchuria over the Open Door Policy, Rear Admiral George C. Remey, Commander of U.S. Naval forces in Asia, reported to the General Board on 29 May 1902 that "In regard to a possible coalition in the East, one side might be arrayed England, Japan, and the United States, and on the other Russia and France." Also, in the War Plan Orange (The American war plan against Japan) of 1902, it was written that "Japan was very much the senior alliance partner." The Japanese victory over Russia changed American-Japanese relations greatly. The victory was interpreted as a defeat of the white man by a colored race, a defeat of Christians by non-Christians. For Asian peoples, the victory showed that the people of the yellow race could win independence from Europeans. Thus victory over Russia created both the image and the legend of a powerful Japan that could liberate the Philippines. Since this image and legend coincided with a change for the worse in relations between the United States and Japan, the American authorities belied that Japan could attack the Philippines became more intense. Especially in 1907, when the San Francisco School Board decided to segregate Japanese school boys from Public Schools, the U.S. Marines Corps prepared twenty 6-inch, four 4.7-inch, four 4-inch, and sixteen 6-pounder guns mounts at the Olongapo base in 10 weeks.

On February 10, 1908, also, Governor-General James F. Smith sent a confidential cable to Washington asking: "Is there any change in Japanese situations? If any change has large deposits with three banking institutions trust funds and general funds; would like to deposit all gold coin with Hongkong Bank in case of danger taking draft of telegraph transfer on London for all funds deposited. Have not spoken to Hongkong Bank about this. Do you approve my taking it up tentatively?"

American suspicion of Japanese invasion to the Philippines were enfamed by Japan's assistance and activities, however misrepresented, during the independence war. The actual extent of Japanese participation was far less than the legend, but by the kongo incident and the free-booking some sympathizers for the Filipinos give rise such a legend. To address American suspicions of Japanese aggression towards the Philippines, Prime Minister Katsura Tarō and the United States Secretary of War, William H. Taft, former Governor General for Philippine exchanged confidential notes regarding the Philippines on 27 July 1905. The notes gave mutual assurance to maintain the status quo in the Philippines, while in return the United States recognized Japanese control in Korea. In 1908, an open agreement regarding the situation in the Far East was established by way of notes exchanged between Secretary of State Elihu Root and the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Takahira Kogorō. In this exchange, Japan disclaimed territorial ambitions toward Hawaii and the Philippines. Yet, after the American occupation of the Philippines, influenced by these legends, American officials felt increasingly uneasy about Japanese intentions, and began encouraging the press, who deliberately inspired the view that Japan was a menace to the Philippines.

In 1911, there was an incident in the Philippines in which a Japanese doctor accused being a spy. It was reported by the press that he was actually a civil engineer who was making maps and plans of fortifications, and that such plans had been found in his possession. Although, mainly hereyey, much of the information was passed on the public. Many tales of espionage and conspiracy arose in the Philippines. In such an atmosphere, American officials grew increasingly uneasy about Japan's intentions. Filipinos school teachers were organized to teach their students to distrust Japan. The government occasionally supported articles containing anti-Japanese rhetoric and the direful effects of Japanese colonialism in Korea and Formosa were reported over and over. However, there also people in the Philippines such as Curtis P. Romulo, who became president under Japanese occupation, wrote that "I admire the Japanese people, I admire their patriotism, the fountain head from which springs their industry, their great respect for Japanese traditions, their skill and their love for work." For the Filipinos whose aspirations for independence, the national unity and the patriotism of the Japanese were most impressive. Again and again the nobility and grandeur of Japanese patriotism and the need for Filipino to follow Japan's example.

The Japanese government had never accepted Philippine requests during the independence war. Japan had no idea to extend Japanese hegemony over the Philippines before the Pacific War. Also, American war planner never seriously believed that Japan foment a war to get such resource-poor archipelagos. The so-called Japanese menace was said to be "the product of mere fantasies", that resulted from Japanese-American naval rivalry in the Pacific. Nonetheless, the Japanese minor and negligible military assistance and sympathies to the Philippine Independence War, especially the Spanish-American War, caused many tensions in American-Japanese relations and contributed to the escalation of naval tensions in the West Pacific thereafter.

1 KImura Takeshi, Hose Ritsuru to Nihon (Jose Rizal and Japan) (Tokyo: Aporonsha, 1971), pp. 1-16.
3 "Renehukan Kaikō no ken" (Subject: Taining Cruise of Kongō), Kōhun-Bikō Meiji 29 Nen (Official Naval Document 1896), Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies (Hereafter cited JNIDS) Archive.
6 Ibid., p. 128.
7 Ibid., p. 126.
9 Alip, op.cit., p. 45.
11 Doc. No.805 (1 September 1898), Ibid., pp. 344-346.
12 Doc. No.810 (8 September 1898), Ibid., pp. 357-358.
15 Eyre, Jr., op.cit., p. 58.
17 Report No.27 (22 June 1899), Okuma Bunsho (Documents of Prime Minister Okuma) A-800-1, National Archive.
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